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ABSTRACT 
It is hoped that this thesis will achieve two objectives. 
The first and more important one is to make a contribution to 
the study of legal development in the sphere of criminal 
procedural law and practice in Saudi Arabia, which is at the 
present time going through a process of evolution. As far as the 
author has been able to ascertain, no full study has been made in 
this field. The fact that the author was given access to 
important material pertaining to judicial proceedings, and that 
he had the opportunity to make valuable personal contacts with 
officials, has been a great help in trying to obtain a compre- 
hensive and constructive picture of the subject-matter. 
The second objective is the hope that this thesis may also 
contribute to a wider comparative study of the legal systems of 
other Arab and Islamic countries. There has been a conscious 
effort in recent years towards a greater degree of harmony in 
legislation, and it is felt that a research in this field may 
facilitate this process. 
Chapter One deals with the Saudi Arabian Constitution. Why 
and how did King `Abdul `Aziz choose this constitution? What are 
the constitutional institutions? What is the relation between the 
different powers of the state? Is the judiciary independent?. 
Chapter Two is dedicated to the study of the institutions 
which run the machinery of justice. 
Chapter Three deals with the proceedings which take place 
after the preliminary investigation by the police has been 
completed and before the hearing begins; in other words it deals 
r i± 
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with the way in which a case is brought to court and the 
receivability, or the non-receivability, of such a case. 
Chapter Four examines the conduct of the trial and the 
general principles according to which it is conducted. 
Chapter Five deals with evidence: standard of proof, the 
categories of evidence, the admissibility and non-admissibility 
of evidence, and examination of witnesses. 
Chapter Six is devoted to the judicial proceedings arising 
after the trial has closed; that is to say appeal. 
The study is concluded in Chapter Seven, which gives an 
appreciation of the system of judicial proceedings, with some 
suggestions regarding the solution of procedural matters, and an 
assessment of possible future developments. 
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Acknowledgement 
I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Mr. A. M. T. Farouki, 
for his guidance and invaluable assistance. I wish to thank 
Professor T. W. Thacker, the Director of the School of Oriental 
Studies, University of Durham, and Mr. J. A. Haywood, reader in 
Arabic, for their encouragement. My thanks are also due to 
Mr. H. Teff, lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Durham, 
for reading parts of my thesis. 
I wish to thank: Professor J. N. D. Anderson, Professor 
N. J. *Coulson, and Dr. Doreen Hinchcliff of the University of 
London; and Dr. David Pearl of Cambridge University for their 
kind advice. 
I am indebted to the advice and invaluable help of many 
personalities in Saudi Arabia without whose generous cooperation 
this study would not have been possible. I am particularly 
indebted to H. E. Shaykh Hasan Al-al-Shaykh - Minister of 
Education - for his genuine support, and Shaykh Muhammad b. 
Jubayr - Chief Judge of the High Judicial Authority - for his 
generous help. I am also grateful to the officials of the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, the Grievances 
Board, and the Governerate of Riyadh for their help. 
Finally, I am indebted to the Ministry of Education of 
Saudi Arabia and King Abdul Aziz University for financial 
support. 
j 
-; iv ,- 
TRANSLITERATION 
Artters Transliteration LArabic etters 
Transliteration 
I a ý+ d 
b t 
t z 
. 
th 
Z h t"9 i 
kh u q 
d =j k 
dh 1 
 r m 
z n 
U" h 
-Pa 
sh .3 w 
s 
s y 
(hamza). R= 
3= prolonged i (yä' mamdüda). 
prolonged a (alif mamdüda )y. 
U= prolonged u (wäw mamdüda). 
a= (tä' marbUta). 
"V- 
ABBREVIATIONS 
A. C. C. = Appellate Customs. Committee. 
A. G. = administrative governor. 
b. = ibn. 
B. C. = Bribery Committee. 
C. = circular. 
C. C. = Consultative Council. 
C. C. (J). = Commercial Council of Jeddah. 
C. C. (M). = Court of Cassation in Mecca. 
C. C. (R). = Court of Cassation in Riyadh. 
C. D. = Council of Deputies. 
C '. E. C. D. = Committee for Ending Commercial Disputes. 
C. L. Commercial Law. 
C. M. = Council of Ministers. 
C. R. = Customs Regulations. 
C. S. = Committee for Securities. 
C. S. C. D. = Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes. 
Cust. C. = Customs Committee. 
Cust. L. = Customs Law. 
D. _ decision. 
(D) = Dammäm. 
D. M. C. I. = Deputy Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
D. M. I. = Deputy Minister of the Interior. 
D. M. J. = Deputy Minister of Justice. 
D. P. C. M. = Deputy President of Council of Ministers. 
D. P. J. = Deputy President of the Judiciary. 
F. C. = Forgery Committee. 
F. M. = Foreign Ministry. 
F. M. C. = First Magistrate's Court. 
G. B. _ Grievances Board. 
- vi - 
G. C. D. = General Customs Directorate. 
G. S. C. = Grand Shari`a Court. 
H. J. C. = High Judicial Committee. 
H. O. = high order. 
H. W. = high will. 
(J) = Jeddah. 
K. O. = King's Office (al-Diwan al-Malaki). 
L. = letter. 
M. = Memorandum. 
(M) = Mecca. 
Ma j. = MajmU'a al-Nuzum. 
M. C. _ Magistrate's Court. 
M. C. I. = Minister (or Ministry) of Commerce and Industry. 
M. F. = Minister (or Ministry) of Finance. 
M. I. = Minister (or Ministry) of the Interior. 
M. J. = Minister (or Ministry) of Justice. 
0. = Order. 
P. C. D. = President of Council of Deputies. 
P. C. M. = President of Council of Ministers. 
P. J. = President (or Presidency) of the Judiciary. 
P. K. O. = President of the King's Office (Diwan). 
P. O. P. C. M. = President-of the Office (Diwan) of the President 
P. P. Public_Prosecutor___ 
of Council of Ministers. 
R. = record. 
(R) = Riyadh. 
R. C. C. = Reviewing Commercial Committee. 
R. D. = royal decree. 
R. O. = royal order. 
R. W. = royal will. 
-m vii~ 
S. = sakk. 
S. C. = Shari`a Court. 
S. M. C. = Second Magistrate's Court. 
(T) = Täiyf . 
Vic. = the Viceroy. 
- viii - 
Preface 
The general purpose of this work is to deal chiefly with 
the practice of judicial institutions in Saudi Arabia in the 
field of criminal procedure. It concentrates on applied principles 
rather than on a pursuit of purely theoretical ones. Yet, we may 
sometimes refer briefly to some theoretical principles for the 
purpose of introduction or comparison, or where the practice and 
law in Saudi Arabia has departed from substantial legal norms of 
the Shari`a (the law of Islam). Here we may allude to the fact 
that the Sharlsa, on the whole has no precise principles and rules 
covering every aspect of criminal procedure. However, -the most 
important of these principles are: the innocence of the accused 
until proven guilty, his full right to defend himself by all 
legitimate means, and the right of both parties to be treated 
equally. Another important consideration in this respect is that 
the Sharr a embraces important principles regarding the burden of 
proof, the conditions thereof, and the mode in which evidence is 
produced. These principles and rules will, besides being 
consulted in documentary sources, be referred to in the recognized 
legal authorities, which will be mentioned in the first chapter. 
In 1927, King `Abdul `AzIz laid the foundations of the legal 
system of Saudi Arabia. By the expression "legal system" or 
"judiciary" in Saudi Arabia is meant the Shäri`a courts system. 
This judicial system is long established; it is well-organized, 
and greatly respected by all. Above all, its substantive' laws 
are considered to be God-given laws. Moreover, the Shari'a 
judiciary covers most of the judicial field. Therefore, there is 
no alternative for this study, but to be devoted to the Sharr a 
- ix - 
system. Nevertheless, the study will also consider some semi- 
judicial institutions, namely those ofa criminal character, and 
will compare their procedure with that of the Shari`a courts, 
when it seems fit. Here, it may be mentioned that, sometimes, the 
laws and regulations governing the semi-judicial institutions and 
their practice are relatively too brief or vague to give a clear 
picture of their procedure. Therefore, the only alternative open 
to us was to rely on the general judicial principles in Saudi 
Arabia and on personal interviews with the respective authorities. 
Limitations. It is important to note that this thesis is 
not intended to deal with all the semi-judicial institutions for 
the following reasons: - 
(a) Some of these institutions follow an administrative 
rather than a judicial procedure such as the General Directorate 
of Passports and Nationality, the Department of Taxes, - and the 
Committees of Combatting Adulterations. - 
(b) Others, such as the "Trial of Ministers", - have no 
detailed procedure or practice and if, on the assumption that 
there is a minister to be tried, this trial will be held in camera. 
(c) Others, such as the "Martial Tribunal", " do not fall 
within the general judiciary. Moreover, its law is too brief to 
give a clear picture of its procedure. Also it holds its sessions 
in camera and there is no access to its records. 
Since the subject of this study is concerned with criminal 
procedure, the punishment itself will not be dealt with for the 
reason that punishments are covered by another branch of criminal 
law. Sentencing will also not be examined in this study on the 
grounds that the mode in which a judge passes a sentence-is not 
complicated enough to deserve special attention. 
--X - 
According to the Sharl'a, crimes are classified into three 
categories: (i) hudt[d (sing. _hadd) 
i. e. crimes with fixed 
punishments, (ii) qic i. e. retaliation, and (iii) ta`zir i. e., 
crimes whose punishments are-left to the discretion of the 
appropriate authority to determine. Besides using these terms 
for crimes-themselves, they are also used to designate their 
punishments. The crimes of hudUd are six types: illegal sex 
relations (zind), defamation (gadhf), wine-drinking (sukr or 
shurb), theft (sariQa), highway robbery ( iräbä orfgat`al-tariq), 
and apostasy from Islam (ridda). The crimes of retaliation 
(qi§RQ) are two kinds: murder, and the intentional cutting off of 
the limb of a human being. The vast majority of crimes comes 
under ta`z! r. Sometimes, the terms misdemeanour, felony and 
offence may be used, but there is no exact definition for these 
terms in the laws either governing SharT'a courts or semi-judicial 
tribunals. However, misdemeanour, felony, and offence fall within 
the category of ta`zir. Hence, we have to follow the classification 
of the Shari`a in this respect. 
Material and sources. The data and-information consulted in 
this study are the following: - 
(1) Unpublished and confidential material consisting of: - 
(a) Records and registers of cases and judicial decisions, 
which are the principal sources. 
(b) Decisions, instructions, and circulars issued by the 
High Judicial Authority. 
(c) Royal and high edicts. 
(d) Decisions taken by legislative and chief administrative 
institutions, i. e. the Consultative Council, the 
Council of. Deputies, and the Council of Ministers. 
(e) Ministerial decisions. 
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(f) Instructions circulated by authoritative institutions. 
(g) Official correspondence. 
(h) Memoranda. 
(i) A few draft laws. 
(j) Reports. 
The above-mentioned data were obtained in fo%r periods of 
fieldwork totalling some fourteen months. 
(2) Published laws, some of which are booklets, and others 
which are published in the official gazette of Saudi Arabia, 
Umm al-Qurä. 
(3) Documents obtained from the Documents Section of the 
Library of Institution of Public Administration in Riyadh. 
() Personal observations and notes made by the author at 
court hearings, to which he was given access. 
(5) Correspondence between the author and some authorities, 
appended together with useful information. 
(6) Interviews conducted by the author with senior judges, 
legal officials and statesmen. However, this kind of material is 
used to a limited extent, namely where the law and the practice do 
not cover the subject of the interview. Equally, it is used where 
it is impossible, for any reason, to have access to the source of 
the subject. 
(7) Published theses, whose consultation is confined to the 
Library of the Faculty of Law at the University of al-Azhar and 
to the Library of the Faculty of Law at Cairo University. These 
theses were consulted in two visits, totalling six weeks. Although 
the theses do not deal with the law in Saudi Arabia, they were 
useful to the theme of this study. 
(8) Legal and general literature available in articles, 
theses and books among which are the Ianbal3 legal books, 
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recognized as authorities on judicial laws. These texts are 
consulted particularly when dealing with evidence. - 
Although it is commonly believed that . data and information 
in developing countries, such as Saudi Arabia, are rare and 
unreliable, it may be claimed that the data utilized in this 
study is quite ample and highly reliable. This fact is for the 
following reasons: - 
(1) The interest which some officials referred to in the 
acknowledgments have shown in the accomplishment of this study. 
Their co-operation helped the author in having access to the 
material needed for this thesis. 
(2) The permission of the Minister of the Interior accorded 
to the author to consult confidential documents relevant to this 
study. 
(3) Personal contact with some officials, through whose 
advice the author was guided to important documents. 
Finally, the question to be considered in this preface is 
whether the subject of this thesis has been dealt with before. 
In Saudi Arabia, it does not appear that an important study of 
criminal proceedings before courts has been made. The Advanced 
Legal Institute (Ma`had al-Qara' al-`Ali), was set up in the 
1960's for the express purpose of providing the country with 
highly-educated judges. But not one of the students of the 
institute has made a specific study of any aspect of the judicial 
system of Saudi Arabia, in spite of the fact that most of the 
students are judges. This shows that the time for a legal study 
of the Saudi Arabian judicial system, from inside Saudi Arabia, 
has yet to come. Nevertheless, it may come shortly. Studies 
written abroad have no direct connection with the main theme of 
this work; in actual fact, no extensive study of the judicial 
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system in Saudi Arabia has been produced. It is true that few 
theses have made reference to the tjudiciary, but only as a prelude 
to another and probably related subject. 
Although this work is a modest attempt, it is hoped that it 
will be a first step towards a comprehensive study not only of 
criminal proceedings at courts and preliminary criminal 
procedure but also of the judicial system of Saudi Arabia as 
a whole. 
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Chapter One 
THE CONSTITUTION OF SAUDI ARABIA- 
s 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 
After the conquest of Hijäz by King "Abdul `Azlz in 1926, the 
people of Hi jAz and Najd were anxious to see real Muslim rule in 
the country. As King `Abdul `Azlz was the formal religious leader. - 
of the country (imam), the organization of this rule was within 
his discretion. His Wahh-abt upbringing was, to a certain degree, 
to influence his political ideas and consequently to shape the 
framework of the constitution of his country. 
The `Ulam' (the doctors of Islam), who kept constant 
observation on matters concerning the hari`& (the Law of Islam), 
. provided the King with the legal advice he heeded. The adoption 
of the Shari`a was also the primary concern of the Ikhwän 
(Brethren), who were at one time the most efficient fighting force 
in Najd. The Muslim world was also concerned with Hijäz, and 
wanted the SharT`a to be applied there. Before examining how far, 
and how much of the Shari'a was to be applied it is necessary to 
consider briefly certain aspects of the historical background of 
the Wahh-abi Movement, King `Abdul `Aziz, the `Ulami', the Ikhwnn, 
the people of Najd and Hi jäz, and the opinion of the Muslim world. 
A. The WahhäbT Movement, 
At the beginning of the 18th century the inhabitants of Najd, 
the desert country in central Arabia, were in a state of 
ignorance, having forgotten even the fundamental principles of 
their religion, Islam. Ibn Ghannam, a Najd3 historian, when 
describing the Najdis at that time, recorded: "They were at this 
time sunk deep in the abyss of paganism, steeped in shame and 
defiled by the taint of corruption. "1 The only exception to this 
was an extremely small minority, including the few `ulamä', who 
had very little influence in the country. In the 18th century, 
there lived a man named Muhammad Ibn `Abdul Wahhäb (1703-1792 A. D. ) 
-6- 
(1115-1206 A. ß. ) -who- was to revive Islam. He was born in `Uyayna, 
a town'situated'near Riyadh. His father gave him'a preliminary 
education'in Islamic-studies. Afterwards, 'he went to Ahsä', 
Hijäz; *'and Basra (in Iraq) to continue his education. At the same 
time he studied the religious convictions held by the people of 
these countries. He, reached the conclusion that they had adopted- 
some superstitious and heretical beliefs. He observed that the 
`ulamal had collaborated, ': with the rulers who betrayed Islam. 
2 
Ibn `Abdul Wahh-ab decided to devote' himself to his beliefs. He 
returned to-his home-town ('Uyayna) and started to preach that 
people should return to the"-principles of Islam as they were 
practised in the early days of the faith. He wanted to see the 
Arabians become devout Muslims, welded into one people serving the 
cause. of the faith of Islam. His-opponents put pressure upon the 
ruler of "'Uyayna", Ibn Mu'ammar, in order to'put an end to Ibn 
'Abdul Wahhllb'steaching. -'In 171.1 (1157) he left for the town of 
"Dir'iyya" which gras ruled by the House of Sa'Ud. There he met 
the Sa`4dt ruler-, Muhammad b. Sa`Ud (d. 1766), who was a typical 
Arabian ruler (amlr) who was ambitious to acquire power over other 
Arabian rulers. 'Ibn'`Abdul Wahhlib promoted this ambition when he 
assured Ibn I8e`Ud that if he 'served the Islamic belief, his 
dynasty would become, much stronger=than it was before. Ibn Sa`IId 
offered-Ibn `Abdul WahhUb the_asylumý'and proctection which he 
needed. 
3 The two'men agreed to devote themselves to the cause and 
to'serve this movement of religious revival by präctical-means. 
The former became the spiritual and the latter the political-and 
military leader of the znovement. 
Ibn `Abdul" Wahhäb's ambition was` partially 'fulfilled when 
Najd'-and some other parts of the Arabian Peninsula- were' annexed. 
The new state became known-to the outside world as the WahhAbi 
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State (A1-Dawla al-Wahhäbiyya). 
In the 20th century this state was revived by `Abdul `Aziz 
Ibn `Abdul Rahm"9n, Al-Sa`Ud, and on September 22,1932 (21/5/1351) 
was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (al-Mamlaka . 
hl-`Arabiyya 
. 6,1-Sa`Udiyya). The question now 
to be considered is the reaction 
of the Muslim world to what came to be known as the Wahhäbi 
Movement. 
The Wahhlbis called themselves unitarians (muwahhidln). The 
outside world looked-upon the Movement in different ways. 
(a) As an independent sect of Islam. This was the opinion 
of some doctors of Islam such as 'Abdul Bäsit al-Fikhiirl, the 
Muftl of Lebanon, who was appointed. by the Ottoman Sultan 'Abdul 
Hamid. ' 
(b) Not as a new sect, but as a movement following the 
Hanbal3-school. This view-was held by many scholars of Islam, 
such as Muhammad Rashid Rida of Egypt. 
(c) Not only as a doctrine at variance with the Sunna (the 
Prophet's Tradition), but as an innovation in Islam. This 
judgement was made by some opponents either for political reasons, 
or because of a difference in the interpretation of the principles, 
of Islam. The Ottoman Empire, The Egyptians, 
5 
and the Hashimites6 
fought for the destruction of the Wahhlbi State. The hý i `a sect 
in a special conference in Karbalä' announced that the Wahhabis 
were nothing but heretics.? Some `ulamä' in Beirut and Damascus, 
who collaborated with the politicians, accused Ibn `Abdul WahhAb 
of hating the Prophet Muhammad and of claiming that he himself was 
a prophet. 
8 
However, the WaYthabis had neither called themselves Wahha-bis, 
nor did. they call their movement WahhUbism,. but rejected this 
designation. 
9 They believed that they were not competent of 
(individual legal opinion) but they followed the i itihäd10 
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traditional teaching of the Sunni schools (ahl al-Sunna wa al- 
J_`a); and in subsidary issues (al-rur3`) they generally followed 
the Hanbali school, 'formed by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. (780-855) 
(164-241). " 
If we study the Wahhabl Movement carefully, we will see that 
it is not a new Islamic doctrine, but has its roots in thes$unni 
concept of Islam. In its theological aspect, it is an echo of the 
teachings of Ibn Taymiyya [1262-1328 (661-728)]. It - , 
Is also 
influenced by the teaching of Ibn al-Qaiyym al-Jawziyya [1291-1350 
(691-751)1.. who was a pupil of - Ibn Taymiyya. Both of them called, 
and so did Ibn `Abdul-Wahhab, for the purification of Islam from 
innovations- and from, the cult of prophets and saints. They - 
believed in the Qur'8n, the Suunna, and the conduct and teachings- 
of the Prophets Companions ($aiaba) and Pious Followers (T"dbi`Tn). 
In matters of law and jurisprudence (fýiah), the movement-generally 
followed the Hanbali School 12 whose founder categorized the 
sources from which he derived his opinion in the following. order; - 
(a) The Qur'än.,, { 
(b) The Authentic Hadith (traditionoP the Prophet). 
(c) The consensus (i ma') of the Prophet's Companions 
(Qa4-aba). 
(d)-. In controversial issues, the opinion nearest to the first 
two sources. 
(e) The weak tradition (hadith da`lf); in other-words that 
which is not as reliable as the authentic (eaiI ) 
tradition, but which is not falsified. 
(P) i äa (legal analogy). 
13 
Clearly then, Wahhabism. is an Islamic revivalistic_movement, which 
called for puritanism and religious revival. 
-9- 
B. King `Abdul `Azlz (1882-1953) 
'Abdul 'Azlz was born on 21 st October 1882, while his father 
aiImm `Abdul Rahmän was engaged in a battle to restore the rule . 
of his family in Najd. Al-Imäm 'Abdul Rahmän made many attempts 
to revive the rule of the House of Sa`üd, but without success. 
Therefore, he decided to look for a refuge, and he found it in 
Kuwait. His son `Abdul `Aziz, who was about ten years of age, 
heard of the glory of his grandfather Faisal (d. 1866), but at the 
same time he witnessed the unenviable fate of his father and the 
misery in which the family then lived. In these circumstances 
`Abdul `Aziz could scarcely have been expected to receive a good 
education. His education was limited to the extent of learning 
the Qur'an and the basic principles of Islam. In the meantime he 
"showed no inclination for book-reading. "1 
1' However, he remained 
in the company of his father, who was well-informed in the history 
of the Arabs. As his father was accustomed to have reading- 
sessions quite frequently, 
15 `Abdul `Az! z's education would no 
doubt have been thereby improved. 
Al-Imäm `Abdul Rahmen had but one purpose in life, that he, 
or his sons after him, should restore the Empire of the House of 
Sa`3d, and re-unite the Arabs into one nation and convert them 
into devout Wahhabis. 
`Abdul `Aziz could not accept or endure'his life in exile and 
the misery of his family. In 1902 (1319) he left Kuwait for 
Riyadh, the capital of his grandfather Faisal, in an attempt to 
restore the rule of his family. On January 15,1902 he succeeded 
in retaking Riyadh. Within about a quarter of a century most of 
the Arabian Peninsula was indisputably under his rule. In 1913 
(1331) he captured al-Ahsä'. In 1921 (13! 41) he conquered Häyil, 
which was the capital of his rivals, the family of Al-Rashid. 
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In 1926 (1344) he was-in full controliof the whole of Hi jäz. 
16 
. 
The tide of- 'Abdul 'Az3z's influence reached its height on 
September '22,1932(21/5/1351) when he became the King of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabial7 (al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'ldiyva). 
We may now. refer to"King 'Abdul `Aziz's religious convictions 
and their influence on his personal life and on, the constitution 
of his country. Since--King `Abdul `Aziz, as mentioned before, was 
brought. up in a-Wahhhbl environment, some have assumed that he-was 
an extremely strict WahhäbI. One of his trusted advisers, H1fiz 
Wahba, wrote:: that King `Abdul `Azlz had established his state-on 
the basic principles of the WahhäbI Movement. 
18 However, it seems 
that King `Abdul `Azlz was, 'in matters of personal religious 
duties and conduct, a- fairly typical Wahhäbi, who would readily 
listen to what his `Ulama-' said. This may be understood from the 
following event. When the`Ulama' of Riyadh objected to his will to 
celebrate the anniversary of his accession to the throne in 1930 
(1349) 19 he obeyeä, the `Ulamä"s-instructions. On matters. - 
relating to-the state, he would do what suited him provided that 
it was-in harmony with-general Islamic principles. His political 
ambitions and realistic: international outlook had, in this respect, 
modified his religious convictions and his-thought. He had to - 
satisfy his subjects, who ranged from the extreme Muslims Wahh-abis 
in Najd to the comparatively-open-minded people of Hijäz. He 
also had to satisfy =the Muslim: World. - He had-to adopt Islam as 
revealed in the`Qur'An, and to follow the--3unna (the Tradition of 
the Prophet), the. Conduct of the_-Companions of the-Prophet and 
their pious Followers. 
20 
C. The `g-l-amV 
The word `ä_ means in this context a learned and well- 
informed religious man of Islam, --the plural is. `ulamä' . The 
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`U1amä''iii'the Wahhab3 Movement were in fact the spiritual leaders. 
Ibn `Abdul.. Wahhbb himself, the founder of the Movement, was 
classified as an `Rlim, and since then the leadership-of the 
`Ulamä' has been; with very few 'exceptions, left to one of his 
descents. The opinion of the'`UlamA' was so important that it was 
usually decisive in questions-relating to the Sharl'a, which 
governed every -aspect of life. 
Their power was great in--the reign of `Abdul `Azlz; when they 
succeeded in converting the non-religious Beduins of Najd into 
devout Muslims; - these were later called 'tal-I i4wäin" (brethren). 
The `Ulam-fi' were the only force which could control and modify the 
emotional beliefs`of the Ikhwän, and the only persons through whom 
King `Abdul=`Aziz could rule. A typical example-of their importance 
is evident in their'Fatvia (legal opinion) issued on= February ii, 
1926 (8/8/1345Ywhich resulted from the conference held on January 
29,1926, (25/7/1345) % -'This ` conference was called by King `Abdul 
`Aziz to look; into the serious dispute between him and the Ikhw'an. 
The -F atwa, however.. -demanded the abolition of anything which was 
contrary to-the Sh" The power of the `UlamV' is also-obvious 
in their Fatwä isäued on November--2,1964 (26/6/1361). This Fatwa 
demanded the deposition of' Sa`ild, the former King of ~ Saudi Arabia, 
and the settingý-tip of his brother, Faisal, as King in-his place. 
21 This Fatwa wasýsoon carried out. 
Thus, -the-`U== practically formed a religious hierarchy 
from which the leading religious figures were chosen. The `Ulamä', 
to whom all-religious questions were usually referred-were 
responsible for carrying out the religious duties, including=the 
laws. 
D. The Ikhwln 
The word`IhWän (brethren) became a designation of -the 'Beduins 
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who deserted the nomadic life to live in hermit settlements, 
called "hi ar" in order to become devout' Muslims. - They were 
inspired by Wahhäb3=-idealism, through religious teachers- who were 
sent to them by King `Abdul `Aziz, 22 his intention being to 
achieve a religious reformation, and thereby to transform them 
into reliable soldiers who would help him in building his Kingdom. 
The first settlement (hijra) was established in 1911 (1330), 
and it soon set the pattern for other settlements. It was named 
"al-Artlwiyya". Some sixty settlements, inhabited by about 40,000 
"IkhwAn were established in rapid succession all over the country. 
23 
The Ikhwwn became enthusiastic and powerful. They were so zealous 
in their faith that they were prepared to fight and die for it. 
A false handling of these militants could have developed into a 
national catastrophe. On one occasion they told King 'Abdul `Aziz 
categorically "that unless he would lead them out to HijAz they 
would themselves declare war on Hussain [Husayn] and march to 
capture Makkah [Mecca] without him. 024 However, King 'Abdul `AzIz 
succeeded in keeping them under control when he assured them that 
he would fight for the faith. The Ikhwän defeated King Husayn's 
army and practically captured Hijäz in 1924-1925 (1343). 
25 Their 
zeal to fight for their faith thereafter was increased. Their 
energy and capability grew to such an extent that they became out 
of the King's control. They accused him of working only for his 
own ambitions and of betraying the faith. They told him that they 
fought not to set him up for his own glory, but for the glory of 
God. They wanted him to enforce Wahhäbi rule in Hi jlz and to 
declare holy war ihäd) against the people of Iraq, whom they 
considered to be heretics. 
26 
In response to this accusation King `Abdul `Azlz called for 
a conference in Riyadh, in 1926, to put the case before the 
'UlamA'. The `UlamL' produced a fatwa which partly supported the 
13 
IkhwUn. The King saw no alternative but to order the implemen- 
tation of some of the items of the fatwa. 
27 Nevertheless, the 
Ikhwän went their own way to fight neighbouring countries which 
they believed were heretical. 
28 
After having unsuccessfully tried-peaceful methods, King 
`Abdul `Aziz had no choice but to put an end to the activities of 
the Ikhwän by force. The year 1929 witnessed their end as an 
important fighting force. 29 
E. The General Attitude of the King's subjects 
Saudi Arabia consists of four provinces: Najd, HijBz, al- 
Ahsä' and `Asir. Only two of them, however, are relevant to our 
discussion, Najd and Hijgz, and it is to the attitudes of the 
people in these two provinces that we now turn. 
Najd was almost entirely isolated from the influence of the 
outside world. It was exclusivly inhabited by Wahhäbis, among 
whom were the `U1= and the Ikhwän. The Najdis wanted a strong 
leader who was able to restore peace in their country and end 
their tribal disputes. The leader whom they needed was `Abdul 
`Aziz b. Sa`Ud, and the law which was to be respected by both 
parties involved in any dispute was the Shari_a, since it was the 
law of Islam. 
The people of Hii z wished and, indeed, demanded to see in 
their country a better system of administration than had been in 
force before the conquest by King `Abdul `Aziz: a system guaranteed 
by a modern constitution. This attitude was to be expected since 
in the past the people of I; ijgz had been in touch with the 
outside world. Two main external influences affected the people 
of Hijäz: firstly, the Ottoman administration, 
30 
with its 
judiciary; 31 and secondly, the contact with Muslims of many 
different cultures, pilgrims and visitors and immigrants who came 
14 
freely to Hijäz. Life here was far- more complex than in Najd. 
Thus, the people of Hi jdz, the inhabitants of 'the Holy Land 
of Islam, wanted a modern constitution, but at the same time they 
wished to be ruled in accordance with the Sharl' a, the law of 
Islam. King `Abdul `Aziz was able to satisfy the Hijäzis and the 
Najdis by drawing upon the Shari`a as the basic source of his 
legislation. 
As soon as Mecca was occupied, the'King declared that the 
Sh ar! 'a was to be the basis of, legislation in Hijliz. 
32 After his 
entry to Mecca, King-'Abdul 'Azlz confirmed what he had already 
proclaimed concerning the role of the Shari'a in the country,, 
adding that the source of legislation was " to be the principles of 
Islam. This was received by the people of Hijäz with great 
satisfaction. 
33 
= 
F. The Opinion of the Muslim World 
Being the Holy Land of Islam, Hi j8z had been very much 
sanctified and respected by the Islamic peoples. - King `Abdul 
`Aziz had to exercise special care and tact in-dealing-with 
matters affecting its status and the welfare of its inhabitants. 
Evidence shows that he was careful not to provoke the sentiments 
of the Muslim world, which was so much concerned with the -- 
administration of HijUz. He tried to introduce his legislation 
when the right moment came. The weight of Muslim world opinion 
on this issue had a clear effect-from-the time when King `Abdul 
`Az! z decided to invade Hijäz and-put an end to the rule of the 
Hashemites. After the conquest of Mecca, he had to prove to the 
whole Muslim world that the Hol4r-Land was safe and in true Islamic 
keeping. In his statement of November lit 1924-(13/7/1343) King 
`Abdul `Azlz, due to leave Riyadh for Mecca for-the'-first time 
said: - 
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! 'I, will leave for Mecca not as overlord, but to 
remove the grievances and the taxes which have 
weighed upon the people, and to grant them the rule 
of, the Shari'a. Now there shall be no rule in Mecca 
except the, rule of the, Sharl'a. All-the people must 
respect it. Mecca belongs to all Muslims. The 
issue of the administration must be decided in 
conformity with the wishes of the: Muslim World. We 
will-meet-the Muslim delegates and consult with them 
with a view to keeping Mecca free of any political 
ambitions, and to preserve the safety and comfort of 
the pilgrims to , the : Holy hand. x'34 -- 
OnDecember -7,1924 (12/5/1343) King `Abdul - `Aziz issued -a 
proclamation putting forward his-programme regarding Hi jäz. -ý 
He 
made it clear thathe would leave matters concerning HijNz to a 
conference<to be attended by delegations representing-all-Muslim 
countries, which would decide which kind of government Hijäz 
should have, in order to implement the-laws of God. The 
proclamation had a drastic effect not only on the Hij9zis but 
also on the whole of the Muslim world, which had been almost 
entirely hostile to VVahhäbis ever since the beginning of their 
movement. 
The King tried to keep-good relations with the outside world, 
especially' with other Muslim countries, in order to give a good 
impression of himself and his government. 
The question now is whether King `Abdul `Az3: z was sincere in 
his promises. It seems that the King was playing for time until 
events should turn his way, when he would not hesitate to annex 
HijAz. That this was his policy could be seen from his 
proclamation of November 7,1926, when he decided to abandon the 
idea of calling the Islamic conference to decide the future of 
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Hijäz. However, he had later to yield to the pressure put *upon 
him by the Muslim world and to agree to hold the conference, 
although he continued to bargain over the issue of the government 
of Hi jTz, with the intention of preventing the conference from 
. 
discussing this matter, until he finally succeeded. 
35 
This Was the time for him to go on with his schemes, when he. 
thought that the Muslim. World was prepared to accept, -or at least 
not to repudiate, his plan to-rule Hijäz, so long as he would-rule 
it according to the-principles of the SharT`a. 
Thus, King `Abdul `Azlz was in a position where he-was-able 
to embark on establishing the constitutional and-administrative 
machinery, after having settled matters both with his oam subjects 
and with the Muslim world. 
Having referred to the factors which played an important role 
in shaping the constitutional organization of Saudi Arabia, we 
proceed. to discuss the' Saudi constitution- on the provincial 'and'- 
national level. 
II. THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
Saudi Arabia, as a twentieth bentury state, was to have a 
modern constitution, but it was not very easy to produce one 
because the country had no experience in this field. Until 1923 
Najd was isolated from the world. Life there was very simple; 
the problems of modern life were little known. On the whole, Najd 
was inspired by the Wahh bl Movement,,, which put an end to, or 
modified, some of the Arab traditions which had been prevalent 
there'before. As to al-AhsV , the Eastern Province, although it 
had been under Turkish control for forty years, its life was 
fundamentally similar to that of Na jd. 
36 
The situation in Hijäz differed from that in Najd and al-AhsV' 10 0 
17 
because Hijgz was relatively modern. 
37 Having entered Mecca, King 
`Abdul `Azlz was confronted with the problems of a more complex 
region. 
King `Abdul `Aziz, with his Na j di background, his limited 
experience in administration, and his great enthusiasm to annex 
Hi jäz . and build a vast kingdom, had. to go through a long process.. . 
He had to take measures which were to be agreed upon by both 
HijHzis and Najdis. This was not an easy task because the Najdis 
disliked innovation, while at the same time the Hij&zis were 
anxious to see modern institutions in their country. As a man who 
knew well the nature of the contradiction between the Najdis and 
Hi jlzis, King `Abdul `Aziz 'bad to be careful and patient when 
establishing new institutions, in order to meet the Hij'9zis 
demands on the one. hand and avoid provoking the Najdis on the 
other. Thus, the King had to deal first with Hijäz. Gradually he 
established a provincial administration in the country. But the 
way in which he went on with his plans to establish a-modern state 
was controlled by his wish to avoid any radical change and to 
concentrate-on Hij'Az till the situation in the other parts of his 
kingdom was such as to Pavour'further change. 
Dealing with HijAz we. shall now consider the institutions 
which the King introduced. The most important-of these was the 
Fundamental Instructions of the Kingdom of Hi iäzofl 926. Later we 
shall refer to the "Consultative Council", "The Council of 
Deputies" 
.4 and-the 
"Viceroy, in Hi jäz" . 
A. The Fundamental Instructions of 1926 
On August 30,1926 (21/2/1345), the Fundamental Instructions 
of the Kingdom of Hijäz (al-T`a13. mät al-As sjyya li al-Mamlaka 
al-$t__ vva) were introduced. They consisted of nine sections 
containing seventy-nine articles. 
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The first section deals with the unity of the Kingdom of 
Hi j&z and stated that the Arab Hi jgzi State is an independent 
Islamic consultative monarchy. 
3$ 
- 
In the second section, it is stated that the administration 
of the Kingdom of Hi jäz is left to King - `Abdul `Aziz, who---is bound 
. 
by the provisions of the hart'a. 
39 In Article (6) it is stated 
that legislation in the Kingdom of HiJBz shall always , conform- 
to 
the Book of God, the Sunna of His -Prophet .9 and 
the conduct of the 
Prophet's Companions and their Pious Followers. The Second 
section deals also with the establishment of the post of the King's 
Viceroy in Hijdz. 
10 
The third section divides-the affairs of the kingdom into six 
categories; Sharl'a, internal, external, fiscal, public educational, 
and military. 
i 
The-fourth-section deals-with-the Consultative Council of 
Mecca, the Administrative Council of Madina, the Administrative 
Council of Jeddah, the District Councils and the Village, and 
2 Tribal Councils. 
The other sections deal with the establishment of the 
Department of Audit, the General Inspectorate, Government 
$mployees, Municipal- Councils and Administrative Committees. 
The Instructions-have been subjected to some amendments; the 
title-of the king, for example, was changed to "the King of Hijäz . 
and Najd and its Dependencies. " --This event took place in 1927 
(1 345) " In 1932 (1351) the whole country was named The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. 11 
3 
An amendment dated December 29,1930 (19/8/1350) created the 
Council of Deputies. 
44 
Since the Consultative Council of Mecca is the most important 
of all the councils determined in the fourth section, w e shall 
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refer to it now. 
B. The Consultative Council 
The term 'Consultative Council' is the equivalent of Ma lis 
al ShIrg in Arabic; Shfrä means consultation. Sh_ has a 
significant appeal to Muslims as this political doctrine is 
attached to the Islamic heritage. If ShiUrl could be put into 
effect by King `Abdul `Aztz, both his subject peoples, the Najdis 
and the Hi jllzis, and the Muslim world too, would be satisfied. 
Indeed, as this principle of ShUrl was very important, King `Abdul 
`Azlz adopted it when he established the Consultative Council in 
1926 (1345)- 
The primary purpose of establishing this council was to 
provide the Viceroy with consultation, when needed. But in 1927 
(9/1/1346) a basic law concerning the Consultative Council was 
promulgated to replace the fourth section of the Fundamental 
Instructions. 45 
The new law gave wider responsibilities to the Council, such 
as. the enactment of-laws and regulations. 
46 But it could not 
initiate projects de Loi; it only studied them, when it was 
instructed to do so. _by 
the supreme authority, the King or his 
Viceroy. The decision taken by the Council had to be ratified by 
the Viceroy or by the King himself, and if the King, who 
possessed the ultimate authority, was not satisfied with any 
decision of the Council, he was; not bound by it. Nevertheless, 
the Council enjoyed the power to discuss and prepare the draft of 
the laws and regulations of-the country ; before the Council of 
Ministers was established in 1953.47 Thus, one can say that the 
Consultative Council left its mark on the laws of Saudi Arabia, as 
a whole, despite its provincial character. 
If a student of constitutional law examines the limitations 
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to which the council had been subject, he may well appreciate its 
achievements - particularly when he bears in mind that the King 
had the power to dissolve the Council, or to dismiss or change its 
members, 
48 
and that he was the ultimate authority in all legis- 
lative matters49 (so long as these did not conflict with the 
Sh aria). 
Finally, one may ask about the fate of. the Consultative 
Council now. It is, in fact, still functioning and has three 
committees: legislative, financial, and administrative; but it is 
subservient to the Council of Ministers. 
50 
C. The Council of Deputies 
The administrative organs functioned according to the 
Fundamental Instructions until 1931; that is to say the Viceroy 
possessed all executive powers. After the Saudi Arabian 
administration had passed the experimental stage and had become 
morecomplicated, the government felt that the time had come to 
create some form of a cabinet, which would be more'suited to the 
needs of the country, and more efficient in assisting the Viceroy 
to run the administration. The"Commission on the Administrative 
Reform" (of 1927) recommended that an organ called the "Council 
of Deputies" should be established. The King approved the 
5 
recommendation in 1927, but it was put into practice only in 
1931, when the Constitution of the Council of Deputies52 was 
promulgated. 
The Council consisted of a president, who was the Viceroy, 
(Faisal), and three other 
Affairs, and Finance, and 
Council. 53 These members 
they derived their author. 
responsible. The Council 
members: the deputies for Foreign 
the Vice President of the Consultative 
were appointed by the King from whom 
Lty and before whom they were 
took its decisions by majority vote. 
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For a decision tobe carried out, the vote of the deputy whose 
department was concerned had to be cast with the majority. 
54 
In the event of his objection to the decision of the majority, the 
President, acting as Viceroy, could in urgent cased order the 
implementation. of the decision. But if the matter in question was 
not urgent, the King had to be referred to for his opinion 
thereon. 55 Although the Council was intended to operate the 
administrative machinery of Hijäz, it used to administer the 
foreign and financial policy of Saudi Arabia as a whole. The 
Council functioned for twenty-three years; it ceased to exist when 
the Council of Ministers was created in 1953. 
D. The Viceroy (al-NV'ib) 
In January 1926, after he had established himself in HijAz, 
King `Abdul `AzIz appointed his son, Faisal, as His Viceroy 
there. 7 From this date, 'Prince 
56 
-Faisal took charge of running the 
administration in HijBz. By the Fundamental Instructions of 1926, 
the affairs of the Kingdom of Hi4lz were assigned to him. except 
for military57 affairs and some foreign58 affairs, which were 
reserved for the King himself. The Viceroy was also accorded the 
Presidency-of the Consultative Council. 59 By the Constitution of 
the Council of Deputies. (1931 ), the Viceroy was granted the 
Presidency of-this, Council, which was the highest administrative 
institution in'the country. In practice the Viceroy directed the 
whole of the affairs of HijAz. 
60 
By the above mentioned 
Constitution-he became the Minister for Internal, Foreign, and 
Military Affairs. 
61 
However, in the presence of the King in 
HijAz, Prince Yaisal was only to-act as the President of the . 
Council of Deputies. 
62 
The position`öf the Viceroy was abolished 
in 1953 when the Council of Ministers was established. 
Finally, it, is important to note that the Fundamental- 
ýý 
Instructions of 1926 served as the constitution of HijAz until its 
unification with Najd on September 21 .9 
1932.. 
63- 
After. this date it 
became clear that these Instructions had to be replaced by new 
ones in order to deal successfully with the new situation in Saudi 
Arabia. Hence, the Royal Order of September 18,1932 (17/5/1351) 
indicated that new Instructions were to be promulgated, 
64 
but 
nothing of this sort has in fact come into existence. 
However, the Constitution of Hijlz, namely the Fundamental 
Instructions of 1926 and the amendments thereof may be criticized 
by some as being undemocratic. But if one considers the 
circumstances in which this constitution existed and to which we 
have referred earlier, one may more readily appreciate the 
r-- 
stability-in the country resulting from its implementation. It 
may be unwarranted for a student of constitutional law to 
criticize King 'Abdul 'AzTz for having adopted such a constitution, 
since the situation in Arabia was at that time not ripe for a more 
modern one. Perhaps, it is to the credit of King 'Abdul 'AzIz 
that he succeeded in unifying the country and ruling it according 
to the system which he had laid down. This was by no means an 
easy taskito accomplish. He had, for example, to avoid even using 
the word DustUr (constitution) for fear that it might anger the 
Najdia. Instead he used the word t'allmlt (instructions). This 
shows how cautious the King was and, in fact, he had to be. 
Umm al-QurA, the official newspaper of Saudi Arabia, in reply 
to the criticism of the Instructions by the Egyptian press, 
commented as follows: 'Any student of constitutionalism in a 
certain country must take into account the nature and mentality of 
its environment ., 165 On the other hand while the constitutional 
institutions of the country were not settled, and not well-defined, 
"the Judicial system has been based on solid institutions ever 
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since King `Abdul `AzIz was. able to lay down its foundation in 
1927. 66 This we shall examine in detail later, as it is an -, 
important concern of this work. 
III. THE CONSTITUTION OAT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
King `Abdul `Aziz spent most of his life in laying down the 
foundations of the kingdom over which he ruled. He established the 
administration with himself at its head, but he delegated some 
powers to his Viceroy in HijAz, a post to which he appointed his 
son Faisal, as mentioned above. In Hijäz, where life was . 
relatively complex, the Fundamental Instructions of 1926 were 
implemented to meet the demands of the Hij'azis, while in the other 
provinces life had not greatly changed until the discovery-of oil 
in the Eastern Province in 1938 (1357). After this date., and 
especially after the end of the Second World War, the national 
income started to grow very rapidly. Revenue obtained from the 
annual pilgrimage to Hijäz became less important to the national 
income. In virtue of this new financial development, Hijaz tended 
to become less important than it hail been in, the administrative 
field. 
In this way, new economic, administrative and social changes 
took place in the whole country. By this time, in 1953, King 
`Abdul `Azlz had become old and ill, and he authorised the Crown 
Prince, his eldest son 3a4tEd, to whom he had gradually been 
delegating some powers, to direct the new administration, which 
began to take on a centralized character. This fact brought about 
a transfer of the administrative centre from Hi jUz to Riyadh which 
from this time became the new administrative capital of Saudi 
Arabia as it had been the home of the Royal Family, and the heart 
of the country in the physical sense. On October 9,1953 (1/1/ 
373) a royal decree was issued setting up anew administrative 1 
67 
- 24 - 
institution'called "Mailis al WuzarV'"", the Council of Ministers. 
It was presided over by Crown Prince Sa'Ud who then took charge of 
executive as well as administrative authority over the whole 
country, since the Council of Ministers was created to be a 
binding force over Saudi Arabia as a whole. 
On November lisp 1953 (2/3/1373)t one month after the 
establishment of the Council of Ministers, King `Abdul `Azlz died. 
He was succeeded by his son Sa`4d, Who, in turn, issued a royal 
decree. on March 17,1954 (12/7/1373) organizing a new constitution 
for the Council of Ministers. 
68 
In this Constitution, the King 
Was to be President of the Council. Later, on August 16,1954 
(16/12/1373) Crown Prince Faisal presided over the Council. 
69 
The 
Constitution accorded the Council extensive executive powers in 
internal and external affairs, (Art. 7). The President of the 
Council had the authority to supervise all-the ministries and, 
administrative departments. But the King, besides being the head 
of the state, had the power to direct-the-executive machine and 
the authority of sanctioning Zegislation. 
70 
As the country had passed. the"" experimental stage-in its 
administration, King Sa`Ud issued a royal = decree71 in 1958 (1377) 
entrusting the President of-the Council, Prince Faisal, with 
complete authority to lay down and supervise the-executive policy 
of the government in internal and external affairs. The decree 
called. for a revision of the Constitution of the Council of 
Ministers. This revision came about in the same year by another 
royal decree. 
72 The new constitution grants the Council of 
Ministers complete authority to lay down the policy of the country 
in legislative, administrative and executive spheres. 
73 But it is 
to be noted that the legislative issues have to be introduced by 
royal decree 
74 in order to be enforceable. Another limitation of 
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the authority of the Council is that the President has to conduct 
the general policy of the=country according to the instructions 
75 
of the King. Thus, the King possesses authority over the 
whole constitutional machinery of the country. It may be said 
that the authority of the King has been modified by Art. (23) of 
the Constitution of the Council, which reads as follows: 
"If His Majesty the King does not approve any proposed 
legislation submitted to His Majesty by the Council, 
the proposal; has to-be returned to the Council, together 
with the reasons for which the legislation is to be 
discussed again by the Council; but if no royal decree 
or-order has been issued within thirty days after the 
proposal has been s. ibmitted. to His. Ma jesty, the- 
President of the Council will take appropriate action 
and will notify the Council of it. " 
However, `this-action has never yet been taken. The Constitution 
is not explicit enough as to. the delimitation of-the'authority of 
the King and`that -of the- President of the Council. As the King- 
himself is now the President of the Council, the distinction- 
between the powers invested in these two positions cannot be 
ascertained in -practice. -- Despite this, the--Council-of-Ministers 
has been-playing-an increasingly important role in=legislative, 
executive-and-administrative matters. - 
It would be useful, at this point, after having°considered- 
the Constitution ' of- the Council of Ministers "of 1958-, - to mention a 
serious attempt made in 1960 to lay down a Constitution for the 
country. -It was divided into eight parts: - - 
(1) The State and the System of Government. 
(2) The Basis "- of= Society. 
_' (3) -Public'Rights and Public Duties., 
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(4) The King. 
(5) The Legislative Power, (al-SultBt al-Ni; ämiyya). 
(6) The Executive Power. 
(7) The Judicial Power. 
(8) General and Provisional Rules. 
The primary purpose of this Constitution was conceived as 
connecting "what has been disconnected between us and our Islamic 
heritage of consultation and. justice. "76 The Constitution did not 
go beyond the proposal stage. Nevertheless, -it 
defined the powers 
of the state and the rights-of-citizens more precisely than any 
other constitutional document in the history of the country. 
Before we end this discussion of constitutional development 
in Saudi Arabia, it is important to: refer to the "Ten Point 
Programme" announced by Crown Prince Faisal, 
77 
after he formed a 
new government on October 31,1962.78 This programme was read 
before the new cabinet on November 6,1962 (9/6/1382). It states 
that the time had come for the promulgation of a basic law for the 
country to be drawn up from the Qu'rrn and the Traditions of the 
Prophet and the acts of his Caliphs, and for the organization of 
the various powers of the state and their-relationships. 
79 It 
also80 stresses the need for the judiciary to have immunity and a 
high standing, and for the creation of a supreme judicial Council, 
and_ of a ministry of justice to which the office of the States 
Public Prosecutor would be attached. 
81 
Quite a long time. has passed since this programme was 
announced, but its most important point, the promulgation of a 
basic law, has not yet been fulfilled. Nevertheless, we shall 
refer to the basic law of Saudi Arabia as it stands. 
Some scholars interested in the study of the SharT`a believe 
that Saudi Arabian law is basically Hanball law. Professor 
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Schacht, for instance, writes "Islamic Hanball Law is not only the 
basic law of Saudi Arabia, it is not only valid without restriction, 
it is even its only law in the full meaning of the term.. "82 A 
close examination of the sources of the Saudi Arabian basic law 
will show that Professor-Schacht's view of the matter is to a 
great extent inaccurate. King `Abdü]. `Aziz, made it clear in 
The Fundamental Instructions of the Kingdom of Hij z of 1926 that 
the source of legislation was the qur'gn, the Sunna, and the 
Conduct of the Prophet's Companions and their Pious Followers. 
83 
Without specifying a certain school, the draft constitution of 
1960, in King Sa`Ud's era laid down that the Shari'a was to be the 
source of legislation. In his "Ten Point Programme of 1962", 
Faisal, the present King, promised that a basic law drawn up, from 
the Shar! 'a would be promulgated. 
84 
In his speech after acceeding 
to the throne, King Faisal stated that the Sharl'a was the source 
of the laws. 
85 
On many occasions he stated that the Shar! 'a is 
the constitution of the country without reference to any 
particular school. 
86 Moreover, some of the Ottoman laws which do 
not contradict the Sharl'a, and which were prevailing in ; iijäz 
before its annexation by King `Abdul `Aziz are still enforceable 
in Saudi Arabia. 
87 The laws introducing reforms, which have been 
promulgated by edicts are based on the principle of the so-called 
al-ma§; älih al-mursala, the general welfare. (The principle of 
al-ma$äli1 al-mursala is probably the most suitable means to meet 
the constellation of new problems). This principle is applied 
more frequently by other schools, such as the Maliki, than by the 
Hanbali. Therefore, it may be said that the laws enforcing 
various reforms in Saudi Arabia are closer to the Maliki than to 
the Hanball Law. 
It is true that the substantive-law89 applied by the Shari`a 
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courts has in`-theory been limited to -the Hanball Law since it was 
enforced in 1928 (1347). 
90 Yet-its limitation to the'Hanball law 
is not absolute. 
91 -The other Sunnl laws are to be'-referred to 
when the application-of'the-'Hanbali law-is-liable to cause 
hardship or contravention of the public'interest. --Matters 
concerning' endowment (waqf), bequest (wasiyya)92 crop sharing 
(musäa&a), and the lease (i Bra) of palm trees93 are not - 
necessarily governed by Hanbal! law. 
It is clear-then-that the basic law of SaudifArabia is not 
limited to the Hanball law but isdrawn up £rom"the general-- 
principles of the Shari`a as interpreted by the Sunni--Schools, 
supplemented by royal edicts and decisions' of the Council°`-of 
Ministers. ' 
IV. THE DIFFERENT POWERS OF THE STATE 
We have now to consider the different powers of the state in 
Saudi Arabia. We must admit that it is not easy to distinguish 
between these. powers with the exception of the judiciary. The 
judicial power will be given special attention since it is closely 
attached to the theme of this study. 
A. The Legislative Power 
King `Abdul `AzTz had total authority over the legislative 
machine but he delegated some power mainly to the Consultative 
Council (Mailis al-Sh1rg). Nevertheless-, this council was not the 
only authority to enact laws. Some laws and regulations were 
promulgated without the Consultative Council being even notified. 
9 
Experience showed that there were Other institutions carrying the 
burden of legislation. The Council of Deputies, 
95 for-instance, 
was'in 1932 instructed to draw up a constitution for the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, a law for the succession to the throne, and laws 
96 for organizing the system of government. King Sa`IId and King 
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Faisal invested the legislative power in the Council of Ministers, 
which was created in 1953. This Council has a legislative 
committee composed of six ministers and a legal staff of ten 
experts. 
97 The committee studies and recommends the new 
legislation which-the Council is to introduce. Thus, the Council 
of Ministers is officially the only legislative institution in the 
country at present. But there is another institution which has in 
practice played an important role in the legislative as well as in 
the judicial sphere; it is the High Judicial Authority (the 
Presidency of the Judiciary and later the Ministry of Justice). 
The former carried greater weight than the latter in this respect. 
As this institution is very important to this study, we shall now 
examine its legislative capacity. 
The SharTla entitles the head of -state "wall -al--amr" or 
persons or institutions representing him-to draw up the-new 
legislation which the country needs. This method of producing law 
is called "siy"fisa shar`iysa". `This power, however, must be 
exercised in such a way that the new legislation is not contrary 
to the Sharl'a, but according to its general principles and its 
spirit. A person who takes responsibility for drawing up such 
legislation must be a scholar of the Sharita, who is thoroughly 
informed of its principles. The persona who are best qualified 
for this position are the `ulamä', who have staffed the High 
Judicial Authority. Indeed, this authority has usually been 
consulted, especially when judicial legislation was to be 
promulgated. 
98 The High Judicial Authority usually opposes any 
legislation which it believes to be contrary to the-Shar36a. 
99 
But, if the legislation opposed by the High Judicial Authority 
does not contradict the Shari'a; the King or the President of the 
Council of ministers may enforce it. 
100 
* The principle of legislation within the spirit of the Shari`a. 
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However, it seems that the Presidency of the Judiciary has 
not been willing to encourage . 
the, enactment of laws, especially 
those which concern judicial issues. 
' O' In. 1969, 
. 
the King, acting 
as the president of the Council of Ministers, commanded the 
formation of a commission in which the Presidency of the Judiciary, 
the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs were represented. ;; 
The. commission was to draw up a , new law 
regarding the treatment of criminal juveniles, before and after 
102 they were-prosecuted at{'courts. rAfter the commission had drawn 
up its decision, the'President of the Judiciary made his own 
decision and circulated it"to the courts. 
103 That decision has 
since ` become` the applied law. This kind of attitude of the High 
Judicial Authority may explain why the government is cautious when 
introducing~ legislation, and careful when formulating it. It is 
sometimes specified in the new legislation that the Shar'i`a shall 
never be ' violated. 
101 It 'may be introduced by a quotation from 
the , Qur'8n or Hadith (Tradition) or from both, or by stating that 
the SharT'a has tressed the importance of the matter which the 
new legislation is dealing with. 
105 
Next to be mentioned is the Office of the Mufti, "Dir al- 
If_", which is also important in producing legislation in 
matters relating to the Sharl'a. A typical example is the atwa 
issued after the increase in the death-rate caused by traffic 
accidents in 1959. This Catwa deals with the responsibility of 
drivers of vehicles involved in accidents0106 The Office of the 
Mufti, however, had been attached to the Presidency of the 
Judiciary during the tenure of office of Shaykh Muhammad b. 
Ibrahim, 107 who died in 1969. However, the office of the Mufti 
has been transformed into an institution called "idAra al-BuhUth 
al 7lmiyya wa al-Iftl' aua al-Da `wawa al-IrshAd" (the Office of 
*The gist of this fatwa was: That a qualified driver 
who was able to prove that he maintained his vehicle 
under reasonable mechanical check, and who was not 
driving recklessly, could not be held responsible for 
the accident. ----. _ý__ 
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Religious 'Researches. the Issuing of Fatä*a, Preaching, and 
Religious Guidance). Parts of the jurisdiction of the Office of 
the Muftl have: also been given to another new : body called "Hay'a 
Kibär al-'U1amU' (Board of the Grand `UlamR'). Nevertheless, both 
of these two new institutions will probably be as important in 
the legislative sphere as the Mufti Shaykh Muhammad b. *lbrähim - 
the strongest '311m which Saudi Arabia has ever had. 
B. 
. 
The Administrative and Executive Powers 
King `Abdul `Aziz, as we have seen, had full power over the 
administrative and executive fields, but he delegated authority to 
some statesmen and some institutions such as the Viceroy of Hij9z 
(Faisal), the-Crown Prince (Sa`üd), and the Ruler (Am! r). of the 
Eastern Province (Ibn Jalaw3), 108 and the Council of Deputies and 
the Council of; Ministers of 1953- 
-, -A new era 
of administration began in 1953 (1373) when the 
Council of-Ministers was established. Crown Prince Sa`Ud, who 
presided over the council, took full responsibility for directing 
the administrative machinery of the whole country. 
109 
Centralization took place then for the first time in Saudi Arabia. 
Since then the Council of Ministers, in particular that of 1958, 
has been accorded all the administrative and executive powers. 
110 
These powers have 
. 
become stronger since Art. and Art. (8 )-in 
the Constitution of 1958 were replaced by new articles, 
111 
which 
gave, the King the Presidency of the Council. 
It may, then, be said that the Council of Ministers is now, 
in practice, the sole institution that possesses administrative 
power and that. supervises the executive organisation, but it must 
also be borne in mind that the King, at least in theory, has the 
authority to instruct and direct the Council. 
112 
C. The Judicial Power 
Generally speaking, the judiciary of Saudi Arabia means the 
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-8harT'a 
judiciary because it covers most of the judicial sphere, 
whereas the semi-judicial tribunals cover only a very small part 
of the judiciary. While the Shari`a judiciary is a stable and 
well-organized system, 
113 the semi-judicial tribunals are disparate 
and unstable, probably with the exception of the Grievances-Board 
(DTwZ(n al-Ma; 'Alim). The Shari`a courts were intended to be the 
only judicial tribunals in =the country, but the Shari `a -judges., 
who: were `ulam8', were reluctant to apply statutes which were, 
promulgated to meet the problems of, modern life. The reasons 
behind their reluctance either to-the promulgation, or the 
application, of statutes may be summarised as follows: - 
(a) The promulgation of new-laws could, in one way or-another, 
not be in conformity with the Sharl'a, -and the enforcement of 
these laws -would therefore violate 
the Sharl'a. Furthermore, 
these laws would become substitutes, for the- Qur'8n and the Sunna, 
and they would prevent the judges from using their talent-in 
arriving at the appropriate judgements through the application of 
the principle of al-iitingd. 
(b)---, The desire of the `ulamV' to minimize, - if -they were > to 
allow in -the : first place, 
the creation of codified laws. They 
feared that an expansion-in codification could ultimately lead-to 
the adoption of. foreign legal principles which were alien to the 
Sharl'a as had-happened-in other-Muslim countries. -The-'u, 
always bore in mind that the Ottoman codification which began with 
"tangy mät" had opened, -. the door wide for the adoption of western 
laws. 
(c) Some-of the -'ulam8' maintained that, a new law or. -ruling 
could only be initiated by muitahidin, i. e. 'ulam8' who are 
qualified to make i tý ingd 
(individual-legal opinion); =that. the 
so qualified were, if any, -very few; that -even if they did 
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not believe in principle in the closing of the gate of i itihAd, 
they had no alternative but to refer to the work of their 
predecessors since they themselves were not competent in 'i ti h d. " 
This negative response of the ' `uff to the needs of the 
'twentieth century necessitated the establishment of some semi- 
Judicial tribunals, and probably resulted in the absence of 
`ulam'6' ' from the -Legislative Committee' of the-Council of Ministers. 
At an early stage "of the 'history of the Saudi-Arabian 
judiciary, namely in'King" `Abdul `Azlz's reiga, 'there existed the 
following semi-judicial- tribunals. - 
(a) The'Commercial Council otJeddah. 
(b) The Administrative Council of Yanbu` which was'in 
miniature, a model of the'former. However, each of these 
councils had a Shari`a judge among its members. 
(c) The Consultätive Council, which was vested with the 
power'to review the decisions of the-Commercial Council-of 
Jeddah. 115 
(d) -Some tribunals set up: to 'look into' cases which the 
Shari'a courts-were not prepared to examine, such -asthe customs- 
cases and cases involving-tobacco. 
The growth of the country's wealth, 'particularly in the era 
of King Sa"üd and King Faisal, made life much more complicated- 
than it had been before. Problems grew simultaneously with the""''- 
national wealth. Consequently, the body of'royal edicts 
introducing new statutes had to be increased. The attitude of the 
`ulamm' in general, and the Sharl'a judges in particular, ` towards 
the application of the statutes did not change. ' As 'a result of 
the increasing statutes and this attitude of _the 
`ülam8', who 
dominated the Shay= judiciary, the necessity-of establishing 
more semi-judicial tribunals was felt. The-tribunals took the 
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form of boards, committees, commissions, or, councils. They were, 
in one way or another, linked with the administrative authorities. 
However, the Shari`a courts still have a general jurisdiction over 
the judicial matters in the country. 
116 The Presidency of the 
Judiciary117instructed the Sharl'a courts that they had to decide 
on any case brought before them because the Shari`a had a binding 
jurisdiction over any issue. Indeed, a Sharl'a court may hear a 
case which, according to statute, lies within the jurisdiction , 
of a semi-judicial tribunal. But the latter cannot decide on an 
issue which falls within the jurisdiction of the former. 
118 
Now we may examine the relationship of the judicial authority 
to the executive authority or, to be exact, the question of how 
independent is the judiciary in Saudi Arabia. 119 
Dealing with the independence of the judiciary from the 
executive does not mean at all that we are talking in terms of 
the principle of "the separation of powers" as formulated by 
Montesquieu. 120 Although the doctrine of the separation of powers 
has been subject to criticism for not being practical in many 
respects, its value "lies in the emphasis placed upon those checks 
and balances which are essential to prevent an abuse of the 
enormous powers which are in the hands of rulers". 
121 The 
importance of this doctrine with regard to Saudi Arabia is that it 
caused the authorities to elucidate the principles relating to the 
independence of the judiciary from the executive in Islamic 
judicial theory and practice. As they have, in determining this, 
found the concept of this independence, they have also emphasized 
its importance. This fact is apparent in the wording of the First 
Chapter of the prospective judicial law, the Law of the Judicial 
Authority. However, we shall only examine the independence of 
the judiciary in the context of the non-interference of the 
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executive officials with the machinary of justice. 
According to the Shari`a both in theory and practice, the 
head of state is entitled to act as a judge in his realm or to 
delegate the judicial authority to some of his subjects. The 
Prophet acted as the judge of the locality of Madina and authorized 
some of his companions to take charge of the judicial authority 
in distant parts of his realm. His Caliphs sometimes deputized 
persons to decide criminal, as well as civil, cases in Madzna 
itself. 122 
Since the law of Saudi Arabia was based on theT principles of 
the Sharr a, King `Abdul `AzTz could have set Himself up as a judge 
if he wanted to, provided that he had the necessary sbholarly 
qualifications. In actual fact, he did not exercise any judicial 
function, probably for the following reasons: - 
(a) He was not qualified scholarly to be a judge. (See what 
has been mentioned earlier about his educatio4,. 
(b) His great respect for the `ulamV', who usually have 
staffed the judiciary, his confidence in their impartiality, 
1 23 
and his satisfaction that they were the most qualified persons for 
the judiciary. 
(c) The power of the `ulamV', who believed that judges had 
to be from among their own class. 
(d) The unwillingness of the King to participate in any 
judicial activities, since he was more interested in the political 
and the internal affairs of his realm. Indeed, he gave no 
indication that he wanted to exercise any judicial functions. One 
of his most urgent and important schemes was to curb the activities 
of thieves by the harshest means the law would permit. 
l24 If he 
had any desire to exercise a judicial function he would have tried 
cases relating-to theft. 
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(e) The long history of the independence .. of 
the. judiciary in 
Islam. 125 
Although-, judges were sometimes appointed in the paBt by the 
King, and are -still appointed by royal edict,, the ; judiciary is 
absolutely independent. 
126 The Saudi 
, 
Arabian judiciary.. is probably 
not less independent.. than that-in the country-which most clearly 
demonstrates the adoption of the theory, of . 
the separation of 
powers - namely the U. S. A. Foreign legal experts who had contact 
with the. Saudi Arabian judiciary. -admire its independence... For 
example, Hart, a former U. S. Consul in -Dhahran. (the centre of 
Aramco), 
. states 
that, the 
. 
first factor which caused the. Saudi . 
Arabian. 
-Judicial system 
to-function efficiently . 'gis the absolute 
incorruptibility, and 
; 
independence of the Shari `a 
, courts ..:. , 
ýý 127 
Shamma writes . that 
the judges.. exercise their judicial, functions 
"without 
; interference 
from the Government 
_"J 
28 On : the other hand 
Professor, Gershenson quoted, in; a certain case brought before the 
federal court in New. York : 
that when a lawyer, who had to prove , the 
Saudi Arabian law, failed to do so, he'bould only argue that there 
was no. legal ; system , 
there;, that parties there had to, 'go to- a 
dictatorial 
. monarch , 
who decided. according to his' whim whether such 
a claim should be redressed. "129 This account. of the Saudi 
Arabian judiciary is not accurate.; The . 
King, for instance, is 
amenable. to the appropriate. , court. of . 
his-, kingdom, even-an ordinary 
one, -irrespective of, -the fact that judges are considered to be his 
deputies. Indeed, the theory that "the Sovereign can-do no 
wrong"130is_completely foreign to the Shri_a which is the Saudi.. 
. Arabian law. 
131_. This fact-is an important proof of the indepen- 
dence of the Saudi. Arabian judiciary., -, -- ý.: 
However, no. constitutional documentl32states-explicitly that 
the judiciary must be independent. 
133 Its independence has been 
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achieved and maintained by, the absolute supremacy of the Shari`a, 
and through the constant practice of the judges in enforcing its 
rules. Nevertheless, it may not be premature to refer to the. fact 
that the Draft Law of the Judicial Authority134 states in its 
First Article: "Judges shall be independent, and there shall be no 
power over them in exercising their judicial functions except the 
power of the Sharl'a and. the prevailing laws, and no one shall 
interfere with the judiciaty. " This draft law is pending the 
assent of King Faisal, who has already stated in his government's 
programme in 1962: "We have determined to ... promulgate a law 
concerning the independence of the judiciary. +'135 ., We may conclude 
that this draft law will provide for this principle. 
Besides the separation of the judiciary from other powers - 
there are certain-important; measures which help- to maintain the 
independence of the judiciary. These are: - (i) the selection 
and appointment of judges according to specific standards of 
conduct, qualification, and experience; (ii) immunity against 
arbitrary removal and transfer;, (iii) immunity against disrespect; 
(iv) other measures for securing the impartiality of judges.. 
1. Selection and appointment of Judges 
The judges, in King `Abdul `Azlz's era were mostly chosen for 
their experience, seniority, and religious belief. At present, as 
the country has academic legal institutes, the judges have to be 
graduates from one of these institutes. They have to demonstrate 
a fair intelligence during the period of their study 
136 
and to 
have judicial training for one year at least. 
137 In addition they 
must be of highly religious and moral standard. - 
(During their 
study they are under-continuous observation with regard to, their 
conduct, piety, and general attitude towards religion. ) -- 
Having fulfilled. these requirements, they are then qualified 
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to be junior judges. --The appointment or promotion of any judge 
is nowadays by royal order issued on the recommendation of the 
Judicial Council (al-MaJlis), 138 which consists of six members. 
These members are chosen from amongst the judiciaries. They are 
a president, who is the High Judicial Authority, one member of 
each of the two Courts of- Cassation, and three members of the most 
senior presiding-judges of Grand Shar! a Courts. 
139 
- Judges are given financial privileges including high salaries 
which are. not -usually granted to administrative functionaries. 
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Before 1967, judges were appointed by the King or by the 
President of the Judiciary. However, Shaykh Muhammad be Ibrähim, 
11 
the last President of the. Judiciary, usually selected his judges 
without referring to the King. .: _Now they have to be appointed by 
royal order on the recommendation of the-Judicial Council. 
142 
2. Immunity against arbitrary removal and transfer 
This principle means that a judge must not be removed or 
transferred by the executive authority on its own initiative, but 
by a judicial authority independent of the executive. 
' 43 Although 
the. commission of -a judge holds less danger to his independence - 
than his removal, it is possible that commission, if abused, could 
be-used to influence him. Thus, modern laws try-to immunize a 
judge against the abuse of commission mainly by vesting the power 
of making the commission in a judicial authority. In Saudi Arabia, 
the law of the-Judges' Cadre determines that a-judge is irremovable. 
But he shall be pensioned off at seventy years of age; that is to 
say he-stays. in-office ten years longer than. a civil servant. 
Nevertheless,. a_judge: maybe removed for misbehaviour-or 
misconduct, 
144 
or for a criminal offence of some gravityi 
45on 
the 
decision of the Judicial Council, passed by a majority of five out 
of six votes; provided. that the decision is given assent by royal 
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order. 
146 A judge may likewise be subject to removal if he. shows 
inability on three. successive occasions. Yet', he. may appeal to 
the Judicial. Council, against the decision determining his inability, 
within. fifteen 
_ 
days of being informed of this decision. 
47 
A judge is not subject to transfer. or commission, except to a 
judicial office, and unless decided by the Judicial Council. If 
he is to be transferred or commissioned to an office outside the 
judiciary,. -the-Judicial Council must decide this in the above-, 
mentioned manner, and the decision must be approved by royal order. 
It-, remains to be said. that the High, Judicial Authority may, in 
exceptional cased (not specified), commission temporarily a judge 
to occupy a vacant judicial office, or an office of an absent 
judge.. But it is stipulated that the commission must be, (i) to a 
post which is not lower in rank to the original post of the 
commissioned- judge;. and (ii) for a period not exceeding three, 
months per year. 
148 
3. Immunity against disrespect 
Since judges are the persons who operate the machinery of 
justice, they. must enjoy-the maximum respect from individuals as 
well as from officials. Certain-measures are adopted to guarantee 
their integrity. It is. true that there are no well-defined rules 
relating to their immunity against disrespect, but they-may be 
traced in judicial laws and practice. This will be seen when we 
refer to contempt of court, and their protection from malicious 
actions. 
(a) Contempt of Court. Contempt. of Court may consist of. 
words or actions directed against the judge or the court 
149 
whether 
they occur inside150or outside151the court. They may also be 
directed against a person inside the_court152whether , or not, he 
is involved in the proceedings. Causing noise or disturbance 
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inside the court is also contempt of court. 
153 Contempt may take 
the form of interference with the proceedings154 other than by a 
prerogative order, which will be examined at a later stage. 
Attempt to delay the proceedings of court is regarded equally as 155 
contempt of court. Such a delay may take one of the following 
forms: - 
(i) False156 or biased157 allegation. 
(ii} Putting a case before a court after it has been finally 
decided. 158 
(iii) The refusal to appear before court after being sum«oned. 
159 
(b) Protection from'Malicious Actions. 'It is 'a general 
proposition of modern law that a judge who is appointed to 
administer the law should do so under its protection, both 
independently and freely, without fear of the consequences of his 
decision. It is for the benefit of the public that ajudge must 
be free to exercise his function. Immunity attaches only to a 
judicial act. Thus, a judge is liable for an unlawful refusal to 
hear a case, but not for erroneous judgement. A judge who exceeds, 
without malice, his jurisdiction is not liable for this" act, unless 
he neglects the order of the High Judicial Authority to'restrain 
his proceedings. No action lies against a judge in"reipect of-his 
ordinary defamatory words when exercising judicial duties. 
Nevertheless, a judge is liable for any act of malice, 'whether made 
inside or outside his judicial functions. 'Indeed, immunity is not 
granted for a malicious or corrupt judge. The law punishes 
160 
corruption and malice, misconduct and misbehaviour, and neglect of 
judicial duty, as well as other public crimes. However, any 
criminal or disciplinary charge or complaint against a judge has 
to be investigated and decided by the High Judicial Authority. 161 
4. Security of impartiality 
The law of Saudi Arabia imposes certain restrictions on a 
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judge regarding both his judicial function and his private life in 
an attempt to guarantee his impartiality. A judge, or a member of 
a court, must not- adjudicate a case to which he is a party, or a 
case concerning his ascendants, descendants, or spouse. Equally, 
it is generally accepted that he cannot sit to hear a matter to 
which he would not be permitted to testify, 'if he were not the 
judge. As a witness is not permitted to give evidence from which 
he may benefit'in any way, or evidence against his enemy, a judge 
cannot decide on a matter in which he has some interest, or a 
matter concerning his enemy. Where an'appellate judge has given a 
162 decision in a lower court, he must not participate in-its review. 
Judges are not permitted to take out of court any document 
relating to the-case in question. 
1 63 It is forbidden for judges 
or officials of courts to have private contacts outside the courts 
with either party, or their representatives. 
164-: Furthermore, 
judges are not permitted to take part in any activity which may 
affect their independence such as assuming a non-judicial-office 
or engaging in businesa. 
165 
Finally, it may be important to mention that,, with the, 
exception of the Shar! 'a Examining Magistrates of the Grievances 
Board, 166 the. members of the semi-judicial tribunals do not enjoy 
the. kind of immunity granted to the. judges of the Sharl`a courts, 
although some of the former may be of much higher rank. For 
example, the President of the Grievances Board, who ranks as' a: 
minister, does not have the immunity enjoyed by- a-Sharl'a 
magistrate. Nevertheless, the members of the semi=judicial 
tribunals are independent in exercising their judicial functions. 
(This will be illustrated in the Chapter on "Appeal. "),. - 
-42- 
References and Comments 
1. Philby, H. st. J. B., Arabia, London, 1930, p. 4. 
2. Wahba, H. v Jazira al-`Arab fi äl-Qarm al-` Ishrin, Cairo, 1967, p: 319- 
3- Ibid, PP- 320-321. 
4. Al-ManBr, Cairo, Part 5, Vol. XXI, August 26,1919, p" 235- 
59 Al-ManTir, part 1, Vol. XXVII , April 13,1926, p. 4. 
6. A1-Qibla, Mecca, July 17,1918 (Shawwwl 9,1336). 
7" Al-Manlr, part 1, Vol. XXVII, April 13,1926, p. 14. 
8. Al-Man&r, part 7, Vol. XXIV, July 14,1923, P" 584. 
90 Al-RRf`S, A. "S8`a ma: ` al Malik `Abdul `Az'iz'; see: al-ManRr, 
part 3, Vol. XXVII, June 11 , 1926, p. 273; See, an interview 
with the President of the Judiciary, Ibid, p. 276. 
10. Iitihäd means independence in forming a legal opinion based 
on the original sources of the Sharl'a. 
11. See, 3[1-al-Shaykh, H. `A. "al-WahhRbiyya", al-`Arabi, 
February, 19711, pp. 26-29. 
12. Concerning the development of the IIanb8li School, see (in 
English), `Abti Sulaiman, `A. I. The Role of Ibn QudAma. in 
Hanball Jurisprudence, (thesis), 1970t pp. 207-215; , 
State in Saudi Arabian Law, thesis , 1971 s PP. 31-37. 
13. Ibn al-Qaiyym al-Jawziyya, I`l'Am al-Muwaggi`T-n, Cairo, 
Vol. I, 'pp. 32-35; Ibn BadrBn, `A. b. A., al-Madkhal, Cairo, 
pp. 41-45. 
111. Armstrong, H. C., Lord of Arabia, London., p. 20. 
15. Famza, F. al-Bil'dd al- 4Arabiyya. a1-Sa. `üdiyya, Riyadh, 
1968, p. 13. 
16. cAdiq, M. T., Tatawwur al-Hukm_ wa al-Id-dra fi al-Mamlaka 
al-'Arabiyya a-a ___yya, 
ya , p. 22. 
17. Hamza, p. 28. 
18. Wahba, p. 324.. 
19. Ibid., p. 284. 
20. The Fundamental Instructions of the Kingdom of ; iijRz 
(1926), art. 6. 
21. See the Fatwa in `Ajl&nI, M., TBrikh Mamlaka fi Stra Za`Im: 
Faisal, 1968j, p. 211. 
22. The letter sent to the author from Shaykh Hasan A1-al-Shaykh 
(Minister of Education) concerning his father Shaykh 
`Abdulla b, tlasan, dated May 24,1971, appended together 
with a biography of Shaykh `Abdulla, (the first imn of the 
Settlement of "al-Art1wiyya", written by-Shaykh "Abdul 
RaI in n be `Abdul ILallf Al-al-Shaykh. 
23. The American University, Foreign Area Studies, Area Handbook 
for Saudi Arabia, Washington, 1971.. p. 35. 
24. Armstrong, P. 1.65- 
25- ijamza, p. 27- 
26. Armstrong, pp* 265-266. 
45 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
See the Fatwa in, Wahbah, pp. 296-297. 
Armstrong, pp. 198-199. 
Wahba, PP. 300-302. 
Ibid, p. 146. 
Ibid.., p. 152. 
Ibid., p. 269. 
Ibid., p. 271. 
Ibid., p. 269. 
See, Ibid, pp. 270-276. 
$Rdiq, pp. 24-25. 
Jjamza, p. 86. 
Art. 2. 
Art. 5. 
Arts. 7-8- 
Art. 9. 
Arts. 28-42. 
stldiq, p. 23. 
Ma1masäni , S, j, a1-Awýiä ` al-Tashri ` 
al-Bild al-`Arabiyya, Beirut, 
Ibid... p. 349. 
19 
rya wä' al-Qaýg'iyya fi 
j, P- 349. 
Hamza, p. 103. 
YamRnl, A. Z., "NizMm al-Hum fi al-Mamlaka al-`Arabiyya 
al-Sa`Udiyya", Ma5alla al-Jami`a, Riyadh University, 
1960, Vol. 3, p. 122. 
The Law of the Consultative Council of 1927, art. 14, quoted 
in Hamza, . 105; the Law of the Consultative Council of 
1926 (13475* Art. 12, quoted in Hamza, p. 107. 
YamrEn!; p. 121. 
Solaim, S. `A., Constitutional and Judicial Organization 
in Saudi Arabia thesis , 1970, p. 35" 
Umm al-Qurä, August 12p 1927 (14/2/1346). 
About its text, see.. Umm al-OurA, January 1,1932 (7/9/1350). 
Constitution of the Council of Deputies, art. 1. 
Ibid., art. 6. 
Ibid., art. 7. 
'Ajlani, p. 133. 
Fundamental Instructions (1926), art. 27. 
The Department of Foreign Affairs was divided into four 
Sections: Political, administrative, legal and consular. 
This department was directly connected with the Royal 
Court, but it carried out the orders of the Viceroy in 
connection with the administrative and consular sections. 
(The Fundamental Instructions, arts., 17-19). 
-'414 - 
59. Ibid, arts. 28,31. 
60. Constitution of the Council of Deputies, 1931p arts. 16-17. 
61. Ibid, art. 3. 
62. Ibid., arts. 2,21. 
63. Hamza, p. 86. 
6i. Art. 6, quoted in Hamza, p. 95. 
65. Umm tl-Qur&, October 15,1926. 
66. See, Solaim, p. p. 6,25. 
67. R. D. No. 5/19/1/4288 of 1/2/1373 (1953). 
68. Q'adiq, p. 55- 
69e R. D. No. 5/20/1/6498- 
70. YamIIn'I, p. 121. 
71. No. 37 of May 22,1958 (2/2/1377). 
72.. No. 38 of 22/10/1377 (1958). 
73. Constitution of the Council of Ministers of 1958, art. 18. 
74. Ibid, art. 19. 
75. Ibid, art. 141. 
76. Ta1ä1 b. `Abdul 'Aziz, Ris8la ilä MuwBtin, p. 9, 
Quoted in Solaim, p. 71. 
77. He is now the King of Saudi Arabia. 
78. Gaury, Gerald de, (Appendix)., p. 147. 
79. Quoted in Gaury, (Appendix)., p. 148. 
80. Ibid, pp. 148-149. 
81. The Council will be set up when the "Law of the Judicial 
Authority" is enforced. 
The Ministry of Justice was established in 1970, The 
Supreme Judicial Council and the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor will be established when the Law of the 
Judicial Authority, which is in a final stage of study 
by the Council of Ministers, is approved by the King. 
82. Schacht J. "Islamic: Law in Contemporary States. " The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. VIII, 1959, 
p. -136. 
83o Art o 6. 
84. See the programme., in Gaury, (Appendix I) p pp. 147-151- 
85. `Assa, A., Mu1 jiza fawa al-Rim&l, Beirut, 1966, p. 148. 
For further information, see, Sa'Id, p. 162. 
86. King"Faisal's speech at the ceremony made in his honour 
in 1967 by the King of Belgium, quoted in Umm al-Qur&, 
June 2,1967 (214/2/1387). 
87. See, R. W. No. 1166 of 27/12/1345 (1927). 
- 45 - 
88. Where there is a problem which is not determined by the 
ur'ýn or the Sunna, not agreed upon by the consensus 
of the authorities, iitingd (individual legal 
oponion) is then to be referred to. The principle of 
ijtihtd may easily be achieved by applying the principle 
of al-maeRlih al-mursala. 
89. Since most aspects of the adjective law and administrative 
rules are not strictly definde by the Shart'a, King `Abdul 
`Aziz and his judiciaries were able to incorporate, to a 
certain degree, from the Ottoman system which existed in 
the cities of HiJlz. 
9C. The Decision of the Judicial Commission, No. 3 of 7/1/13b7 
(1928)p determined that judges had to refer to two Hanbali 
commentary books when deciding upon a matter-. These were: 
(i) Sharb Muntahä al-Ir8d1t, by al-Bahlttl and (ii) Kashsh&f 
al-Qin8' $an Matn al-Iang', by al-BahUti. Another two 
Hanball commentaries were substituted for the former; they 
were: al-Bawd al-Murbi' bi Sharh ZRd al-Mustaqna' of al- 
BahBt3, and 
Manir 
al-Sabil fi Sharh al-Dalil of Ibn 
]uwayy8n. The more extensive Iianbali books were to be 
consulted if the case pending examination had no adequate 
ruling in the former ones. There were four more books 
which were generally recognized as authoritative. These 
were: (i) al-Iann`, by al-Vajj&wi, (ii) Muntah"d al- 
Ir'IdXt; by al-FutllII, (iii) al-Muglinl, by Ibn Quddma, 
M., and (iv) al-Shari al-KabTr of Ibn Quddma, S. (See, 
1! amza, p. 197). 
91. Indeed, in practice, the judges do not rigidly confine 
their rulings to the J5anbalT opinion, but they may occasio- 
nally exercise their own discretion. By doing so they are 
applying the principle of # tihad. (See, Abn Sulaiman, 
pp. 249-251; `ALI, PP. 54-55 " Yet, the Hanbali law is 
officially and, to a great extent in practice, still the 
law applied-by Sharr a courts. Moreover, in controversial 
or serious cases, the judges usually refer to Shari 
. Muntahl al-Ir'fiddt, and 
to Kashshäf al-in' 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
The Decision of the Judicial Commission, sanctioned by the 
King on 30/12/1348 (1930). 
H. W. No. 5/9/2 of 13/7/1353 (1934). 
Yammn3, p. 121. 
R. O. No. 2716 of 17/5/1351 (1932), g quoted in Ijamza, p. 95. 
None of these laws came into being, except the last. 
Nafisa, M. A., 
thesis), 1972, p. lb. 
98. See, e. g., R. D. of 4/2/1346 (1927). 
99. A typical example of this was the objection of the Presidency 
of the Judiciary to the Law of the Guardianship Court 
(al-Majlis al-Visbi) [C. D., D. No. 35 of 16/5/1336 (1937)]-- 
Furthermore, an American life insurance company in Saudi 
Arabia was abolished on the order of the President of the 
Judiciary. [L, of C. M. to M. C. I. No. 2190 of 27/10/1389 - (1969)] 
100. L. of P. K. O. to P. C. D. No. 99/2/2 of 20/1/1355 (1936). 
- 46 - 
101. See, L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 1290/1 of 7/7/1389 (1969). 
102. L. of P. C. M. to M. I. No. 12812 of 26/7/1387 (1967)- 
103. L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 526/1 of 16/3/1389 (1969). 
1.04. See,, e. g., Law of Companies, the Memorandum introducing 
the Law, R. D. No. M/6 of 22/3/1385 (1965). 
105. See, e. g. Law of the Co-operative Society, the Code, p. 13. 
106. Fatwa No. 383 of 7/3/1379 (1959). The text of the Fatwa _ is enclosed in L. of the Mufti to the King No. 1725 of 
24/12/1380 (1961 ). 
107. H. O. No. 197146 of 22/9/1379 (1959)- 
108. Lipsky, G. A., Saudi Arabia, New Haven, 1959, P. 126. 
109. The Constitution of the Council of Ministers of 1953, 
arts. 7-8. 
110. The Constitution of the Council of Ministers of 1958, 
art. 18. 
111.4Ajl1; ni, (footnotes) p. 265. 
112. The Constitution of the Council of Ministers of 1958, 
art. 44. 
113. Lipsky., p. 120. 
1114. Mahma$8ni, p. 360. 
11.5. L. of P. K. 0. to Vic. No. 2620/1366 of 22/10/1351 (1933). 
116. H. 0. to M. C. I. No. 21900 of 27/10/1379 (1960); H. O. to 
M. I. No. 3829 of 211/2/1388 (1968). See also, al'AmUdI, 
"al-Tan; im al-QadB'I fi al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al- 
Sa'Udi a", a lecture at King 'Abdul 'AzIz University 
(Jeddah) on 8/7/1388 (1968). 
117. C. No. 1819/3/M of 14/6/1385 (1965). 
118. Seery "Governmental Proclamation", Umm A1 urä, 29/2/1344 
(September 17,1925); Law of Administrative Council [C-. C. D. 
of 19/7/1352 (19 3)J , Chap. II, art. 2; C. M., D. No. I of 
30/12/1391 (19723* 
119" It may be worth mentioning that there has been no 
capitulation in Saudi Arabia. (Hart, T. B., "Application of 
Hanbalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in Saudi Arabia", 
George Washington Law Review, xxii, December 1953, P"P" 
1 5,169; Shhwi, M. T. , Mu-4ag. arrt fi al-Tashrl' al-Jin& 
t' fi 
al-Duwal al-'Arabi Ya, Cairo, 1954, PP. 37-38; 'Assa, pp. 
112-113. It is true that Saudi Arabia has some legal 
treaties and conventions wit4 other countries (see, Solaim 
pp. 131-132), but this is inevitable for a country of this 
century. For further information see, 
(C. C., D. No. 60 of 
17/3/1358 (1939); L. of the British Commissioner in Saudi 
Arabia to P. M. No. 39 (829/1283/10) of April 8,1939 (30/2/ 
1359); M. of F. M. to Vic. No. 153/2/19 of 13/3/1359 (1940); 
L. of P. C. M. to G. B. No. 1612 of 19/1 1383 (196 ); L. of F. M. 
to M. I. No. 31/1, ) '0/12995/3 of 23 11/1383 (19643; L. of F. M. 
to M. I. No. 22/5/30/11158 of 2/9/1389 (1969). 
120. Some wtiters maintain that the Islamic judiciary had known' 
the independence of the judiciary one thousand gears before 
Montesquieu formulated his theory. (Arsilän. M. S., al-Qa g' 
47 
wa al-Quddt, Beirut, 1969, P. 39)- 
121. Wade, E. C. S. and Bradley, A. W., Constitutional Law, 
London, 1965, p. 22. 
122. Hasan, I. H., Tärikh al-Isl m al-Siyäsi, Cairo, 1948) 
Vol. I. p. 378. 
123. L. of King `Abdul `Azrz to his son Faisal (the Viceroy in 
Hiijäz) of 3/4/1349 (1930). 
124. Lipsky, p. 124; Mutwalls, 'A. j, Mablldl' Nizäm al-Hukum fi 
al-I slllm, Cairo v 1966, pp. 1403-404. 
125. Hasan, vol. It P. P. 377,379,380; Hasan, I. H., and Hasan, a1-Nuzun al-Islämiyya, Cairo, 1962, p. p. 275,276,219. 
126. In this respect, the Saudi Arabian judiciary is, to a large 
extent, similar to the English judiciary. 
127. P. 172. 
128. Shamma, S., "Law and Lawyers in Saudi Arabia", International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, XIV, July 1965, p. 1035- 
129. Gershenson, Milton, M., "Fasten Your Seat Belt and Know 
Your Travel Law", Worldwide P. and I. Planning, Marcb/ 
April, 1969, P- 35. 
130. In this matter the Saudi Arabian judiciary differs funda- 
mentally from its English counterpart. 
131. Shamma, ibid, pp. 1034-1035. 
132. The "Ten Point Programme of 1962" of Faisal stresses the 
necessity for the independence of the judiciary. 
133. The Law of Administrative Governors and Councils (Art. 15) 
states: "It is prohibited that the governor may interfere 
in judicial affairs ... " The Law of Regional Governments (Art. 10) determines that governors or their assistants 
must not interfere with the judicial functions of judges or 
try to influence them in any way. 
134. Ni; 'Gm al-Sul4a al-QaýViyya. 
135. The Third Point of the Programme. - 
136. See The Judges' Cadre, R. D. No. Mu1 of 12/1/1387 (1967) 
art. 2. 
137. Ibid, art. 3- 
138. Ibid, art. 18. 
139. The function of the Judicial Council is determined by the 
"Judges Cadre", arts. 15-16. 
1140. Durayb, S., "brief report on the judiciary", 1972. As to 
the amount of judges' salaries, see the "Judges' Cadre", 
Appendices. 
141. Baroudi, George, "Shari'a Law of Islam", Aramco World, 
November/December 1966, p. 30. 
142. Judges' Cadre, art. 18. 
- 48 - 
1.43. Sh&w!, M. T., Muhhdarrt fi al-Mabädi' al-AsUsi a li al- 
Tan; Im al-qa f al-Bild al- Arabiyya, Cairo, 1957, 
P. 37. 
144. Judges' Cadre, art. 12. 
145" See, ibid, art. 26; Law of Civil Servant (Ni;; Bm al- 
Muwa; Zahn al-? qmm) (1958/1377), art. 85. 
146. Judges' Cadre, art. 12. 
147. Ibid, art. 19. 
148. Ibid, art. 20. 
149. See, P. P. v. al-`Azlb, M. C. , 
(al-Has! ')., D. of 1388 (1969). 
150. C. C., D. No. 252 of 22/11/1350 (1930- 
151. C. C., D. No. 40 of 9/2/1352 (1933). 
152. Gharlb v. BjFdI, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 191 of 1385 (1965). 
153. Law of 1936, art. 114; Law of 1952p(A)j, art. 74. 
154. Law of 1938j. art. 280; Law of 1952 (B),. art . 256. 
155. L. of King `Abdul `Azlz to Vic. No. 67/2/6 of 14/2/1355 
(1936). 
156. Ibid. 
157" L. of P. C. M. to M. I. No. 17993 of 11/7/1383 (1963). 
158. P. J., Co No. 82/M/T of 2/7/1389. (1969). 
159. L. of P. K. O. to CCC. No. 8/15/842 of 19/8/1368 (1949); 
R. O. to A. G. (Shagrll) No. 15841 of 16/5/1375 (1955)- 
16o. See, P. J. , D. No. 81 of 26/2/1359 
(1940); L. of P. K. O. to Vic. No. 33/1/6 of 12/14/1359 (1940); L. of P. C. M. to P. J. 
No. 11951 of 13/5/1384 (1964). 
161. See, e. g. Law of 1931 , art. 36; Law of 1952 (B), art. 21; 
M. J., D. No. 1008 of 8/9/1390 (1970). 
162. See, e. g. Law of 1952 (B), art. 31; Regulations for the 
High Judicial Committee, art. 6. 
163. Sea, e. g. Instructions of 1967, art. 29. 
164. Law of 1938P art. 280; Law of 1952 (B) p 
art 
o 256. 
165. A. G. of NajrBn v. Judge al-Janfbi, G. B. Registry, . 
1375. 
(1955-56), vol. I, p. I. For further information, see the 
"Draft Law of the Judicial Authority", art. 58. 
166. C. M., D. No. 91 of 4/4/1390 (1970). 
I 
Chapter Two 
CRIMINAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
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I. THE SHARI`A COURTS 
The judicial reforms undertaken by the late Ottomans did not 
apply to Hijäz because of its special religious position. 
1 During 
the period of ottoman rule in Vijäz there was a chief judge, who was 
a Janafi, and three deputy judges representing the other Sunni 
schools. 2 The fact that the judiciary in HijrLz was Islamic made 
it easy for the Hashemite King, IIusayn, as well as for King `Abdul 
`Aziz who came to power after him-to adopt a similar judicial 
system. Indeed, the judiciary then existing in Hijäz, which was 
Ottoman in character, was not changed by King `Abdul `Azlz until 
he was in full control of Uijäz in 1926. In that year he establishes 
in Mecca the Presidency of the Judiciary (Ri'äsa al-Qadä') and 
the Shari`a Court (al-Mabkama al-Shar'iyya). The former was the 
High Judicial Authority, and the latter was an interim court, which 
was replaced in 1927 by three courts, as we shall see below. The 
Presidency of the Judiciary at that time was headed by a Wahhhbi 
jurist (`Rlim) called `Abdullah b. Bulayhid. The Sharl'a Court 
was composed of: - 
(a) A chief judge, who was a Hanafl. 
(b) Two first deputy judges, a Helakl and a Shaf`I. 
3 (c) A second deputy judge, who was a Jlanball. 
Thus, all the Sunni schools were represented in the court in order 
to cover cases involving the followers of the four Sunni schools, 
who constituted the vast majority of the inhabitants of Mecca. 
The Ottoman influence is seen in its composition. 
The establishment of the judicial institutions in this manner 
did not last for very long. The judiciary was re-constituted by 
the Law of 1927 concerning the organisation of the Shari`a courts. 
By this law, King `Abdul 'AzTz laid down solid foundations for the 
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judiciary, not-only in Mecca, but in VijRz as a: whole. Suhsequently, 
this judicial system proved itself to be the most suitable judicial 
system for the whole `of Saudi Arabia. The laws which followed the 
Law of 1927 did "not bring any drastic changes, but created 
additional institutions, and altered or added some procedural rules 
in response to the normal evolution in the economic, social, 
administrative; and educational circumstances of the country. All 
types of courts of first instance were creat_ed-by this law, except 
the Third Magistrate's Courts, which 'were established in 1952,5 
6 
and later abolished in 1971 . 
In the system'of Shari4a Courts, there are no purely criminal 
courts. 'All the courts, which are empowered to hear_, criminal 
cases, also settle civil disputes. Thus, we shall refer briefly 
to the civil jurisdiction of these courts, in order to form a clear 
picture of the Courts with which we are dealing. These courts are 
the First' Magistrate's Courts, the'-Second Magistrate's Courts, the 
Magistrate 'sYCourts, the Grand Sharl'a Courts, the Shar3'a Courts, 
the Committee'of Review, the Courts of Cassation, and the Supreme 
Appellate Authority. 
A. The-First Magistrate's Courts 
The first First Magistrate's Court (Ma$kama Musta`jala Ui ) 
in Saudi `Arabia was established in Mecca. in accordance with the 
Läw of 1927" It 'set the pattern for the rest of the First 
Magistrate's Courts, which were instituted only in'the important 
cities of Saudi Arabia. 
A First Magistrate's Court is empowered to hear all crimes 
which fall within the SharT`a judiciary, except the following: - 
(a) The hadd of illegal sex relations (zing). 7 
(b) ' The: hradd of theft sari aT). 
(o) Highway robbery (qa' al-tarlq, or hir&ba) 
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(d) Apostasy from, Islam (ridda- . 
(e) Crimes-of retaliation (qi a ). 
Thus, this type of court deals with all crimes of ta'zTr, and 
crimes of the hadd of intoxication (sukr) and defamation (gadhf). 
8 
It decides also some minor civil disputes, not involving a sum. of 
more-than approximately £30.9 In addition, it settles-cases con- 
cerning the compensation for corporal injury (arch) which does not 
amount to more than one tenth-of the whole blood-money. 
10, 
These First Magistrate's Courts are competent to hear cases. 
involving urban dwellers only. 
11 
B. The Second Magistrate's Courts 
The first Second Magistrate's Court (Mal)kama Musta'jala 
Thän1ya) was established in Mecca, in 1927, like the first First 
Magistrate's Court. 12 It was a pioneer for the other Second 
Magistrate's Courts, which were set up side by side with the First 
Magistrate's Courts in the important cities. 
A Second Magistrate's Court decides the same type of cases 
13 lying within the jurisdiction of the First Magistrate's Courts, 
provided that both parties are Bedouins. In addition, it settles 
some civil cases among Bedouins, which concern non-serious personal, 
commrcia1, and agricultural disputes on bequests, guardianship 
and inheritance. 
14 
The Jurisdiction of this type of court may extend to include 
an urban dweller who is a party in a minor dispute with a Bedouin. 
15 
C. The Magistrate's Courts 
These courts were created by the Law of 1927. Two 
Magistrate's Courts, one in Jeddah and the other in. Madina, were 
established. Subsequently, Magistrate's Courts were established 
in towns which had no-,, other type of magistrate's courts to deal with 
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the magistrates. Thus, 
J -- 
- 53 - 
a Magistrate's Court is empowered to hear cases, criminal or 
civil, involving both urban-dwellers and Bedouins. 
16 But, it is to 
be noted here that the Magistrate's Court of Madina was 
disqualified in 1936 by a royal will17 of hearing criminal cases 
pertaining to the inhabitants of Madina. However, the detailed 
Law of 1938 did not reaffirm this disqualification. Therefore, 
it may be concluded that. the Magistrate's Court of Madina has 
regained its full competence as a Magistrate's Court. 
Comparison between the magistrate's courts 
All three types of magistrate's courts have only one judge. 
18 
These courts hear cases which need a speedy handling because they 
are not so serious as to be dealt with by a Grand Sharl'a Court, 
or a Shari'a Court. 
Of the three types, the First Magistrate's Courts have the 
smallest jurisdiction. Next come the Second Magistrate's Courts. 
The Magistrate's Courts have the greatest jurisdiction, since they 
are competent to hear all kinds of cases decided by the First and 
Second Magistrate's Courts. As to the number of cases heard, the 
First Magistrate's Courts have the largest number. This may be 
due to the fact that the First Magistrate's Courts are constituted 
in the most heavily populated cities, which have a higher 
proportion of crimes. The jurisdiction of these magistrate's 
courts has been slightly reduced, since some cases which used to be 
tried by them have been allocated to semi-judicial tribunals. 
However, they still hear the vast majority of crimes. 
In 1927, the judgements of the Magistrate's courts were made 
liable to appeal. But if an appellant failed'to establish that 
the judgement was contrary to the Shrl`a, the court had the 
option of refusing to commit the case for appeal. 
19 This rule was 
abolished by Article 33 of the Law of 1931, which determined that a 
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criminal judgement of-a lower court was to be automatically 
committed for review. The Law of 1936 basically followed this 
Article, but it determined that a conviction of a crime of ta`zir2° 
based on an. express confession was not appealable. 
21 Nevertheless, 
the Law of 1952(A) does not distinguish between a judgement based 
on an express confession and a judgement based on any other kind of 
evidence. In other words, all decisions decreed by a magistrate's 
court are appealable. In 1954, a royal order22 repealed the right 
of appeal, but this order was not applied by all courts until 195 
ý3 7. 
Hence, a judgement of a. -magistrate's court was officially 
inappealable. This fact was confirmed by Article 5 of the Instructions 
of 1962. But when The Instructions of 1967ý5 
24 
were promulgated, 
appeal against the judgements of the magistrate was practically 
restored. The exceptions to this were: - 
(a) When-the sentence was of no more than forty lashes or 
ten days imprisonment. 
(b) When the judgement concerned a sum of no more than 
26 SR500 (£50), or its equivalent. 
D. The Grand Sharl'a Courts 
The first Grand Shari'a Court (Mahkaina Shar`iyya Kubrä) was 
established in Mecca in accordance with the Law of 1927, 
ý7 
and was 
to set the pattern for the remainder cf the Grand Shar3'a Courts, 
which have since been constituted in the important cities in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The judges of the Grand Shari`a Court of Mecca were at this time 
28 29 
three in number. By 1971, they numbered seven. With the excep- 
tion of the Law of 1927, the Judicial Laws do not determine the 
number of judges of a Grand Sharl'a Court. It is usually determined 
according to need. For instance, the Grand Sharl'a Court of Riyadh, 
the capital, has eleven judges, while that of al-DawNdmi, a small 
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city, has only three. 
3° This shows the great difference in the 
number of judges. 
A Grand Shari`a Court has competence to hear all cases which 
do not fall within the jurisdiction of magistrate's courts, and 
which are tried by the Shar34a judiciary. As a magistrate's court 
hears a comparatively small proportion of civil and a large. 
proportion of criminal cases, so a Grand Sharl'a Court hears a 
large proportion of civil cases and a small proportion-of criminal 
cases. It settles most of the civil disputes, but it tries very 
few crimes. These crimes are: - 
(a) The crimes of the badd of zin , 
31 highway robbery, and 
apostasy from Islam. 
(b) The crimes of retaliation. 
32 
Besides that, Grand Shari'a Courts were entitled, in 1931 
(1350), to review criminal judgements passed by magistrate's courts 
sitting in the same venue as the former. 
33 But the Grand Shari`a 
Court of Mecca was not accorded such appellate power before 1954.34 
However, the Grand Shari'a Courts had ceased to act-as appellate 
authorities by the end of 1957.35 
Here, the question may arise as to whether the judgements of 
a Grand Shari'a Court itself have been appealable. In answering 
this question, we have to distinguish between civil and criminal 
cases as follows: - 
(a) Most of the civil cases which were within the competence 
of Grand Sharl'a Courts were appealable from the time these courts 
were established in 1927 
6 
until 1954.37 Still, appeal against the 
judgements passed by Grand Shari'a Courts was restored in 1962,38 
but in 1967, such an appeal against civil judgements of minor 
cases was annulled. 
39 
(b) As to criminal cases, although original judgements were 
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made final in 1954 and in 1957,, criminal judgements by Sharl' a 
Courts continued to need approval by the. President of the Judiciary, 
as they had prior to this date. This measure, however,, may be 
classified as a kind of. appeal, especially since the President was 
to study thoroughly the cases and approve, or reverse, the sentences. 
In 1962, the Courts of Cassation were set up, and the criminal 
judgements of Grand Shari'a Courts were made liable to appeal. 
4° 
Thus, all criminal judgements by the Grand Sharl'a Courts 
have been appealable, in one way or another, since the establishment 
of, the Shari` a judiciary in 1927. 
From all that has been said, a Grand Shari`a Court used to 
have both jurisdiction of first instance (as some of its judgements 
were appealable, particularly the criminal ones) and appellate., 
jurisdiction (since it reviewed, at one time, the criminal judgements 
passed by a magistrates court). Now, it has only an original 
jurisdiction - that means it is a court of first instance. 
E. The Shari`a Courts 
According to the Law of 1927, two SharI`a Courts41 were to be 
established, one in Jeddah, and the other in Madina. 
42 Subsequently, 
this kind-of court began to spread in Saudi Arabia, so much so that 
their number is now greater than that of any other kind of court. 
The number of the judges of each Sharl'a Court has never-been 
determined by law but has been fixed according to need. The only 
exception was the Law of 1927 which determined that Sharl'a Courts 
of Jeddah and Madlna were to . consist of 
two judges, a first. (chief) 
judge, and a second (deputy) judge. 
43 
Before the establishment of modern administrative systems . 
in 
Saudi Arabia, the Sharl'a Courts were classified- into two kinds: - 
(a) Organized courts which occupied a permanent building and 
worked according to fixed office hours, such as the courts of 
- 57 - 
Jeddah and Madlna. 
(b) Courts in towns outside Hijrtz, and in villages in all 
provinces. These usually consisted of one judge, who heard cases: 
in any convenient place, even in his home or in the market or in 
the building of the office of the governor, and at any, convenient 
time, whether during the day. or night. 
44 At the present time, 
every court, even if it is in a village, occupies a building called 
"the Court" (al-Mal; ksma), and cases are decided during set. office 
hours. 
A Sharl'a Court is empowered to hear: - 
(a) All cases decided by a Grand Sharl'a Court, 
45 
since a 
Sharl'a Court is constituted in an area where no Grand Sharl'a 
Court exists. 
(b) All cases. adjudged by a magistrate's court in an area 
where no magistrate's court exists. 
46 There has been only one 
exception to this rule in the history of the Saudi Arabian 
Judiciary. From 1936 to 1938, the Shari` a Court of Madina was 
entitled to try the criminal cases of the towns people which were 
17 
allocated, originally, to the Magistrate's Court. 
(c. ) All functions falling within . the competence of 
the Public 
Notary (Kätib al-`Adl); where no office of Public Notary in the 
jurisdiction of the Sharl'a Court exists. 
49 
(d) The jurisdiction of "Bart al-M1", 
50 
where no such office 
exists within the Sharl`a Courts venue. 
51 
It is to be concluded that a Sharl'a Court may have a large 
criminal jurisdiction if there is no magistrate's court situated. 
in its venue, but if there is a magistrate's court, the criminal.. 
jurisdiction of the Sharl'a Court will be very, limited. Thus, a 
Shar36a Court with a single judge in a village, which does not have 
a magistrate's court, exereises. much greater jurisdiction than a. 
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Shari`a Court in a big city, where a magistrate's court exists. 
F. The Committee of Review 
The words "tam Tz" and "tadgio" mean the same thing. They 
have been used in the judicial laws and regulations t to mean 
reviewing a judgement of a court of first instance , by an appellate 
authority, in order to ensure: - 
(a) That the judgement conforms to the rules of the Shari a, 
and if not, the court is to be informed of the right judgement as 
to the case in issue, and instructed to avoid the error in future. 
(b) That the sentence, if left to the discretion of the court, 
is consistent with-the general spirit of the Shart'a. 
52 
The power of review (tamytz or tadai4) was first invested in 
the Presidency of the Judiciary in 1927.53 But in 1931, a special 
committee attached to the Presidency was accorded the power"of 
review. It was called "The Committee of Review". 
54 This committee 
comprised a president, who was to be the President of the Judiciary, 
55 
and four-members who were, incidentally, the same members of the 
Presidency of the Judiciary. 
56 Although the President ofýthe 
Judiciary was the President of the Committee, -he was only to give 
his opinion on judicial questions hike any other member. 
57 The 
Committee had. only one president throughout its existence - he was 
Shaykh `Abdullah b. Hasen Al-al-Shaykh (1870-1959). 
58 
The judgements which had to be reviewed were those concerning 
civil cases, provided that these were not minor ones. 
59 The 
criminal judgements were not to be reviewed unless they concerned 
crimes of retaliation (¢i$ß$), 
60 
and hudUd, excluding the judgements 
of the had& of intoxication and defamation. 
61 
However, all criminal 
cases tried in Mecca were liable to be reviewed by the Committee* 
62 
The Committee ceased to exist in 1954. t when the original 
judgements were made final. The reason why these judgements were 
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made final was to shorten the procedure so that cases would be 
dealt with in the speediest way possible. Yet, it appears that 
this measure was not successful-in shortening the procedure, as 
planned, since some parties began to complain to the'King or to the 
High Judicial Authority, who usually considered their complaints. 
This resulted in inconvenience and waste of time to the adminis- 
trative and judicial authorities. Consequently,. the execution of 
the judgements was delayed. In order to avoid this inconvenience 
and delay, the authority executing'the. judgements, the Ministry of 
the Interior, proposed to the King in 1961 the establishment of 
some independent institutions to deal with the review of the 
judgements, and whose decisions were to be final. 
63 
The King and 
the President of the Judiciary approved-this proposal and put it 
into practice by creating appellate institutions in. 1962. They were 
called the Courts of Cassation (Ma$8kim al-Tamyiz) or (Ham 
al-TamyTz). 
G. The Courts of Cassation -I 
There are two Courts of Cassation, one in Riyadh, and the 
other in Mecca. The first deals with cases decided by the courts 
of the Central Province and the Eastern Province. The second deals 
with cases decided. by the courts in the Western Province. The 
number of judges is not fixed by their laws-or regulations, but is 
decided according to need. However, in the Court of Cassation in 
Riyadh, there were four judges (including the Chief Judge),, before 
1971, but after that their number rose to six. In. -the court of 
Mecca, the number rose from three to six in 1971.64 
According to Article 5 of the Instructions of 1962., only the 
judgements of the Grand SharT'a Courts, and the judgements of the 
magistrate's courts concerning a trustee of endowment (watt), a 
guardian: or an absent person, were appealable to the Courts of 
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Cassation. 
65 This means that the vast majority of criminal. 
judgements -were `iiöt -läppealable. Nevertheless, the criminal 
jurisdiction "ofýthese cöurts was enlarged by the-Instructions of 
1967, which are1now in`"force. ' According to these-instructions, a 
decision by- 'a-lower court, whether criminal or civil, -is' appealable, 
except when: - ... 
(a) It does not involve more than SR500 (£50), or--its 
equivalent. 
(b) It. 'does nöt inflict- a punishment ca'm'e than, forty lashes - 
or ten days imprisonment. '' 
However, - certain decisions are to be committed to the'Court' 
of Cassation under' all"circumstances. These are: - -- 
(a) Sentences imposing mutilation66 or-death. 
6? 
- 
'(b) Convictions against trustees of endowment (wagf), 
guardians, or "Bart al-M1", 
68 
except if the-convicted persons are 
foreign pilgrims, where-decisions of-lower courts are 'to be . carried 
out69 on account of the fact that the said persons are due to, leave 
the country quickly, so that their. 'cases have to be dealt with 
expeditiously. 
(c) Decisions concerning real estate. 
70 
(d)= Decisions awarded by default. 
71 
(e) Decisions referred by-the Judicial Authority, even, if 
originally they-were-not liable to -appeal. 
72 
(f) =Decisions'-against juveniles. 
73 
, 
Thus, most criminal cases triable by lower Sharl'a courts are 
liable to appeal. 
A-comparison between the-Committee of Review and the Courts 
of Cassation -shows=-the. 
following facts: - 
(a) Both have the-function of affirming or reversing the 
decisions of - courts of ,_ 
first instance. 
. 
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(b) The Committee of Review was the final judicial 
authority, except when the sentence imposed death or mutilation, 
and the fact that the President of the Judiciary was its Chief 
Judge assured. it of this kind of authority. Moreover, King `Abdul 
`AzTz informed the Council of Deputies that if the Committee of 
Review and the Presidency of the Judiciary differed in their 
decisions upon a judicial issue, the decision of the Committee was , 
to be considered valid. 
74 Although this difference was unlikely 
to happen, since both the Presidency and the Committee consisted of 
the same members, it indicated how final were the decisions of the 
Committee. As to the Courts of Cassation, the matter is-not quite 
the same. The High Judicial Authority (represented at present by 
the ;: Jiigh Judicial Committee) may reverse the decision of the Court 
of Cassation if its decision is liable to review, such as that 
concerning death or mutilation. - Thus, it-may be concluded. that the 
Committee of Review used-to have greater power over the judgements 
of original courts than the Court of Caseation. 
H. The Supreme Appellate Authority 
1. The President of the Judiciary. 
Having examined the appellate institutions in Saudi Arabia, 
it is necessary to deal with the supreme appellate authorities 
which the judiciary has known. This means that we have to refer 
now to the Presidents of the Judiciary. The first President was 
Shaykh `Abdullah b. Bulayhid, who took office75 soon after King 
`Abdul `Aziz occupied Hijäz in 1926. He retired in 1927. In 
virtue of what'has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
about the judicial situation at that time, one cannot draw a clear 
picture of the power of the President of the Judiciary during the 
office of the Shay-kh b. Bulayhid. 
In 1927, Shaykh `Abdullah b. Iasan succeeded to the Presidency 
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of the Judiciary. 
76 In 1931, he was invested with an appellate 
jurisdiction to review sentences imposing punishments of a hadd or 
retaliation (giqc) in HijHz and its dependencies, and any criminal 
judgement decreed in Mecca, no matter how lenient it was. 
77 Since 
1936, he was empowered only to review sentences of mutilation and 
death, but he continued, to have the power to review any criminal 
decision given in Mecca. 
78 However, 
-the 
King occasionally referred 
this type of sentence to the . 
Mufti Shaykh Mu4ammad b. Ibra-him 
Al-al-Shaykh, (the most important`Alim in Najd and the Head-of its 
Judiciary). 79 But after 1950, when Shaykh `Abdullah was in his: 
eighties and still-in office, the King referred cases more 
frequently to Shaykh. MuJ; ammad b. Ibrähim as a final appellate 
authority. 
80 This became apparent after the review of the . 
judgements was repealed in 1954. In 1959, Shaykh 'Abdullah died, 
and Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrahim presided over the whole judiciary of 
Saudi Arabia. 81 In addition to reviewing the-sentences of-mutilation 
and death, Shaykh Muhammad had the power to give-the casting 
opinion, when the members of. the Court of Cassation were equally 
divided on an issue. 
82 In November 1969,, Shaykh Muhammad died 
leaving behind him serious: cases pending a final review. 
2. The Judicial Commission of 1970. 
In January 1970, King Faisal issued- a royal order allocating 
the appellate authority of Shaykh Mu4ammad to aCommission situated 
in Riyadh, and compoied, of five members. It made its decisions by 
majority. Its decisions were final - exactly as the decisions-of 
Shaykh Muhammad. 
83 In September 1970, the Presidency of the 
Judiciary was converted-into a ministry, which was called the 
"Ministry of Justice". 
81 Its_Minister85 gras in theory accorded the 
same power which-had-been allocated to the President of the 
Judiciary. Yet, in practice, the Minister of Justice has. no_ 
86 
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appellate power such as that enjoyed by the President of the 
Judiciary. This fact made the Commission the ultimate Appellate 
authority. However, this Commission lasted only for about one year 
and in 1971 it was replaced by the new High Judicial Committee 
(al-Hay' a al-Q, ac A' iyya al=Ulyä) . 
3. The High Judicial Committee. 
This Committee was set up in January 1971 in Riyadh. 
87 
It 
consisted of a chairman and four members. The Chairman is a judge 
of the Court of Cassation in Riyadh. Two of its members are 
members of the former- Commission, and the other two experts in 
judicial problems. The High Judicial Committee88 decides the cases 
which were pending review by its predecessor, and those which are 
to be reviewed-since it came into existence. Its decisions are 
taken by majority. Although it is administratively'linked. with the 
Ministry of Justice, the Committee is absolutely independent in 
taking its decisions, which are final. This Committee will continue ti 
function until it is replaced by a new institution called the "High 
Judicial Council" (Mailis al-QadV' al-A`LA). 
89 The latest 
indication is that this Council will probably start functioning in 
1973 (1393)- 
Finally, to complete the picture of the SharV a Judicial 
institutions, one should look at the ad hoc commissions. Such 
commissions handle only single cases and are then automatically 
dissolved. The cases which they try are serious and complicated. 
Their members are selected. from the judiciary. They are formed on 
the order of the King9° or the President of the Council of Ministers91 
or by the High Judicial Authority. 
92 These commissions may act as 
a court of first instance, whose decisions are appealable, 
93 
or as 
an appellate authority. 
9 Their procedure is exactly the same as 
applied. by the Sharl`a courts. However, this kind of commission is 
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formed only rarely. 
II. THE SEMI-JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS 
A. The Commercial Tribunals 
1. The Commercial Council of Jeddah 
Although the Commercial Council of Jeddah (al-Mailis, al-- 
Ti iäri be Jeddah) does not function now, it may be useful to refer 
to it here. It was set up in 1926 (1345)95 -According to the 
Commercial Law, 96 the Council was given the following powers: - 
(a) To settle disputes among merchants and money changers, 
and disputes over bills of exchange, trade marks, business 
partnerships or companies, contracts, and marine questions. 
97 
(b) To decide cases referred-to it-by the-King. 
98 
(c) To try offences violating the Commercial Law. 
99. 
(d) To review the=decisions of the Administrative Council 
of Yanbu`, when acting as a commercial tribunal. 
100 
The Commercial Council of Jeddah consisted of a chairman and 
seven members, -three of whom were honorary members, and the seventh 
was a Shar= judge. They were all chosen for their experience and 
good religious and moral' standing. They had to be at leabt thirty 
Years. old. 
101 All of them had to be appointed by the King for a 
period of two years, but they could be -appointed 
for a further two 
years. 
102 
The decisions of the Council had to be agreed upon by a 
majority of the members. 
103 The decisions were at first appealable 
to the Administrative Council of Jeddah together with the Chief 
Judge there as it was determined by Article 556 of the Commercial 
Law, But after 1933, appeal against them lay to the Consultative 
Council. ' 04 
The Commercial Council ceased to exist in 1955, when its 
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jurisdiction was transferred to the Shari`a courts. 
105 However, 
the Shar! `a judges were not acquainted with some commercial matters, 
such as marine disputes over-commercial business between Saudis 
and non-Saudis. The government realized this when a case involving 
a marine dispute occurred. As a remedy for this problem and for 
prospective ones, the government set up, in 1957, two commercial 
committees situated in Jeddah and Dammam. They were to settle 
disputes between merchants and traders, and marine disputes concer- 
ning goods on wrecked ships, or goods transferred from one ship to 
another, and similar disputes. 
106 In 1960, the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry was invested with the power to decide commercial 
questions. 
107 Accordingly, committees were set up in this Ministry 
to hear commercial cases. The operative committees at the present 
time are the Committees for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
and the Committees for Securities. 
2. The Committees for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes. 
109 
These Committees, were set up in 1967 in Riyadh.. Jeddah and 
Dammim109 to replace the following committees: - 
(a) The Committees-for the Ending of Commercial Disputes 
(Hay'At Faqýi al-Munäza`ät al-Tij*driyya) which were established in 
1965, and were empowered to settle commercial disputes and to try 
offences of violating the Law of Trade Marks, 
11 ° 
of 1939i 
ll 
(b) The Committees for the Settlement of Disputes among 
Companies112 of 1965, (which were also to try the offences of 
violating the Law of Companies). 
113 The Committees for the 
Settlement of Commercial, Disputes are additionally invested with 
the power to liquidate companies if they deem fit. 
114 Before 1969, 
the Committees used to try offences of fraud in Securities. 
The Committees of the Settlement of Commercial Disputes at 
first consisted of three members115 who were legal experts. 
' 16 In 
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1968, each Committee was composed of two members, who were experts 
in the Shari`a, and two members from among the legal experts of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
117 but since 1969 it has been 
composed of only two Shari`a experts. 
118 
The Committees sit only in the evening because their members 
have a full-time professional occupation. The decisions of the 
Committees were appealable to the Reviewing Commercial Committee 
(Hav'a al-TamyTz al-TiJUriysa), which was composed of the Deputy 
Minister of Commerce as chairman, and two legal advisors as members. 
The decision of the Reviewing Committee was. final. 
119 Nevertheless, 
this Reviewing Committee was abolished in 1968, and since then, the 
decisions of the Committees for the Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes have been final. 
120 
The procedural rules applied by these committees are in theory 
those determined by the Commercial Law of 1931.121 In practice, 
the committees also apply, to some extent, the procedural rules 
122 
followed by the Shri_a courts, and do not confine their 
procedure to this Law. This may be due to the following reasons. 
First, all the members of the Committees are now SharT`a or former 
Shari`a judges, or at least qualified. in the SharT`a. 
Secondly, the procedural rules determined by the Commercial 
Law are fairly similar to those of the SharI'a. 
123 
Thirdly, there are no detailed procedural rules in the 
Commercial Law. A good example here is that this Law does not 
specify any measure to be taken if the parties concerned fail to 
appear, whereas the Law of 1952(A), which is operative in the - 
Sha ri`a courts, deals with this matter by dropping the case. 
l24 
Indeed, the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes of 
Riyadh has met this particular guestion, and it applies the Law of 
1952(A), exactly in the same way as it is applied in the SharV a 
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courts. 
125 
3. The Committees for Securities 
In 1968, the jurisdiction over cases concerning fraud in 
securities was removed from the Committees for the Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes and was allocated to independent committees, 
named the Committees for Securities (lijUn al-Awr&a al-TijUriyya). 
These Committees are three in number, one in Riyadh, one in Jeddah, 
and the third in Dammäm. Each Committee consists of a president 
and two members, who are chosen from among the legal experts of the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
126 
In addition to the hearing of cases of fraud in securities, 
these Committees are empowered to hear cases concerning the 
violation of the Law of Commercial Agencies (al-wakalät al-Tiiäriyya) 
and the Law of Weights and Measures (al-Mu`äyara wa al-MaaTiy'Is). 
127 
The decisions of these Committees are appealed against to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
128 
Having examined the various commercial tribunals it is clear 
that the Commercial Council has the widest jurisdiction. Next come 
the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes, and last 
the Committees for Securities. However, it should be pointed out 
here that none of these three commercial tribunals cover the whole 
area of commercial disputes. The Shar! `a courts have always been 
invested with very considerable commercial jurisdiction. If we 
examine the competence of the Commercial Council, while it was in 
existence, and that of the Sharl`a courts, we shall find that the 
Council dealt only with special commercial problems in Jeddah and 
to some extent in Mecca, whereas the commercial problems in the rest 
of the country were dealt with by the Shari`a courts. Moreover, 
the Sharx`a Court of Jeddah, like other Shar-l'a courts, was 
empowered to hear important commercial questions, and since the 
129 
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SharT'a courts had general jurisdiction over all matters the 
SharI'a Court of Jeddah could deal with commercial issues brought 
before it which were also within the competence of the Council. 
At present the Committees for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
and the Committees for Securities are in no stronger position than 
that of the Commercial Council when compared with the Shar`a 
courts. The Shart`a courts hear cases which fall within the 
jurisdiction of these committees, when such cases are referred to 
them. 13o Although the government intends to make these Committees 
the only'tribunala to decide the questions allocated to them, the 
Shar3'a courts are too strong'to be deprived of their general 
jurisdiction. 131 However, there is no delimitation between the 
competence of the*Sharl`a courts and between that of these Commit- 
tees in commercial cases. On the whole, the Committees usually 
decide cases which are technically rather complicated, whilst most 
of the cases brought before the Shart`a courts are not technically 
complicated. 
B. The 'Grieiänces Board. 
The jurisdiction of tLa; 81im (grievances) was defined by 
Muslim jurists` as forcing the parties involved in a grievance to 
yield to justice. Therefore, the person who had this - authority, 
w81i al=ma;, glim, was to have the power of a ruler and the education 
of a judge. 
132 He looked into grievances and corruption committed 
by officials in any position, or even by private individuals. He 
also had power, to expedite the execution of the judgements of 
judges, and look into the matters falling within the jurisdiction 
of mu$tasibTn (persons who looked after the public interest) if the 
execution of their decisions was delayed. Additionally, he-decided 
cases involving personal quarrels or disputes, but by the same 
procedure followed by judges. 
133 
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The first Muslim ruler to fix a specific day for, . 
looking into 
his people's-grievances was the Umyydd Caliph. `Abdul Malik b. 
Marw$n (646-715). He referred these grievances to his judge, when 
they were so complicated that they had to be settled by judicial 
decision. 'Umar b. `Abdul `AzIz, another Umayyad Caliph (682-720), 
was, the first Muslim ruler to invest the jurisdiction of üaa; dlim in 
himself. In this way, he set the pattern for the Muslim , caliphs, 
who dealt personally with their people's grievances. The 
jurisdiction of mazälim came to an end-with the death of the 
Abbasid Caliph al-Muhtadi (869-870). 
13' 
The concept of ma slim was adopted by King `Abdul `Aziz after 
his conquest of JJij8z. In 1926 he made himself available for 
hearing grievances against anyone, irrespective of. his position. 
A box for complaints was set up and its key was kept by the_King. 
1_35 
In 1930 he dedicated-two hours every day to-look-into complaints 
made by aggrieved persons. These complaints were. to, reach him, 
according to their importance, by a 
. 
visit to the Royal Palace, , 
by 
telegram, or by mail. 
136 
After modern = administration had found its way to Saudi Arabia, 
the ma; TL. lim was, in turn, modernized. By the-Constitution of the 
Council of Ministers of 1954,137 a public institution, called. the 
Grievances, Board. (DIwln al-Mazälim), was established and attached 
to this Council. Prince Mus `ad b., `Abdul Ra1m n, an-uncle of the.. 
Zing, was appointed to be President of the.. Board. Its being. 
presided over by this important prince gave the Board considerable 
prestige. This. fact was demonstrated in 1955, when a,. royal decree. 
was issued re-organizing the Board.. Since then, it has been=an 
independent institution, presided over by a president with the rank 
of minister. Its President was directly responsible to the King, 
who was the highest authority for ,. 
the Board. 13a However, the power 
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of the King concerning the Board was transferred to the President 
of the Council of Ministers, when the Constitution of the Council 
of Ministers of 1958139 was promulgated. Since King Faisal 
succeeded to the throne in 1965, and did not relinquish the post of 
the Presidency of the Council, he is now the final 'authority of the 
Board. 
The Board site in Riyadh and it has a branch in Jeddah. The 
Board comprises: - 
(a) A president. 
(b) A deputy president. 
(c) A general director. 
(d) Legal advisors on Shar! 'a, and other legal matters. 
Their number was not determined by the Law or by the Internal 
Regulations of the Board. However, in practice, there has been only 
one advisor on Sharl'a and on other legal matters. 
(e) An unspecified number of examining magistrates.. 
specialized in the matters with which the Board deals, whose number 
is to be determined according to need. 
(f) Clerical staff. 
140 
The structure of the Board is now constituted as follows: - 
(a) The reviewing Committee, which is in theory composed of 
the'Vice-President of the Board as chairman, (but in practice,. 
the President himself acts as chairman for the Committee); the legal 
advisors of the Board; some examining magistrates, who may be 
called in if necessary to take part in the proceeding's of the 
141 
Committee; and a secretary to deal with clerical matters. 
(b) The Consultative Committee, which is composed of the 
legal advisors. 
(c) The Sh= section. 
(d) The section of other legal matters. 
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(e) The Fiscal section. 
Each of these sections consists of competent examining magistrates, 
who investigate matters related to their own area--of specializa- 
tion. 42 
(f) Some administrative departments. 
143 
The Law and the Internal Regulations of the Grievances-Board 
do not explicitly set out the types of cases into which it looks. 
They only state that it looks into complaints against governmental 
officials, 
1 44 indicating that the Board is set up; to deal only with 
115 
administrative cases. Besides this, the Board may, in theory, 
look into a complaint against the judgement of a Shar3`a court on 
two grounds - first, when the impartiality of the judge is 
challenged, -and second, if the procedure followed by him- is alleged 
to be illegal. 146 
While it is evident that the Board was not intended to be 
concerned-with complaints against individuals, in actual practice 
it has dealt largely with such compiaints. 
147 A study of the 
Board's General Records for the 1950's showed that it dealt with all 
kinds of complaints, except those against judgements of Sharr a 
courts, where the Board decided that it was not an authority to 
review such judgements. 
148 Where a complaint presented to the 
Board fell within the jurisdiction of a Shart`a court, but it had 
not yet been adjudged by it, the former usually- referred it to the 
latter in the form of a suggestion. 
1 49 
The first indication of the limiting of the Board's wide 
jurisdiction came in 1958, when it was informed by a high order 
that it should not accept any further complaint involving labour 
disputes, which were to be decided by a committee: attached to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
50 
- However, - the wide 
jurisdiction of the Board did not begin to contract considerably 
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until Prince Musä`ad b. `Abdul Rahman resigned-from its presidency 
in 1960 (1380)151 
At the present time the Board is the authority which decides 
on the following matters: - 
(a) An application for executing a judgement issued in an 
Arab country, which is a member of the Arab League, according to 
the Arab League Agreement Concerning the Execution of Judgements. 
152 
(b) Cases concerning government officials or employees, who 
fail to claim. refunds for the expense of their official transport- 
ation within the determined period, and claim later that they have 
a legal excuse for their delay. 
153 
(c) Disputes between Ministers and business companies in 
Saudi Arabia* 154 
(d) An appeal by a foreign business establishment operating 
in Saudi Arabia against a decision withdrawing its licence or 
liquidating it. 155 
Moreover, the Board is represented at tribunals and on committees, 
which deal with the following crimes and offences: - 
(1) Bribery. 
(2) Violations of the Law Concerning the Boycott of Israel. 
156 
(3) Illegal wealth of government officials and their 
dependants. 157 
(4) Military disciplinary offences involving officers of the 
rank of general and lieutenant general. 
158 
(5) Forgery. 159 
(6) Immoral offences committed by members of the education 
staff. 
16o 
(7) Disciplinary offences of civil servants. 
161 
A comparison between the period of Prince MuaV ad and the 
present day shows the following facts: - 
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(a) In the first period, the Board looked into complaints, 
whether determined in its Law and Internal Regulations or not, and 
whether they were concerned with public or private parties. This 
large jurisdiction was due to the vagueness and brevity of its Law 
and Regulations, which allowed it power to deal with almost any kind 
of case except when the case fell within the jurisdiction of the 
SharT'a courts. Equally, it is attributed. to the fact that it was 
presided. over by Prince MusR'ad., who was one "of the most 
intelligent administrators in the. kingdom. ff162 At the present-the 
jurisdiction of the Board has been greatly limited. 
(b) While it formerly examined cases independently, at 
present other authorities participate with it in the trial of the 
majority of the cases. 
(c) While previously it dealt with cases-as an appellate 
authority as well as an authority of first instance, now it decides 
cases. as an authority of first instance, except when it reviews 
decisions against foreign business. establishments. 
(d) In the first period its decisions were more like 
recommendations. Now they are definitive judgements. 
63 
However, 
they have to be approved by the President of the Council of 
Ministers, except when it acts as an appellate authority, where 16 
its decisions are final. 
165 
Some writers consider that the Board has been functioning as 
the council of state does in other countries. 
166 Others believe 
that the Board has a wider jurisdiction than that of the council of 
state, or even of the high court in other countries. 
167 
This view may be an overestimation of the Board, since 
(i) neither does it possess. power to study the legal problems facing 
the country and suggest new laws concerning such problems, (ii) nor 
does it have power to review judgements, except those against 
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foreign business establishments, or have authority over courts. 
However, the Board has a rel$tively'important role to play in the 
judicial sphere for two reasons. Firstly, it consists of legal 
experts in the Sharl'a affairs and in other legal affairs, and this 
enables it to be a connecting link between the Sharl`a courts and 
the semi-judicial tribunals. Secondly, it has a comparatively long 
experience in dealing with legal questions. 
Finally, we, may here consider briefly the. -Bribery Committee, 
which-has some attachment to the Grievances Board. This Committee 
was set up in accordance with Article 17 of the Law of Combating 
Bribery16br (1962). The Committee consists of: - 
(a) -A president, who is the President or the Vice-President 
of the Grievances Board. 
(b) Two members, -one from the Board, and the other is 
appointed from outside it. 
The examining magistrates of the Board deal with cases involving 
bribes ih much the same-way as they deal with the cases examined by 
the Board. The Bribery Committee holds its hearing in the-Board 
Office. Its decision must be ratified by the President of the 
Council of Ministers. 
Co The Customs Committees169 
According to the Customs Law 170 of 1952, - there are eight 
committees of first instance jurisdiction. The number of their 
members varies - while some consist ofa chairman and four members, 
others are composed of only a chairman and three members. Each 
committee has a secretary to undertake the clerical functions. 
Most members are administrative officials from among the, personnel 
of the customs office, with which each committee is linked. 
171 A 
Customs committee of first instance is entitled to investigate and 
decide on crimes of smuggling taking Place-within its area. 
172 
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Its decisions are appealable to the Appellate-Customs Committee-173 
According to the Customs Regulations, 174 an appellate tribunal, 
called the Appellate Customs Committee (al-Laina al-Jumrukiyya 
al-Isti'näfiyya), was established. It consisted of: - 
(a) A president, appointed from among the officials of the 
Ministry of Finance, ranking as a general director of ministry. 
(b) Two members - one was the General Director of the Public 
Department of the Ministry of Finance, and the other was a legal 
adviser from this Ministry. 
The President and the Members of the Appellate Customs Committee 
were appointed by the Minister of Finance. The usual seat of the 
Committee was in the Ministry of Finance in Riyadh. The Committee 
was set up to review the decisions of the Customs committees of the 
first instance. The Committee functioned from 1952 till 1971 when 
it was replaced by two new appellate committees, one in Riyadh and 
the other in Jeddah. 
The Appellate Customs Committee of Riyadh is-empowered to 
review the decisions of the original committees in the locality of 
Riyadh, the Eastern Province, and the Northern Borders. 
The Appellate Customs Committee of Jeddah has the power to 
review the original decisions made by the Customs committees in 
Jeddah, the South, and Tabfk. 
1 75 The members of the Appellate 
Customs Committee work only part-time. 
The decisions of the Appellate Customs Committee must be 
approved by the Minister of Finance. 
176 
D. The Forgery Committee 
In 1960, a royal dearee177 set out the penalties for crimes 
for the forgery of money, and in 1961, another royal dearee178 
introduced the Law for Combatting Forgery (Nizjjm Muk7af4a.. al-Tazwir). 
This Law was partly amended by a third royal decree in 1963.179 
- 76 - 
Up till then, however, no single authority was designated to try 
cases involving forgery; this matter had been left to the President 
of the Ministers, the Minister of Finance and National Economy,. and 
the Minister of the Interior, who were to enforce these Laws, each 
within his own jurisdiction. 
180 Nevertheless, in 1966, the Council 
of Ministers decided that a special committee for trying crimes of 
forgery was to be set up. This Committee is composed of the 
Minister of the Interior as chairman (who may depute another 
official to preside over it) # two members from the Grievances 
Board, one member from the Ministry of the Interior and one member 
from among the legal advisers of the Council of Ministers. 
181 
The decisions of the Committee must be approved by the 
President of the Council of Ministers before they are carried out. 
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Chapter Three 
PROCEEDINGS PRIOR TO TRIAL 
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Introduction 
Generally speaking, it is difficult to distinguish in Saudi 
Arabian criminal procedure between interrogation or the inquiry 
for establishing the suspicion, and preliminary investigation or 
the inquiry for establishing the accusation. Both are conducted 
by the police and are not subject to any form of judicial restraint, 
as it is the case in some countries. 
' The authority in charge of 
any inquiry made before the trial is neither judicial nor even 
semi-judicial, but administrative. Therefore, any process prior 
to the trial is solely an administrative process. It is true that 
cases triable by the Grievances Board, the Bribery Committee, and 
the Forgery Committee are examined by the examining magistrates of 
the Grievances Board, whose function is semi-judicial. However, 
these cases are negligible in volume compared with those triable 
by the Sharl'a courts and other tribunals. The mode in which the 
police conduct the preliminary investigation and the right of 
parties at this stage will not be dealt with in this thesis, 
since its theme is concerned with judicial proceedings. Moreover, 
evidence mentioned in the minutes of the police in their inquiry 
will not be examined, but the evidenciary value of these minutes 
will be briefly referred to when evidence is discussed. In the 
light of what has been said, we shall mention the police only 
when we refer to their power to bring a criminal action against 
an accused person. 
Since proceedings before the trial in the Commercial 
tribunals are similar to those in Shari`a courts, and since 
proceedings in other semi-judicial tribunals are purely 
administrative, with the exception of investigation by the examining 
magistrates of the Grievances Board which, for convenience, will be 
examined later under "Trial", we shall refer only to the process 
- 86 - 
before the trial in SharT'a courts. 
A. WHO MAY BRING CRIMINAL ACTION OF A PRIVATE RIGHT? 
Crimes are divided into two categories with regard to 
the procedure followed in bringing criminal action before the 
Sharl'a courts. First, those which are tried only on a demand 
by a private claimant, and are therefore called crimes of 
private rights (jarä'im al-haqq al-khäss), or according to 
the traditional classification, haqq al-'abd (human right). 
Secondly, those in which action can be brought by anyone, and 
therefore are called crimes of the public right (: iar7im al- 
hagq al-`ämm), or traditionally, haqq Allah (Divine Right). 
In broad terms, crimes of private rights are four: (1) the 
hadd of theft (sariaa), (2) the hadd of defamation (qadhf), 
(3) crimes of retaliation (cam), and (4) an offence against 
a parent falling within ta`zir. 
1. Theft 
Most Muslim jurists, including the majority of the 
Hanbalis, 2 are of the opinion that the crime of the hadd of 
theft must not be prosecuted unless the owner of the stolen 
object, or his representative, demands its recovery. A minority 
of Muslim jurists uphold the view that an action against this 
crime can be brought before the court without such a demand. 
3 
Saudi Arabian judges differ in their views on this matter. The 
majority of them take the view that the owner of the stolen 
object, or his representative, must submit a complaint to the 
court in which he demands the recovery of the stolen object, 
otherwise the court must not receive the charge. Shaykh 
`Abdullah b. Jjasan, the President of the Judiciary from 
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1927-1959, supported this view. A minority of Saudi Arabian 
judges hold that the demand of the owner for recovery of the 
stolen object is not necessary. This minority is represented 
by Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrähim, the Mufti and last President of 
the Judiciary and his pupils, such as the judges of the Grand 
Shari'a Court of Riyadh .4 
It is important for us to look into the basic reasons for 
this controversy. The majority, who restrict the prosecution 
of the action against theft punishable by the $add to a demand 
for the recovery of the stolen object by its owner, base their 
view on the principle of the Shari`a that "hudüd shall be 
averted on account of dubious circumstances". They argue that 
the fact that the owner does not demand the recovery of his 
property is a sufficient reason to implement this principle. 
5 
They also hold that the SharT'a lays down the principle of 
the "removal of doubt" for the benefit of the accused, and 
that the fact that the owner of the stolen object does not 
demand its recovery indicates doubt, the benefit of which is 
to be given to the accused. They also argue that the offender 
will not be left without punishment for his crime, since an 
action of ta'zir may be brought against him. 
6 
The minority view maintains that the rule of restricting 
the prosecution of a charge concerning the hadd of theft to a 
demand by the owner of the stolen object is not stipulated by 
the Qur'än, the Sunna, or consensus (i'mä`), while the 
punishment of the hadd is explicitly stipulated; that it is 
not justifiable to implement a rule whose origin is not found 
in the sources of the SharT'a against a rule which is explicitly 
stipulated? 
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Having examined both arguments, we may conclude that 
the view of the majority judges, which restrict the prose- 
cution of the hadd to a demand by the owner of the stolen 
object, is more appropriate, especially in view of the fact 
that the punishment of the hadd is so severe that the judge must 
take extra precautions before convicting the accused. 
Once a claimant demands the recovery of his property 
there is no stipulation that he must pursue the prosecution 
until the court awards its judgement. It is the duty of the 
court to take the appropriate measures for trying the accused. 
2. Defamation 
While Muslim jurists are divided on the question as to 
who may bring an action against the hadd of theft, they all 
agree that in the, 4add of defamation (gadhf) it is only the 
offended person (magdhif), or his representative, 
8 
who may 
bring an action against the offender. 
9 Saudi Arabian judges 
do not differ from their predecessors in their views on the 
hadd of defamation. If the defamation does not amount to the 
hadd, the criminal action which may be brought against the 
accused is not confined to the offended party. It may be 
brought in the same way as a criminal action for the public 
right. However, the offended party is given priority in this 
respect. But the public prosecutor may handle the prosecution 
in two circumstances: - 
(a) If the offended party fails to bring his action 
within a reasonable time after the defamation has been made. 
(b) If the public interest lies in prosecuting the 
offender immediately after his offence. 
10 
Here, the question to be raised is: why should it be 
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admissible that defamation which does not amount to, that of, 
the hadd may be brought before the court, e. g. by the public 
prosecutor, while it is inadmissible in the liadd itself? The 
answer is that in Saudi Arabian society the accusation of 
zinä, if proved, is so grievous that the defamed party 
and the members of his family, especially the females, would 
suffer social detriment. To avoid such detriment, the prose- 
cution of the alleged offender, who made the accusation of 
zing, is entirely left to the will of the defamed party, who 
may prefer not to bring an action in order to avoid public 
scandal. Since the defamed party ýis the only one who can 
bring an action against the alleged offender in the $add of 
defamation, the defamed party must pursue his case until the 
judgement is given. 
3. Retaliation 
As in an action against the }add of defamation, the 
action against a crime of retaliation whether murder 
or the cutting off of a person's limb, may be brought only by 
the claimant, the heirs of the deceased person, or by the party 
affected, or their representative. 
It must be noted here that there are technically two 
crimes involved in a crime of retaliation. The first is a 
so-called private crime, whose prosecution is left to the 
private claimant. The second is a public crime, whose 
prosecution is not confined to the claimant. The action 
concerning the private crime can only be initiated by the 
claimant or his representative, as the private interest is 
dominant. 
" For example, the punishment of the private crime 
in the case of murder is death, while the punishment of the 
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public crime is only five years imprisonment. 
12 As both crimes 
come under the same class, the punishment of the smaller 
(the public crime) falls within that of the greater (the 
private crime), according to the principle of "the cumulation 
of crimes". 
13 In other words, if the punishment of the private 
crime (the retaliation) is to be carried out, the punishment 
of the public one (the ta'zir) is to be ommitted. Therefore, 
the private action is to be given priority in the prosecution. 
However, if the claimant waives his right, the appropriate 
authority will prosecute the offender for the public crime. 
Saudi Arabian judges apply the Shari'a principles 
concerning murder. They insist that the claimant must pursue 
his case till the judgement is awarded. The claimant must be 
the heir of the deceased, and must be of full legal competence. 
Where the deceased has more than one heir, they must unani- 
mously demand the punishment of retaliation, 
1 
otherwise the 
private action cannot be brought before the court. Consequently, 
the public action may be initiated. When the heirs of the 
deceased are legally incompetent and have no guardian, or if 
the deceased has no heirs, the head of the state, or°his 
representative, must take responsibility for the private right, 
and action for the private right would be brought in the same 
way as the criminal action for the public right. 
15 
Although an illegal physical assault other than that 
punishable by retaliation, and an illegal threat of using a 
weapon against a person, are considered public crimes, priority 
in the prosecution concerning them is given to the private 
claimants, i. e. the persons who have been assaulted. But the 
alleged offenders may be prosecuted in the same way in which 
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other offenders accused of public crimes are prosecuted if 
the 9laimants do not duly demand-the prosecution, or if they 
waive their right to pursue the case. 
16 
It is necessary to note here that an action brought 
against a treacherous murderer (mughtä]) can only be a public 
one. Here it is to be mentioned that some Muslim jurists, 
such as the Mälikis, hold that murder by treachery--(gatl 
al- ila) is a purely public crime punishable only by death, 
even if the heirs of the deceased pardon the murderer. 
According to the Hanbali law, murder by treachery is treated 
like any other type of murder. 
17 However, some independant 
Hanbalis, such as Ibn Taymiyya, are of the opinion that murder 
by treachery is a purely public crime. 
18 Generally speaking, 
Saudi Arabian judges follow the IIanbali law. But there are two 
cases in which they departed from the JIanbali law. The first 
concerned a woman who had killed her husband treacherously; 
in this case the trial and the appellate judges agreed that 
the action which was to be brought had to be of a public 
nature, disregarding the demand by the son of the deceased that 
he was the only one who had the right to bring an action. 
19 
The second case concerned a person who had killed his uncle 
treacherously - the crime was treated by the trial court as a 
public crime in which the heirs of the deceased had no say. 
20 
Although the judgement of the trial court has not yet been 
confirmed, it is most likely that it will be reversed, as the 
President of the High Judicial Committee has indicated that 
the law and the practice are that murder is one class of crime 
as far as prosecution is concerned. The reason why the Mäliki 
opinion was adopted in the first case was that the heir of 
the deceased was the son of both the deceased and the murderer, 
*Or assassination 
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and this made it impossible that he could act as an approp- 
riate claimant, on the assumption that he would be bringing an 
action against his mother. 
L. Offence against a parent 
We shall now consider the question as to who may bring 
action against an offender committing an act constituting a 
crime of ta`zir against his parent. Crimes of ta`zir are 
regarded as public crimes, and criminal action in them does 
not depend upon the offended person. 21 The only exception to 
this rule is when such a crime is committed by a child against 
his parent. In this case, it is only the parent who may bring 
an action against his offending child. If the parent renounces 
his right to prosecute the child, the latter will not be 
liable to trial. The parent has also the right to pardon his 
child, even if a sentence had been passed against him. 22 
The reason for confining the right to initiate prose- 
cution in such a charge to the parent is explained by the 
Presidency of the Judiciary as follows: "A criminal action 
concerning ta`zir may be brought before court for chastising 
(ta`dTb) the offender, and only a parent has the right to 
chastise his child. Therefore, the parent is the only one who 
may bring action against his child. 1"23 The Presidency of the 
Judiciary does not refer to the source from which it has 
derived this procedural rule. However, some Hanball authorities 
refer to it vaguely. A1-Ian7i`2Z and its commentary, Kashshäf, 
25 
refer to al-Ahkäm al-Sultäniyya of Abt Ya`lä. Yet, Abü Ya`lä 
mentions so little about it26 that it is not clear how this 
rule has originated. 
It can be said that if prosecution in this kind of crime 
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is left only to the parent, it is rare that the offender will 
be prosecuted. This rule is open to criticism as it gives 
the parent full right to chastise his child, while it seems 
proper to allow chastisement only in a very limited sense. 
A crime of ta`zir, committed by a person against his parent, 
unless it was a minor offence, must be prosecuted in the same 
way as any other crime of ta`zir. 
B. WHO MAY BRING AN ACTION OF A PUBLIC RIGHT? 
I. Individuals 
According to Muslim jurists, criminal action of a public 
right does not need to be initiated in any specific manner. 
This action is to be dealt with as soon as it is brought 
before the court, irrespective of the person or authority 
making the allegation. The Shari`a courts in gaudi Arabia apply 
this principle, except when the action is against a dismissed 
judge or an administrative governor. 
27 In this case the 
allegation must reach the court via the High Judicial Authority 
or the high executive authority respectively, so that the 
judge and the governor may be protected from a malicious 
action. 
28 
In theory, it is the right as well as the duty of 
individuals to bring an action against an offender charged with 
a public crime. This obligation stems from the principle of 
"Enjoining the Right and Forbidding the Wrong" (al-Amr bi 
al-Ma`rüf wa al-Nahy `an al-Munkar). 
29 It can be waived only 
if the head of the state or his representative takes the 
initiative for the prosecution of the crime. Indeed, the 
prosecution in this case is the duty of the head of the state 
94 - 
in the first place. 
30 In Saudi Arabia, the head of the state 
has given the right to initiate criminal prosecution in public 
crimes to certain executive authorities, which we shall refer 
to later. 
In actual practice, a criminal action of a public right -" 
may or may not be initiated by an individual. - Afterhaving, 
brought such an action, the individual may decline to pursue- 
it before the court since he is not a party to the case. He- 
may not even go beyond the act of informing the court of the 
crime. This manner of bringing an action is called hisba 
(anticipation of God's reward in the hereafter). 31 
The testimony of the individual who brings an action as 
isba is admissible, while that of a private claimant, who is 
directly involved in the case, is not. However, a close 
examination of present judicial practice shows that individuals 
decline to bring crimes before courts, especially-in the 
towns where living conditions and the administration have 
become more complicated. They are content with reporting a 
crime to the competent authorities, who will investigate, 
and in due course prosecute the alleged offenders. 
2. The Committees for Enjoining the Right and Forbidding 
the Wrong 
Hay'ät al-Amr bi al-Ma`rüf wa al-Nahy'an-al-Munkar 
These Committees-wer-first established in HijRz in 1926, 
immediately after King `Abdul `Aziz assumed power. They are 
now widespread throughout the. whole country. Although these 
Committees are the Saudi Arabian model of liisba, they have no 
judicial jurisdiction like-that of the traditional muJtasibin, 
known in Islamic administrative justice. Before the 1960's, 
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these Committees had the right to detect, investigate, and 
prosecute in matters relating to the enforcement of religious 
and moral principles. 
32 When investigating a crime they 
committed the accused to the appropriate court33 without 
pursuing the case before the courts. Occasionally they appoin- 
ted one of their personnel to undertake the prosecution. The 
right of the Committees to prosecute cases brought by them to 
the courts was not determined by statute or regulations. The 
vast powers which these Committees had brought them into 
conflict with the police. At one time the Committees were so 
strong that their power could not be withdrawn or even limited 
by the High Authority. However, in 1960, one of these 
Committees in I; ijäz investigated a serious crime inefficiently, 
and this was held by the High Authority as a sufficient reason 
to withdraw the power of the Committees in Hijäz of bringing 
criminal actions before courts. Henceforth they were to refer 
crimes within, their jurisdiction to administrative governors, 
who would take the appropriate measures. 
34 In December 1960 
the Committees regained a part of their previous power. They 
were authorized again to investigate and bring before courts 
crimes against religion and morality and crimes of intoxi- 
cation and drugs. 
35 In June 1961 their jurisdiction over the 
prosecution of charges concerning drugs was withdrawn. 
36 In 
1962 their power as investigating and prosecuting authorities 
was finally withdrawn. 
37 It seems that this was due to the 
fact that these Committees continued to recruit their personnel 
and to deal with cases in almost the same old way which they 
had followed since their creation. They failed to adapt 
them. selves to the conditions of modern life. 
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3. The Executive Authorities 
Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
most crimes of the public right have been brought to court 
by the executive authorities. In Mecca, the Viceroyalty used 
to refer such crimes to court. In 1927, King `Abdul `Azlz 
objected to the way in which the Grand Shari`a Court of Mecca 
accepted cases without their first being referred to it by the 
Viceroyalty. He explained that the Viceroyalty could possibly 
have some information regarding the case in issue which no 
private person or other authority had. 
38 In 1928, the 
Consultative Counci139 decided that the Magistrate Court must 
not hear criminal cases until they had been referred to it by 
the Viceroyalty. But the Viceroyalty was not the only 
authority which used to bring criminal actions of the public 
right before the courts in Mecca. The police used also to do 
so in crimes falling within the jurisdiction of a magistrate 
court, 
4° 
especially if they were minor ones. 
41 The juris- 
diction of the Viceroyalty did not conflict with that of the 
police since-the police in Mecca were attached to the Viceroyalty. 
42 
In other places the administrative governors and the 
police played the same role as the Viceroyalty and the police 
in Mecca. 
43 Where there was no police post, the administrative 
governor was the only authority who could refer a criminal 
case to the court. 
4 In general, most criminal charges were 
referred to courts by the administrative governors until 1961 
when the Council of Ministers decided45 that the administrative 
governors in areas where there were police posts were to refer 
to the courts only serious crimes. 
46 Minor crimes were to be 
referred to courts by the police. In 1965, the High Authority 
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issued a regulation that crimes falling within the competence 
of magistrate's courts had to be brought by the police and 
not by the governors . 
47 In practice, some governors still 
refer to courts many crimes, even if they are not of a serious 
character. Some governors are so influential that they may 
exceed the limit of their jurisdiction fixed by the law and 
act in the way that they themselves think appropriate. 
When a crime is referred to the court by an executive 
authority, it must be handled by the appropriate public 
prosecutor. By the public prosecutor is meant any authority 
which is competent to prosecute the defendant in a criminal 
case. Here we must examine briefly the history of the function 
of public prosecution in Saudi Arabia. It"is necessary to 
differentiate between two periods. The first period refers 
to an early stage after King `Abdul `Az3z had assumed power in 
Hijäz, when the Consultative Council assigned the function 
of prosecution to specific authorities. Thus, in Mecca, a 
department attached to the police called the "Legal 
Department"" was entrusted with the power of prosecution. 
The head of this department, or one of his officials in his 
illness or absence, was the authority who handled the cases for 
the prosecution. '9 In other important towns of Iii jäz and its 
dependencies, officials representing the "Legal Department"50 
were appointed-51 The chief of the police was accorded the 
power of prosecution in a place where there was no represen- 
tative of the "Legal Department . "52 
This period was marked by two things. First, the system 
of public prosecution assigned-to official authorities prevailed 
only in Hijäz and its dependencies. Second, public crimes 
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were usually prosecuted by public prosecutors. However, in 
other parts of the country public prosecution as such was 
almost unknown. 
The second period began in the 1960' s following the 
centralization of administration and the unification of the 
judiciary and the removal of its centre from Hijäz to Riyadh. 
During this period the system of prosecution prevailing in 
; iijäz was adopted in other parts of the Kingdom. In areas 
where there were no police the governor was given the power to 
53 
appoint one of his officials to' handle public prosecutions. 
The "Legal Department" was transferred from Mecca to Riyadh 
and attached directly to the Ministry of the Interior, where 
it has now various functions ahrthan undertaking public prose- 
cutions. Therefore, public prosecutions in Mecca are now 
handled in the same way as in other towns. The designation of 
the representative of the "Legal Department" has consequently 
been abandoned and replaced by that of the public prosecutor. 
The important difference between the two periods lies in the 
fact that at the present time the courts are empowered to 
take the initiative and try a party without even notifying 
the public prosecutor, although this is not very commonly done. 
The Court 
The court may look into certain criminal cases initially 
without their being brought before it by any authority or a 
private individual. These are usually of two kinds, (a) those 
connected with cases pending trial and (b) non-serious cases 
which take place inside the court, such as contempt of court. 
(a) When a criminal action of a public right is brought 
before the court by any of the aforementioned methods, the 
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court must try it even if the case involves a preponderant 
private right. 
54 Equally, when the court hears a case and 
discovers that it relates to a criminal act of public right, 
the court may adjudge it immediately. For example, if a 
private claimant brings an action and the court discovers that 
he himself has in some way participated in the crime, the 
court may take the initiative and try him, without asking the 
public prosecutor to handle the prosecution. 
55 But if the 
case is so complicated that it requires a preliminary 
investigation, the court must refer it to the police, and 
after the investigation has been completed the public prose- 
cutor may prosecute the accused. 
56 
(b) The Law of 193657 did not allow a court to try a 
crime committed inside it unless that crime would have fallen 
within its jurisdiction if it had been committed outside it. 
However, the Law of 1952(A), 
58 
which is now in force, vests 
the court with the right to try a non-serious crime which 
occurs inside it without any request for prosecution from 
outside, in order to protect the court from disrespect. This 
means that Sharl'a'courts can try any crime of this type, 
whether or not the crime was originally within their competence. 
However, an examination of the judicial practice will show 
that although the courts are entitled to try this kind of 
crime, some of them prefer to commit it to a competent court 
as if it had taken place outside the court. 
59 
This attitude may be attributed to the fact that the 
Shari`a judges decline to look into any case unless they deem 
that they are able to do so with complete impartiality. The 
punishment of this kind of crime is left to the judge to 
-"1oo- 
determine, and he may be inclined to pass a more severe 
sentence had the crime not happened in his own court. As a 
precautionary measure, the judges prefer to remit such crimes 
to another court to-insure impartiality. 
C. THE ACCEPTANCE OF A CLAIM OR A CHARGE FOR TRIAL 
In 1928, the Consultative Council6o decided that an 
action brought by a private claimant could not be accepted 
unless it was included in a petition to which certain stamps 
were affixed. This decision was applied only in the'towns of 
Hijäz. However, the Law of 1952(A)61 determines that the judge 
shall not demand that a claimant should submit his complaint 
in written form. If the crime reaches the court through a 
formal authority, all the papers concerning the charge will 
be sent to the court. Thus, the courts do not restrict the 
receivability of an action to any formal measure. However, the 
acceptance of an action by the court is subject to three 
conditions: (a) t rlr i. e. stating the case adequately, 
(b) the accused must be still alive, and (c) the time 
prescribed for trying the charge has not lapsed. 
(a) T ahrir 
The claimant or the prosecution must state the essential 
particulars of his case in a fairly adequate way in order that 
the court may know the exact nature of the charge. The accused 
must be known to the claimant or the prosecution by an accurate 
description. Although this condition is theoretically 
essential, it is not necessarily applied by every judge. Indeed, 
it was a subject of controversy between the Grand Sharl`a 
Court and the Court of Cassation in Riyadh. The former 
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accepted some cases without their being adequately stated. 
But the Court of Cassation ruled that a case had to be adequ- 
ately stated before it could be accepted. 
62 
The acceptance of 
a case without an adequate statement may be justified on the 
ground that the party concerned may find himself obliged to 
make out a prima facie case in the trial; and that if then he 
was found to have made a false allegation he is to be punished 
63 
and he is to defray his opponent's damages. 
64 
(b) The accused must be still alive 
Obviously, no criminal action concerning a crime involving 
physical punishment can be brought against an offender who 
has died before he can be prosecuted. Thus, a deceased who 
has committed a crime of a hadd or retaliation is not liable 
to prosecutions 
65 
Here, one may ask whether it is possible to 
bring a criminal action against a dead accused if the punish- 
went was monetary. The answer is in the negative, since a 
monetary punishment is only applicable in ta`zir, which is 
meant to be chastisement, 
66 
and the dead cannot be chastised. 
One important reason for applying the punishment of ta'zTr is 
to deter the offender, 
67 
and this reason no longer exists if 
he is dead. Consequently, if a fine was imposed upon an 
offender during his life and he dies before he has paid it, 
the fine must be dropped. 
(c) Lapse of time68 
The lapse of the period prescribed for trying crimes has 
differed from time to time and from one crime to another as 
follows: - 
(a) In 1933, a royal decree 
69 
determined that 
actions regarding crimes arising from the unlawful seizure of 
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land which had taken place before 1921, the year in which 
King `Abdul `Aziz invaded Hijäz, were not to be accepted. 
(b) In 1940, the Council of Deputies70 ruled that 
actions relating to murder or other crimes of violence 
committed in Hijäz and its dependencies before King `Abdul 
`Aziz assumed power could not be accepted. 
(c) Actions concerning other crimes must not be 
accepted if twenty-five years have passed subsequent to the 
occurence of these crimes. If an action is brought immediately 
before the end of this period, it may be accepted. 
71 
A private claimant may bring an action before the court after 
the prescribed period has lapsed if he has an acceptable 
excuse for the delay. An excuse accepted by the law may be: 
long absence, insanity, minority, or fear of a tyrannical 
person. 
72 
Generally speaking, it may be concluded that Saudi 
Arabian courts accept an action without formal restrictions 
whenever the case seems to be-prima facie. The exception to 
this rule is when the action is against a person who is due to 
leave the country. In this instance, the court must not 
accept the action for trial before giving a summary decision 
accepting the case and ordering the prevention of the accused 
from leaving the country until the case is decided. 
73 The 
summary decision may-be-given only after the court has examined 
the particulars of the case as presented by the claimant or the 
prosecution and concluded that it was a prima facie case. If 
the action is brought by a private individual or a claimant, 
he must pledge, and also bring someone else to pledge, that 
they will be liable for any damages arising from delaying the 
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departure of the accused if the charge against him is found 
to be false. 74 Where the accused is a pilgrim, a foreign 
visitor, a foreigner who entered the country illegally, or a 
person whose national identity is unknown and who is to be 
deported, he must not be delayed for more than one month after 
the summary decision and before the trial. 75 
Having accepted an action, the court must immediately 
fix a date for the hearing. 
76 The time between the acceptance77 
of an action and the hearing must be as short as possible. 
78 
However, the circumstance of the defendant must be given proper 
consideration, 
79 
even if he is absent from the country. 
80 
The 
court should take into consideration the proper order of cases 
except when a summary case pertaining to a traveller or a 
woman is presented, which should then be heard first. 81 But 
in all circumstances, priority in the hearing must be given to 
a case involving detention. 
82 
The hearing may, however, be postponed if the claimant 
or the prosecution needs a longer time than that already 
fixed to produce his evidence. 
83 
In a criminal action of a 
private right, the hearing may be postponed on request by the 
claimant if no detention is involved. The postponement may 
take the form of the suspension, or the dropping of the action. 
Before the court summons the accused to appear the 
claimant may move for the suspension (wagf) of his action. 
84 
If the court has summoned the accused, the action cannot be 
suspended unless the accused consents. 
85 But there is one 
exception; namely, an action concerning a crime constituting 
an aggression falling within ta`zir brought by a parent against 
his child, which may be suspended before or after the hearing 
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begins. 
The suspension of an action does not mean its dismissal 
or the closure of its hearing, if this has begun. 
86 It is 
only a procedural measure, which may be a temporary one if the 
claimant later demands that his case be heard by the court. 
On the other hand, it may last indefinitely if he neglects his 
claim. However, the suspension of the hearing cannot be made 
more than twice, 
87 
even if the defendant consents to it, on 
the ground that it may cause inconvenience to the court and to 
the defendant p if he has been already summoned to appear. 
As to the dropping of a case (shatb al-da`wä), the Law 
of 1952(A) which is in force, determines that a case must be 
dropped if the claimant fails to appear at the time fixed for 
the first, session88 in the hearing without an acceptable 
excuse. The claimant may, however, move for the hearing of 
his case; 
89 
and if he again fails to appear without an excuse 
acceptable to the court, the case will be dropped once more. 
Henceforth, it may only be heard if so required by a high 
order. 
go Thus, it seems that the dropping of a case is left 
to the discretion of the court since the law does not specify 
how to assess the excuse of the absent claimant, but leaves it 
to the court to do so. 
Next to be considered is how to drop an action against 
a defendant who is due to leave Saudi Arabia and to live 
temporarily or permanently in another country. If he appears, 
and the claimant fails to appear, the claim must be dropped and 
the defendant allowed to go abroad. 
91 
The dropping of a case does not necessarily mean its 
dismissal. It means that the case dropped will not be heard 
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again as easily as if it were a fresh one. 
D. SECURING THE APPEARANCE OF PARTIES 
After the court has -fixed a date for the hearing of a 
case, it must immediately notify the claimant if the action 
is of a private right, and the prosecution if the action is 
of a public right. When notifying a claimant, the summoner 
(muhaddir) must ask him to sign two copies of a document, one 
of which is to be handed to the claimant and the other to be 
preserved at the court. 
92 The defendant must be notified of 
the charge against him and the date of the hearing by a writ 
of summons. The summons consists of a summary of the claim 
or the charge93 and two forms, which are to be signed by the 
defendant, one of which is to be given to the defendant. 
94 
Where the defendant resides in a foreign country, the summons 
must be served on him through the Foreign Ministry-95 If the 
defendant cannot write and has no seal, or if he refuses to 
receive the summons, the summoner must have two witnesses 
testifying that the defendant has been notified of the charge 
and the date of the hearing. Their testimony and signature 
must be entered and applied respectively on the form which is 
to be returned to the court. 
96 The time between the serving of 
the summons and the opening of the trial97 has to be fixed with 
reference to the residence of the defendant whether inside or 
outside Saudi Arabia. 
98 
The question to be asked here is whether a party may be 
compelled to appear. The judicial laws do not refer to the 
fact that a private claimant may be brought to court by force. 
They only refer to his case being dropped if he fails to 
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appear without an excuse acceptable to the court. But the 
Consultative Council, 99 the Council of Deputies, 
100 
and the 
Presidency of the Judiciary101 have ruled that a party, whether 
a claimant or a defendant, had to be compelled to appear when 
the appropriate court deemed it necessary. Besides, the High 
Authority and the High Judicial Authority may order that a 
claimant be compelled to appear by the police. Generally, a 
claimant may be compelled to appear in court (i) when he makes 
persistant claims to judicial authorities or to the High 
Authority, 102 or (ii) when the case involves a serious dispute 
which may lead to violence, especially if the case pertains to 
tribal groups-103 
Where a defendant is in custody, he is to be brought for 
trial on request by the competent court. Before 1971, the 
court could only demand the arraignment of the prisoner from 
the administrative governer or the chief of police. 
104 At 
present, the court itself directly requests the custodian to 
produce the prisoner. 
105 The demand of the court that the 
prisoner be presented may be verbal or written, except when 
the charge is serious, when the demand must be written. 
106 
Where a defendant is not detained, and he has failed to 
appear at the first session of the hearing without giving an 
acceptable excuse, he is to be compelled to appear at once. 
107 
If the office hours of the same day pass and he has not yet 
appeared or been produced, the court must assign another date 
for the hearing within three days, 
108 
and request the police to 
search for the defendant and to notify him of the time of the 
new session. The governor of a place with no police is to 
undertake the task of the police. 
109 If the defendant fails 
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to appear at the second session without submitting an 
acceptable excuse, the court must try him in default. However, 
if the hearing is not completed at this session, the court 
should summon him to appear for the last time, and if he 
fails again to appear he must be tried by default. 
11 ° The only 
exception to this is when the defendant is a trustee of an 
endowment (waQf), or a guardian, who may then be summoned more 
than three times. 111 This is attributed to the fact that his 
offence may involve the rights of others, and this makes it 
appropriate that he should be present at the trial in person. 
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88. Article 9 of the Law of 1927, the Decision of the 
Consultative Council No. 671 of 13/12/1349 (1931), and 
Article 5 of the Law of 1931 determined that a case had 
to be dropped if the claimant failed to appear at the 
first session of the hearing and did not give an accept- 
able excuse, but he could move for the reconsideration 
of his case. The High Will No. 653/1184 of 1353 (1935) 
indicated that the court had to fix a date for another 
session within three days after the first session at 
which the claimant had failed to appear. At the new 
session, the court was to examine the claimant's excuse 
for his failure to appear and decide if it was accept- 
able. If it was so, the court had to hear the case in 
the same session. Article 37 of the Law of 1936 added 
that if the claimant negligently failed to appear at the 
third session, the case could only be heard on a high 
order. 
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89. If a new session is appointed, the proceedings should 
commence from the point at Which the case was dropped. 
(P. J., D. No. 1067/3/M of 12/4/1384 (1964). ) 
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Law of 1952(A), which is in force, does not specify a 
certain period but leaves it to the discretion of the 
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106. Statute of Directorate of Public Security, art. 329. 
107. Law of 1952(A), art. 26. 
108. According to Article 10 of the Law of 1927 and Article 4 
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the first session, he would have to be compelled to appear. 
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default in the second date fixed for the hearing. 
109. Law of 1952(A), arts. 26,28. 
110. Ibid, arts. 279 29. 
111. Ibid, art. 30. 
Chapter Four 
TRIAL 
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A. CONDUCT OF TRIAL 
1. In Shari'a Courts 
When the court sits to hear, a case. for the first time, the 
judge must ascertain the identity of both parties. Having satisfied 
himself that the parties are correctly identified, he must request 
the claimant or the prosecutor to state his claim or allegations 
against the defendant, although the court has recorded it when 
accepting the case prior to the trial. The most important object 
in making this statement is to enable the defendant to hear the 
claim or the allegation against him from his opponent. Another 
important objective for the court is to obtain an amplification of 
the claim or the allegation of the claimant or the prosecutor if it 
is felt that this was not full enough when the case was submitted 
to the court for acceptance. 
1 After entering the statement on the 
record, 
2 the record clerk is to read it out in the presence of both 
parties. Before the judge asks the claimant or the prosecutor to 
adduce his evidence, he usually requests the defendant to state 
whether he admits the charge against him. If he admits it, and 
the judge is satisfied that his admission is valid, the judge must 
give a judgement based. on this admission and close the trial. 
Where the defendant has to refer to his books, consult his 
documents, or prepare a statement of accounts, the judge must 
adjourn the hearing for ample time. 
3 Should the new session open 
and the defendant has not prepared his plea or answer and has no 
legal excuse, the hearing must not be adjourned again for this 
reason. 
4 If the defendant denies the claim or the charge, or 
refuses to answer properly whether or not he admits the claim or 
the charge three times, 
5 the judge must then ask the claimant or 
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the prosecutor to produce his evidence. 
6 
However, where a party 
moves for the adjournment of the hearing in order to prepare his 
challenge to the contention of his rival, the court must not agree. 
to his motion unless it feels it necessary.? 
The hearing must be adjourned if the evidence of a party is 
not available, but this adjournment has to be as short as possible. 
If this party fails to produce his evidence at the new session, or 
if his evidence is unacceptable, then the hearing should be 
adjourned for a second time. Where he fails again to bring an 
admissible evidence, he is to be given a last chance to present 
his evidence, and he must be warned that he will not be granted any 
further chance to produce his evidence. If he fails yet again to 
produce his evidence, the court has to proceed with the hearing 
considering him as unable to produce evidence. Consequently, the 
judge will decide on the case without any further adjournment, 
8 
unless the party has an acceptable excuse such as the absence of 
his witnesses. 
9 However, if a party has witnesses who reside 
outside the venue of the court, and it is not easy for the party 
to cause their appearance before the court, he may move for the 
postponement of the trial, and for the reception of the evidence 
of his witnesses by the court within whose venue they reside. 
10 
The trial court should then authorize that court to hear this 
evidence, and instruct the party concerned to produce it therein. 
Having heard the evidence, the authorized court is to transfer it 
to the trial court. 
" This mode of receiving evidence seems to be 
more convenient for witnesses and for the party for whom the 
evidence is given. 
A claimant in an action of a private right who has evidence 
which has not been put before the court is entitled to withhold 
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his evidence and demand instead the oath of his rival that the 
claim against him is untrue, provided that the rival resides within 
the venje of the court and that he consents to take the oath. But 
if the claimant has already adduced his evidence he cannot move for 
the oath, 
12 
since the reason for demanding this oath in this 
circumstance is to avoid delaying the trial and burdening him with 
the production of his evidence, and this reason no longer exists. 
However, if a claimant has no evidence at all, or if he has 
adduced only invalid evidence, he is entitled to ask the trial 
court to authorize the court within whose venue the absentee. 
resides to summon him to appear and to take the oath denying the 
charge against him. 
13 
This measure is an implementation of a general procedural 
rule, that in a private action, whether criminal or civil, in the 
absence of his evidence, the claimant may demand the oath of the 
14 
defendant denying the claim. As a general rule, since a judge 
must give a party a fair opportunity to prove his claim or charge, 
he must give the opposing party the same opportunity to question 
his opponent, provided that the questions are relevant. Equally, 
the judge must enable a party to examine the witnesses for his 
opponent and attack their characters. The judge himself is 
entitled to ask a party or a witness any question which may help 
him in deciding the case. 
15 Where the claimant refrains from 
pursuing his case in the court after the trial has begun, his case 
must be dropped. If he moves for the suspension of the case after 
the trial-has begun, the court should consider his motion, 
provided the defendant consents. The measures which the court 
takes concerning the suspension are exactly the same as those 
taken for suspension before the opening of the hearing. 
6 
Where 
the claimant moves for the adjournment Of the trial'for any reason 
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other than that of the production of evidence, the judge must not 
accept his motion without the consent of the defendant. 
17 If the 
action is of a public right, the prosecution cannot move for its 
suspension, or dropping, or dismissal, since this right does not 
particularly belong to anybody, but to the whole community. 
However, unlike the prosecutor in an action of a public 
right, the claimant in an action of a private right can renounce 
his right at any stage in the trial. The court must thereupon 
dismiss it, 18 and discharge the defendant. In a case concerning 
both a private right and a public right where the punishment for 
the latter right falls within that of the former, such as the case 
of murder and the Ladd of defamation, the defendant cannot be 
discharged from the punishment for the public right if the claimant 
renounces his private right. To pursue the case for the public 
right, the court itself may complete the trial without a public 
prosecutor, but this happens very rarely in present practice. The 
court usually asks the public prosecutor to undertake the 
prosecution. A private action of a civil character and a public 
action resulting from the same act, such as a road traffic 
accident which causes private injuries and the violation of the, 
law, are for convenience heard usually together in one trial. 
Where the claimant immediately sues the accused, there may be no 
prosecuting authority for the offence, which is in this example 
the violation of the law, since the guilt of this may be 
established automatically by the evidence given to prove the 
private claim. But if the claimant neglects. the case or if he 
renounces his right, the court must continue the trial for the 
public right or request the presence of a public prosecutor to 
undertake the prosecution. 
As soon as the court is satisfied that both parties have 
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stated their cases-and tendered their evidence it should retire and 
examine fully all the data and render its decision. However, if 
the case is trivial and the proceedings are not complicated, the 
court may not retire but immediately make its decision. Yet, the 
court may delay its decision in three circumstances: - 
(a) When the court is not sure as to the right sentence, 
where it should inquire about it from a higher judicial authority. 
(b) Then the case involves a private right, and the court 
Peels that the contending parties, especially if they are relatives, 
may settle their dispute between themselves. 
19 The public right 
involved therein may be decided after the settlement (pulp). The 
prevailing law does not specify the period for which the decision 
may be delayed20 but leaves it to the court to-decide. 
(c) When a defaulting defendant appears, or when the court 
knows of his arrival at its locality in order to appear, before the 
judgement is announced. Then the court must hear the defendant, in 
the way mentioned in "Trial by default". 
Having made its decision, the court must inform the two parties of 
it as soon as possible. 
What has been outlined-above is the mode in which the trial 
is generally administered. But there are two special types of 
trial which are conducted in a somewhat different mode. These are 
the trial by default, and the trial of a juvenile. 
Trial by Default 
Judgements decreed in default are valid if they concern civil 
issues. or criminal issues of private rights, but judgements 
concerning public crimes21 cannot be given in default at all. 
22 
Thus, what follows is confined to criminal cases concerning 
private rights (as well as civil cases). 
If a defendant or his representative has not appeared at all, 
- 120 - 
or if he has appeared and then'failed to appear, the court 'should 
consider him absent and proceed as soon as it concludes that he is 
contumacious and decide'on the case, 
23 
even if its decision is 
against him. 'Where the defendant was represented and has dismissed 
his representative, or if the latter has resigned, the court must 
summon the defendant to appear if he resides inside its locality. 
If he is outside its locality, the court'should proceed and hear 
the evidence for his opponent. 
24 Having received the evidence 
for the opponent, the court must ask him to swear that his claim is 
true, and then decide against the defendant by default. 
25 If the 
court decided against the defendant only by default upon the 
evidence for the claimant but without his oath, its decision is 
invalid. 26 Should the defendant fail to appear after the claim 
against him has been proved partly or totally, 
27 the decision 
based on such evidence without the oath may be valid. 
However, as soon as the defaulting defendant appears, or the 
judge learns that he has arrived in the locality of the court, the 
judge must halt the proceedings till the defendant is informed of 
what the court has received against him,. and until he is given a 
chance to make his counterclaim and produce his evidence. 
28 Where 
the judge learns of his arrival at the locality of the court or if 
he appears after the court has decided against him, the judge must 
suspend his decision. When the judge has found that the defendant 
has a prima facie plea and valid evidence, the judge must 
invalidate his previous decision and initiate a new one acquitting 
the defendant. Should the judge hear from the defendant no such- 
plea and evidence, he must revive his previous decision, 
29 
which 
ought to be carried out after it has been affirmed by the 
appellate authority3° if-it is appealable. 
Finally it should be mentioned that even if a judgement by 
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default has been affirmed by the appelate authority, the defendant 
can give his plea and evidence, when he appears in the trial 
court, 'upon which he may be acquitted. 
31 
By giving a defaulting defendant the right to appear in 
court and state his case after he has been convicted, some may 
think that the law is encouraging default from the trial at the 
expense of the time and the dignity of the court. This right may 
also seem to them as being at variance with the interest of 
justice, on the ground that it causes an unnecessary prolongation 
of the trial. But it may, nevertheless, be thought that the truer 
interest of justice lies in giving a defendant every opportunity to 
defend himself, even after having defaulted. The law safeguards 
justice from defaulting by incriminating the defendant who defaults 
without an acceptable excuse. 
32 
Trial of Juveniles 
Where a juvenile commits a serious crime, 
33 
and the police 
feel that it is necessary to detain him, he must first be committed 
to court for a decision as to whether or not he should be 
detained. 34 The court should base its decision on the available 
evidence which appears to be prima facie. If the court orders his 
detention, the case should if necessary be sent back to the police 
for further investigation. As soon as this investigation is 
completed, the case must be committed again to the court for trial. 
Before the court opens the trial of a juvenile, whether he has been 
subjected to detention or not, the police must put before the court 
full information about his medical, mental, and social conditions. 
35 
The main procedural principles which apply only to this type of 
trial may be summarized as follows: - 
(a) The judge must examine all the documents attached to the 
case prior to the appearance of the defendant. 
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(b) The trial must not be held in public, and no one is 
permitted to attend its except the judge(s), the record clerk, the 
witnesses, the guardian of the defendant, and the claimant, if the 
case is for a private right.. 
-Where 
it is for the public right, the 
public prosecutor must not handle the prosecution, but he may be 
replaced by the person who undertook the preliminary investigation 
if necessary, provided that he. woars civilian clothes. 
36 
(c) The-court should make the trial as short and speedy as 
possible. 
(d) The judge must take extra care to treat the defendant 
very gently throughout the trial37 in order to avoid his 
demoralization. 38 
2. In Commercial Tribunals 
According to the Commercial Law, 39 after both parties have 
appeared at a tribunal, the chairman must open the hearing of a 
case in the name of the King, and this procedure was adopted in the 
Commercial Council of Jeddah. But this procedure has not been 
applied since the formation of the Committee for the Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes and the Committee for Securities. In pursuance 
of the law, the chairman must ask the litigants which of them is 
the claimant immediately after the opening of the hearing. 
40 
This was the traditional Islamic mode of opening a litigation at a 
time when it quite often happened that the contending parties 
walked in together to the court and asked the judge to settle 
their case. In modern times when the appropriate clerk usually 
records the names of both parties, it seems to be unimportant to 
ask such a question. The important measure to be taken in this 
respect is to identify the litigants, as is common practice at the 
present time. 
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Having established the identification of the contending 
parties, the chairman must ask the claimant or the prosecutor to 
give his claim, and if it is denied by the defendant, the claimant 
or the prosecutor must produce his evidence. When he has adduced 
it, the tribunal must ask the defendant about it'and give him_-a 
chance to plead against it and produce his evidence, almost in the 
same way as that adopted by the Shari`a courts. 
Where the witnesses for a party reside outside the locality 
in which the tribunal sits, this party must be given sufficient 
time to produce his witnesses. If it is very difficult for a 
party to produce the testimony in the trial court, he may request 
that it be received by the court in whose jurisdiction the 
witnesses reside, even if this court is situated in a foreign 
country. 
41 
Although both the Commercial tribunals and the Shari`a courts 
apply similar rules as far as testimony is concerned, the former 
accept the giving of testimony by witnesses other than the original 
ones, whereas the latter courts do not accept such testimony in 
criminal proceedings, as hearsay evidence in inadmissible in them. 
Commercial tribunals do not impose restrictions on the admission of 
testimony given before any court even if it is foreign, while the 
Sharl'a courts admit only this type of testimony if it is given 
before a national court on the authorization of the trial court. 
Commercial tribunals, other than the Committee for the 
Settlement of Commercial Disputes, usually hear the criminal case 
simultaneously with the civil one, if such a case stems from one 
act by the same defendant, since the evidence adduced to prove the 
civil case by the claimant will also prove the criminal case. 
Nevertheless, when the-claimant renounces or neglects his civil. 
right, the tribunal must then pursue, or request the appearance of 
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the public prosecutor to pursue, the criminal case. It is true 
that the tribunal may adjourn the hearing of the criminal case if 
the claimant in the civil one does not appear at the time fixed 
for the hearing. 
42 
But as soon as the tribunal realises that he 
is neglecting his case, it will proceed with the trial for the 
public right. 
3 This procedural rule applies also to cases 
involving civil and criminal action, where the civil issue is 
settled by arbitration or by "settlement" ( ul ), 
44 
in which case 
the tribunal must proceed with the trial for the criminal issue. 
Unlike the Commercial Council of Jeddah and the Committee for 
Securities, the Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
does not pursue criminal cases but it leaves this to the 
appropriate public prosecutor. 
45 
As a general rule, the proceedings must be conducted in 
Arabic, yet if a party does not speak Arabic he may bring with him 
an interpreter whom he trusts. If he has no interpreter, the 
court must appoint a trustworthy interpreter for him, and this 
interpreter must swear that he will translate the words of the 
party authentically "146 
When the contending parties have no more claims and counter- 
claims, and no more evidence, the chairman must announce the 
closure of the trial, and the tribunal must retire to deliberate 
on its decision. 
47 
But if a party submits a document to the 
tribunal during the deliberation, the tribunal must accept and 
examine it, but no verbal claim. or plea is accepted. 
48 
Finally, it is important to examine the mode in which a 
Commercial tribunal tries a case by default. The general 
procedural principles applied in the ordinary trial are also 
applied in the trial by default, but the latter trial differs from 
the former in the following ways. Where the defendant does not 
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appear at any stage of the trial without any legal-excuse, the 
tribunal must continue his trial and decide on the case in his 
absence. Yet, if he disappears subsequent to the retirement for 
deliberation but prior to the announcement of the judgement, this 
judgement is regarded as having been made in his presence. 
49 A 
defendant who is convicted by default can object to his conviction 
within fifteen days after he has been notified by the tribunal of 
its judgement against him. If he resides far from the place in 
which the tribunal is situated, he must be given a longer period in 
which to make his objection. 
50 The objection of the defendant 
takes the form of a petition to the tribunal explaining the reasons 
for which he believes that both the charge and the judgement made, 
against him are unfair. The tribunal must then accept this 
petition and appoint a date for re-hearing the case; it'must then 
notify him, and also the other party if necessary, of this date. 
51 
If the defendant fails to appear without a legal excuse, the 
tribunal must dismiss his objection and revive its previous 
judgement which will then be final. Afterwards, the tribunal will 
not accept any further objection-by the defendant unless he appeals 
his case, and the appellate authority requests the trial tribunal 
to look into it again. 
52 However, when the tribunal re-hears the 
case in response to such an objection, it may acquit the defendant, 
or revive the previous conviction, or modify the punishemcnt 
determined before, according to the evidence produced by the 
defendant. 53 
3. In the Grievances Board and the Bribery Committee 
When a case reaches the President of the Grievances Board he 
refers it to any of the examining magistrates of the Board, who 
must then undertake the necessary examination. An examining 
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magistrate is entitled to question a party or a witness about any 
matter which is relevant to the case under examination. The 
presence of a party or a witness may be demanded by a summons or 
by other means which the examining magistrate thinks appropriate. 
If a witness failed to appear, the Board would, at the request of 
this examining magistrate, take the necessary measures to secure 
his appearance. The investigation takes place at the seat of the 
Board, but if it has to be carried out in a different place, the 
examining magistrate must have the permission of the President of 
the Board in advance. The examining magistrate may call one expert 
or more, if needed, to help him-in his investigation. 
Having completed his investigation, the examining magistrate 
must write his report and suggest the measures which are to be 
taken to decide on the matter in issue. This report has to be 
submitted to the Reviewing Committee, 
54 but if the case concerns 
a bribe, the report has to go to the Bribery Committee. 
The Reviewing Committee must then examine the investigation -. 
and all documents presented by the two parties. When the Reviewing 
Committee or the Bribery Committee decides that the investigation 
is not sufficiently thorough, it should direct the same examining 
magistrate who made it to complete it in the proper way. Having 
heard the report of the magistrate and examined his investigation 
and the documents attached to it, the committee concerned should 
give consideration to his decision if it is appropriate and in 
harmony with'the general judicial principles. But-if the committee 
believes that his decision is unfair or is contrary to the 
customary judicial practice, it is not bound by the decision and 
is entitled to form its own decision. The committee is entitled 
to call upon the examining magistrate and request him to clarify 
any matter included in his investigation and to give his opinion 
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in regard to some issue, whether the committee adopts his decision 
55 
or not. 
In practice, the importance of the decisions or recommen- 
dations of the examining magistrates differs from one committee 
to another and from time to time. In the first period of the 
Board, these decisions were usually approved by the Reviewing 
Committee. This may be attributed to two factors: - 
(a) The decisions of the Board at that time were more like 
recommendations than definitive judgements, as they are now. 
(b) The Board used to look into such a large number of 
cases that it made it difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Reviewing Committee to examine those cases thoroughly. 
Consequently the Reviewing Committee usually had to adopt 
the decisions made by the examining magistrates. At present, 
since the Board deals only with a limited number of cases and 
gives definitive judicial decisions, neither the Reviewing 
Committee nor the Bribery Committee necessarily adopt the recommen- 
dation of a magistrate. 
In conclusion, we may refer to the differences between the 
mode of trial followed by the Reviewing Committee of the Board and 
that followed by the Bribery Committee. In the Reviewing Committee 
the contending parties are not permitted to be present when the 
Committee examines their case. Each member of the Committee 
examines individually the documents pertaining to the case to form 
his opinion. In order to form a collective opinion making the 
formal judgement of the Board,. all members must have a conference 
and adopt the appropriate opinion. If they do not agree on one 
single opinion, the opinion of the majority must constitute the 
judgement of the Board. 
As to the trial by the Bribery Committee, the parties 
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concerned are to appear and the trial is conducted in a similar 
mode to that of Shari`a courts and Commercial tribunals. 56 
4" In the Customs Committee 
-s 
Every Customs committee is charged with the investigation of 
those cases which occur within its jurisdiction. It is also 
empowered to interrogate the accused whether or not he has been 
interrogated before by any other authority. An accused must 
appear before the appropriate committee when the interrogation. and 
the investigation take place, 
57 in order to facilitate the task of 
the committee in its examination and to enable him to defend 
himself. The committee is the only authority which receives the 
evidence against, and for., the defendant, and if it is adduced 
before another authority, the committee is entitled to receive 
only what it believes to be valid. 
At these committees, no authority such as the public 
prosecutor is charged with the prosecution, since these committees 
do not subject the accused to a real judicial trial, but commit 
him only to an investigation, which is similar to preliminary 
5$ investigation. 
The proces verbal of a Customs committee is regarded as 
authentic and final to the degree that the Appellate Customs 
Committee does not question its authenticity, except when the 
accused challenges its validity on the grounds that it was forged. 
59 
Having completed the investigation, the committee retires to 
deliberate on the decision, which must be based on its own 
investigation. 
60 
Finally, it is necessary to note that a Customs committee 
may give its decision by default if the accused does not appear at 
the date fixed for the investigation. 
61 
But some. of the Customs 
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committees favour the adjournment of deciding against a"defaulting 
accused until he is arrested and compelled to appear. 
62 
However, 
unlike a defaulting party convicted by a Shari`a court or a 
Commercial tribunal, a party convicted in absentia by a Customs 
committee cannot object to it against its decision. He may only 
challenge the decision against him by way of appeal. 
5. In the Forgery Committee-, 
When a crime of forgery is committed, the necessary pre- 
liminary investigation has to be made before it is committed to 
the Forgery Committee. When the case is put before the Committee, 
the investigation must be submitted in its original form. Having 
received the case, the Committee must examine all the documents 
and reports attached to it in order to complete, or request the 
appropriate authority to complete, the investigation. However,. 
this will not prevent the Committee from making further investi- 
gation if necessary at any stage of the trial. 
63 
In carrying out its investigation, the Committee may consult 
experts such as experts in handivriting. 
64 
The Committee requests the appearance of the defendant, and 
does not normally try any defendant in absentia. Since there is 
no authority representing the prosecution, the Committee is in 
charge of this matter; in other words it prosecutes the defendant 
and adjudges him. Nevertheless, it gives the defendant opportunity 
to defend himself and to refute the charge; and to rebut the 
evidence against him. Where he claims that the documents conveyed 
against him were falsified, the Committee takes extra care to 
ascertain their authenticity. 
There-are no statutory rules which govern the procedure of 
this Committee, but it follows the rules, which it feels 
- 130 - 
appropriate. Thus, it may adjourn the hearing for a period, which 
may sometimes be a long one, at any stage. 
When the Committee feels that all investigations and evidence 
have been completed, it retires for deliberation, where its members 
study the case again from the record. Having completed its 
deliberation, the Committee must give its decision and request the 
appearance of the accused and read the decision in his presence. 
65 
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TRIAL 
Is A sufficient number of competent Judges 
The tribunal which tries a case must consist of judges who 
are accorded judicial jurisdiction by the appropriate authority, so 
that its decision can be valid. Where a judge was accorded such a 
jurisdiction for a certain period his decisions prior or subsequent 
to this period are invalid. Here, it may be relevant to mention 
that when King `Abdul `Aziz conquered Jijrtz, he dismissed some 
judges appointed by the previous government, but they continued to 
decide cases referred to them. These judges were influential 
religious persons who belonged to certain sects, and decided cases 
pertaining to the adherents of their sects. When the Saudi Arabian 
authorities discovered this practice they nullified the judgements 
of these judges given after the King assumed power in HijAz. 
66 
Besides judicial jurisdiction, the tribunal must consitt of 
a sufficient number of members which varies from one tribunal to 
another, and from case to case, as has been mentioned in the 
"Second Chapter". According to the laws of the Shari`a courts, 
there are two classes of cases which must be tried per curiom. 
These are: - 
(a) Crimes whose punishments are mutilation or death. 
67 
(b) Crimes whose sentences are not determined by the 
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Hanbal3 Law, where the consensus of the judges is needed for the 
initiating of these sentences. 
68 
In practice, the first class of cases are always tried by 
all the judges of the court, but the second class is not necessarily 
so tried at the present time. The remainder of cases are tried 
only by one judge to whom the case is referred by the chief judge 
of the court, who distributes cases amongst the judges including 
himself. However, according to the Law of 1927,69 the judge who 
heard the case could not alone determine the judgement, but all 
judges had to examine its record colloectively and then make their 
decision. Yet, if the court consisted of one judge only, his 
decision was valid. Nevertheless, according to all laws issued 
after 1931,70 the judge who tries a case alone is the only one who 
determines its judgement, since one judge is considered to be 
sufficient to decide on any case, provided that it does not involve a 
crime of murder, apostasy from Islam, highway robbery, the hadd 
of theft, or the hadd of zinä, which is tried by the whole panel 
of the Court's judges. 
The members of a semi-judicial tribunal must collectively 
try any case, even if the charge is trivial. Should a member be 
absent when the trial is to be opened, the tribunal is to sit 
without him as long as the majority of the members are sitting. 
2. Open Trial 
As the Islamic judicial tradition adopted the rule of 
conducting trial in public, 
71 the Saudi Arabian judiciary follows 
this rule in principle. But the judicial laws are so vague on this 
matter that no one can draw a clear picture concerning the 
application of the rule. The Law of 1936 and the Law of 1952(A) 
determine that "proceedings shall be carried on in public, except 
in circumstances where the court regards it to be in the interests 
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of morals to have it done in secret. " Article 472 of the 
Commercial Law determines: "Proceedings shall be in public ... 
Article 178 thereof states that the presiding judge must "conduct 
the trial in public. " Thus, the judge will find himself the only 
authority who applies this rule in the way he feels it proper, 
since he is the authority who interprets these brief laws. Thus, 
the interpretation of "morals" is left totally to the presiding 
judge and this allows the interpretation of one judge to be 
different from that of another. Under normal circumstances, the 
judge must theoretically allow the public to attend the trial 
without discrimination. Yet, the principle of "open trial" must not 
contradict the principle of the "maintenance of order. " The judge 
must prevent any member of the audience from attending the, hearing 
if this measure is taken in the interests of keeping order. 
However, the trial must not be held in public in the following 
circumstances: - 
(a) When the defendant is a juvenile on the ground that he 
may be demoralized if he is tried in public. 
72 
(b) Where the alleged crime may damage the reputation of 
the prisoner or that of any of his relatives. 
(c) Where the alleged crime is regarded as dangerous to 
society, such as crimes involving drugs. The trial of this kind 
of crime is made in camera for two reasons. The first is to 
facilitate the task of the police in detecting the sources of drugs 
and the persons involved. The second is not to draw the attention 
of the public to the method used by the prisoner in committing his 
crime. 
73 
Now we may turn to the judicial practice concerning "open 
trial". One must differentiate between two phases of the Saudi 
Arabian administration - the first one is prior to the 
centralization of administration in the early 1950's, and the 
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other is subsequent to this centralization. In the first phase, 
there were two kinds of judiciary: the judiciary in the cities of 
$ijgz, which was well organized, and the judiciary prevailing in 
other parts of the country which was less organized. In this 
latter judiciary the trial took place usually in open court. As 
mentioned before, the court building was often the residence of the 
judge and his visitors were allowed to attend trials. Sometimes 
the trials were conducted in the market. After the centralization 
of administration the Sharl'a judicial system was unified on the 
Hijlz% pattern. However, at the present time the tribunals are 
not, in actual practice, open to the public for the following 
reasons: - 
(a) No one can attend the hearing unless the judge allows 
him permission to enter. 
(b) Some judges may extend the interpretation of the law 
which prohibits the trial in public in the interests of "morals" 
to include most criminal cases. 
(c) The ban on publicity concerning crimes before, during, 
and arter the trial, and this makis it impossible for a journalist 
to attend the court. This is a good example of how narrow is the 
scope of the principle of "open court". 
(d) Some tribunals do not allow entrance to any person other 
than parties, their representatives, witnesses, or the judicial 
staff, unless a person has permission to attend from an authority 
higher than the tribunal. For example, the author was not 
permitted to attend the Forgery Committee without the permission of 
the Deputy Minister of the Interior, although the judge who 
conducted the trial stated: "Vie know that the judicial tradition of 
this country is that the trial must be in open court, but it is 
customary that no audience attend in this committee. " 
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(e) A judgement cannot be challenged if the trial was not 
made in open court. Additionally, judicial decrees do not mention 
that trials were performed in open court. 
(f) In general, the size of the courtroom in Saudi Arabia 
is very small74 compared with that in other countries whose laws 
determine that trial must take place in open court. 
75 The size of 
the Saudi Arabian court is only slightly larger than that of an 
average office. Thus, judging from the size of the courtroom of 
any tribunal the trial in open court hardly exists since there is 
no room for an audience, specially in a case involving several 
parties and witnesses. 
It may be concluded that the law recognises, in principle, 
that a trial must be held in open court, but this hardly exists in 
practice. Consequently, the decisions are not normally delivered 
in public. 
76 
3. Maintenance of order 
The presiding judge, or the single judge who conducts the 
trial alone, must prevent any act of "disturbance" and maintain 
the "dignity of the court" throughout the hearing. The law does 
not set out which acts can be regarded as "disturbance", but it 
leaves it to the judge conducting the trial to use his discretion. 
It seems, however, that "disturbance" involves any interruption of 
the judge, a party or his representative, or a witness. As no 
statement can be made during the hearing unless the permission of the 
judge is obtained, it may be said that any statement or comment made 
without his permission is accordingly considered an act of 
"disturbance". Since the "dignity of the court" is very essential, 
any act which violates this dignity, even if it was not of spoken 
words but of an unacceptable. gesture, may also be regarded as an 
act of "disturbance". By virtue of the fact that the tribunal 
- 135 - 
should not permit any party or his lawyer to make any speech which 
is irrelevant, 77 such a speech may thus be regarded as a type of 
"disturbance", if it is repeatedly made. 
In theory, the judge conducting the trial must take 
preventive measures against the source of "disturbance", but in 
practice, he may tolerate it if it is not excessive. Indeed, in 
proceedings regarding a private right, some judges mag tolerate to 
a certain extent an argument between the contending parties 
without it being conducted by these judges in order to illuminate 
aspects of their personalities and their claims and counter- 
claims. 
78 However, the main preventive measures against 
'disturbance" are four: -79 
(a) Censure. This measure is usually taken when the act of 
"disturbance" is very minor and not made repeatedly. 
(b) Temporary expulsion from the tribunal. This measure is 
usually taken against a party, whose appearance is required and who 
has committed an act of "disturbance" while a statement was being 
made. 
80 
(c) Expulsion. Any person, other than a party, who violates 
the "dignity of the court" may be expelled from the court, and 
prohibited from attending it. 
81 
(d) Imprisonment. A judge who conducts trial at a Shari`a 
court is entitled to order a person causing "disturbance" to be 
committed to imprisonment for a maximum period of twenty-four hours. 
This imprisonment is applied against those who persevere in their 
"disturbance" and ignore the order of the judge. 
When the judge decides to send out or to expel from the 
tribunal a person who makes "disturbance", his decision is not 
technically regarded as a sentence, or a punishment, it is regarded 
only as a preventive measure, since this decision is made by the 
presiding` judge, and it is not subjected to the rules and 
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formalities to which a judicial decision is subjected. The 
imprisonment for twenty-four hours mentioned above is not also a 
sentence, but it is a disciplinary measure. Where the judge feels 
that the imprisonment of twenty-four hours is not sufficient, then 
the act of "disturbance"will amount to a crime of contempt of 
court, and its punishment will take the course of any other crime; 
in other words it is punishable by a sentence. 
Finally, the question to be raised here is: can the judge 
maintain order by using a police or a semi-police force? It is 
to be mentioned that each SharT`a court has a few summoners who 
are, besides their function as summoners, in charge of keeping 
order outside the courtroom. 
83 
They are not allowed to be present 
11 
in the courtroom during the hearing in their official capacity, 
unless they are called by the judge. It is within the power of the 
judge to order the summoners to send out any person causing 
"disturbance" and refusing to leave the courtroom when he is 
requested to do so. Besides the summoners, there is a police post 
assigned to the court building or situated nearby in the large 
tovms. The judge is entitled to use these police if needed. 
84 
However, their presence in the courtroom during the hearing is not 
allowed, unless the contending parties are so hostile that they may 
physically attack each other. In such circumstances when force is 
needed, some judges prefer to use civil officials instead of the 
police. 
85 The intention of these judges is probably to make both 
parties feel that they are under no pressure of any kind by the 
executive. In villages and small towns the civil officials of the 
governor are the only force to be called, if force is needed. 
The judge must deal with all procedural 
measures taken during the trial 
Generally speaking, this principle does not mean that the 
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Judge necessarily conducts 
must be present during the 
who conducts it or merely 
judge who tries it. There 
procedural principle: - 
(a) By dealing with 
the trial. It means that the judge 
whole trial, whether he is the president 
a member of the tribunal, or the only 
are two objectives behind this 
the proceedings throughout the trial, 
the judge makes sure that all data presented to the court, 
including documents, are authentic, and all entries in the record 
are reliable. Thus, the record clerk must not enter anything 
therein unless he is instructed to do so by the judge. Similarly, 
he must not receive any document from a party without the permission 
of the judge and in his presence. 
86 
(b) Where the judge deals with all the proceedings, his 
judgement is bound to be more accurate than that of a judge who 
does not deal with every measure taken in the trial. Yet, where 
the judge is not certain as to which kind of judgement is suitable, 
he can consult the judicial authority. 
87 
By this consultation he 
is still regarded as dealing with the whole trial, since the 
opinion of the judicial authority cannot be imposed on him if he 
does not agree to it. 
In view of these two objectives, the judge is entitled to 
request a party or a witness to give his statement just as he has 
the right to question them about any matter concerning the 
proceedings. The questioning and examining of a party, or of his 
representative, or the cross-examining of a witness by the opposing 
party should be made upon request to the judge. 
88 
Moreover, a 
party who wishes to examine the documents of his opponent must 
first have the permission of the judge. 
89 
This general principle is applied in a restricted manner by 
the Sh_ar3`a courts,. which try the vast majority of crimes. Yet, 
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the Shari`a judiciary has known two exceptions to this general 
principle: - 
(a) By Article 1 of the Law of 1927, it was provided that 
after a judge who had colleagues in his court had retired for 
deliberation, his colleagues must join him and examine the case 
from its record, and then give collective decision. Nevertheless, 
this exception was abolished by the Law of 1931,90 which 
determined that no judge alone could make, or participate in making, 
a decision unless he had dealt with the case from the outset of 
its trial until its closure. 
(b) Where a'judge has retired or died before he has completed 
the trial of a case, his successor may continue the hearing from 
where it was stopped by the previous judge, on two conditions. 
The first is that any statement given by a party or a witness, 
which was then entered on the record, was signed by the one who 
gave it and endorsed by that judge'. The second is that the 
succeeding judge must read all the record of the case. 
91 However, 
a succeeding judge is not compelled by the law to start from where 
his predecessor had concluded, but he may look into the case from 
the start. However, it may be appropriate for a judge to consider 
what was entered on the record during his predecessor's office and 
to complete the hearing if the case is not complicated or serious, 
for two reasons. 
(a) The record signed in'the way mentioned above is conside- 
red authentic. 
(b) This measure will speed up the trial, and this is very 
important when a detainee is involved. 
The reason for the law being very flexible in this matter is 
probably to give the judge full opportunity to act according to 
the seriousness and the circumstances of the case. Despite this 
- 139 - 
flexibility, a judge who is transferred officially to another court 
must not leave for the new court until after he has completed the 
case which he has started to hear. 
92 The semi-judicial tribunals 
are not as strict as the Sharl'a courts in applying this principle. 
In these tribunals, a member is not required to be present at 
every session if he examines with his colleagues all the data 
pertaining to the case when they retire for deliberation. 
93 
5. Appearance of parties 
According to the law94 and the general practice, 
95 the two 
parties must, under normal circumstances, appear during the pro- 
ceedings in order to state their case or defend themselves. Thus, 
if a judgement is passed without the appearance of a party, even 
in a part of the trial only, it is invalid. Evidence must be 
adduced in the presence of the party against whom it is produced, 
otherwise it will not be receivable, except when his trial is con- 
ducted by default. The question now is what measure is to be taken 
when this party is not willing to hear the evidence? If he attends 
court and tries to prevent a witness from deposing his evidence by 
means of shouting at him, the party has to be taken away from the 
courtroom, and when the evidence is completely deposed and entered 
on the record, he has to be brought back where it is to be read out 
while the witness is present. 
96 Yet, when the court decides that 
the defendant is to be tried by default for his failure to appear 
it should carry on with the hearing in the way, and on the condi- 
tions, mentioned when dealing with the trial by default. There 
are two justifications for trying a defaulting defendant in 
absence: - 
(a) The court has taken the legal measure to enable him to 
appear when summoning him before the trial was opened, but he 
refused to appear. 
14o 
(b) No one must escape justice merely by defaulting, and the 
normal procedure of implementing justice has to be made through 
trial. 
Nevertheless, some semi-judicial tribunals, namely the 
Grievances Board, do not hold their session in the presence of 
parties as referred to before. 
97 
6 -, Equality between the two parties 
It is a well established fact that any civilized law must 
grant the contending parties equality before the court. Islamic 
law and judicial practice hold strongly this principle. The 
Prophet commands that the judge "must regard the two parties equal 
when he speaks to, or points at, them; he must treat them equally 
in his presence; 
98 
he must not speak quietly to one of them and 
speak loudly to the other. "99 Muslim jurists set out the measures 
which the judge must take to apply the principle of equality 
between parties. The general Islamic criterion of ensuring 
equality is that the judge must handle the case in a way that a" 
party who is humble does not despair of justice and impartiality, 
and the party who is of high standing does not hope to find 
favour. 100 
Early in his rule, King `Abdul `Aziz stated that one of his 
aims was to ensure equality before the law. Whether this aim has 
been fulfilled will be dealt with later. The judicial laws 
mention this equality very little. 
101 In practice, the Saudi 
Arabian judiciary applies the principle of equality between parties, 
especially the Sharl'a judiciary which applies totally the Islamic 
judicial tradition in this respect. The courts regard parties as 
equal irrespective of their political position, social status, or 
religion. 
102 The parties must sit side by side in front of the 
judge, enjoying the same attention. Equality is shown by the fact 
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that the court usually calls a party by his plain name omitting 
his honorary title. If it happens that one party is a prince 
103 
for example, the court will not mention his title during the 
proceedings, but calls him by his plain name in order to show his 
rival that the court isnot in favour of anything but justice. 
The courts regard the public prosecutor as a mere litigant, who 
must sit side by side with the defendant. The President of the 
Judiciary informed the Minister of the Interior - who is the chief 
authority for the prosecution - that "It must be known that justice 
requires that the public prosecutor must not be given special 
attention because he is the representative of the government, but 
he must only be regarded as a mere litigant and treated by the 
court in the same way in which the defendant is treated. t"04 
Another indication that the accused is treated equally with the 
prosecutor or the claimant is that the Saudi Arabian tribunal does 
not know the dock in which the defendant sits in some countries. 
Moreover, as the court must make the defendant feel secure enough 
to defend himself and free from discrimination, no prison officer 
or policemen or any person representing the executive authority 
is allowed inside the court, except in a case of violence. 
7- Oral conduct of proceedings 
The main purpose of the parties being present during the 
hearing is to enable them to debate their cases and to hear what 
is stated by the opposing party or by witnesses. The most 
important objectives of this principle are the following: - 
(a) A fact stated orally before court by the original source 
is bound to be more reliable than one stated in writing and 
recorded outside the court. - 
(b) When a statement is given viva voce, the court will read 
it over after it has been recorded, and this will enable the 
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person who gave it to correct any error appearing on the record. 
This may be illustrated by instances when an uneducated party or 
witness gives his statement in his own local dialect which may 
not be fully understood by the judge and the record clerk. The 
judge has to ask this party or witness about the exact meaning of 
his statement. This mode of recording a statement helps-to eli- 
minate errors. 
(c) A witness intending to give false evidence may find it 
easier to do so in writing and not in words before the court. 
When such evidence is given orally in the court, in the presence 
of the party against whom it is conveyed, the witness will probably 
be embarrassed and nervous to the extent that the court may suspect 
his evidence, and therefore, subject him to a thorough examination. 
(d) Parties will be more satisfied as to the fairness of the 
trial if the proceedings are oral, since they know that all they 
have said, or has been said in their favour, was heard by the court. 
For these reasons, the Shari'a and the Commercial Law hold 
that proceedings must be made orally. 
105 "Orally" here means the 
giving of a statement by its original source by word of mouth. But 
it is accepted legally that a statement may be regarded as having 
been given orally in the following circumstances: - 
(a) When evidence is given in the absence of a defendant, who 
was sent out by the court subsequent to his causing a "disturbance" 
when a witness for his rival was giving his evidence, on condition 
that it is read out in the presence of this party after he has been 
allowed to return to the courtroom. 
(b) When facts are stated in a document produced by an 
official authority, provided that this document does not contain 
testimony required to be given viva voce, and provided that it is 
read in the court. 
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(e) When a plea was signed by the defendant and read out by 
the tribunal before it is entered on the record. 
106 
8- Lepal representation 
The Saudi Arabian Judiciary grants every party a fair oppor- 
tunity to argue his case and convey any acimissable evidence. 
However, it differs basically from the Judiciaries of other 
countries which have bar institutions in limiting the scope of 
legal representation. Generally speaking, the SharT'a courts do 
not encourage legal representation on the ground that it is 
infinitely preferable to keep professionalism out of the judicial 
proceedings. It is true that the semi-judicial tribunals do not 
object in principle to legal representation conducted by a profes- 
sional lawyer. These tribunals usually tolerate the lengthy argu- 
ments of lawyers which may concentrate on technicalities and on 
side issues, 
107 
which are not tolerated by the SharI'a courts. 
Nevertheless, since the Shari'a courts dominate the vast bulk of 
the judiciary, we shall concentrate more on legal representation 
at these courts. 
Here, one must differentiate between criminal cases which 
involve public rights and those which involve only private rights. 
According to the Vanball law and the general practice of the 
courts, no legal representation is permitted in criminal proceedings 
regarding a public right. 
108 A defendant must appear in person to 
argue his case. The judge may learn more about the truth of the 
charge and about the validity of evidence when a party argues the 
case. However, where the case involves both a private right and a 
public right and the court looks into them simultaneously, legal 
representation is permitted, especially if a foreigner who does 
not speak Arabic is involved. The extent of such permission 
depends on the judge himself and not on a statutory or an adminis- 
trative rule. The judges who usually encounter non-Arabic speaking 
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foreigners, such as the judges of the Eastern Province where the 
oil companies are found, tend to tolerate professional lawyers. 
Such a toleration is mainly due to the fact that lawyers may, at 
the same time, act as interpreters. 
Where a case concerns a private right, whether criminal or 
civil, the Shar3`a109 permits representation by a member of the 
legal profession or by a lay person, whether the represented party 
is present at the court or not. The Law of 106110 and the Law of 
1952(A 111 determine that "every person has the right to be 
represented without any restrictions. " In actual fact, legal 
representation in cases of private rights is restricted by certain 
conditions regarding the social and medical status of parties, the i 
location of courts, the type of the case, the qualifications of 
representatives, their occupations and their nationalities. This 
fact may be illustrated by reference to the historical background 
of legal representation in Saudi Arabia. According to the judicial 
instructions issued in 1927 (13Li. 5)1 12 by the Presidency of the 
Judiciary, Article 11 of the Law of 1927, and a royal order in 
1930 (349) , 
113 the only persons who could be represented at courts 
111 
were those who had a legal reason, such as absence or illness; 
15 
or a secluded woman (mu addara)1 
6 
Where a party resided some 
distance outside the town in which the court was situated, he was 
considered absent, and thus, he could be represented. 
117 Article 23 
of the Law of 1931 granted a public functionary the right to 
appoint a representative. Minas and old persons are in practice 
entitled to representation118 although their right in this respect 
is not recognised by the law. Article 97 of the Law of 1936 
provided for the representation of all persons without regard to 
status. But three months later, the Presidency of the Judiciary 
decided119 that the inhabitants of Mecca, Jeddah, and Madina, were 
not entitled to be represented. This may be explained by the fact 
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that the judicial and executive authorities were against legal 
professionalism which they thought could lead to delay in the 
hearing, and to an attempt at gaining benefits for clients at the 
expense of justice. 
120 In 1366, the Beduins living outside Madzna 
but within the jurisdiction of its courts were not allowed to 
appoint representatives but had to argue their cases in person. 
The reason given for this was that these Beduins were in the habit 
of trespassing on the properties, especially the lands, of others 
and claiming that those properties were their own. Where a case 
was raised against them, they referred to their representatives in 
Madina and refused to appear since they were represented. By doing 
so, they made it very difficult for their rivals to pursue their 
cases, since they had in some cases to travel to Madina, and this 
forced their rivals, especially those who were weak or poor, to 
give up their rights. Yet, if any of these Beduins had a legal 
excuse, he was entitled to appoint a representative. 
121 
Article 59 of Law of 1952(A) follows Article 97 of the Law of 
1936, in giving any person the right to be represented irrespective 
of his status. In 1955, a juristl2a submitted a memorandum to King 
`Abdul `Aziz requesting the abolition of legal representation in 
the interest of justice. The King referred this memorandum to the 
Mufti for his opinion. The Mufti ruled that legal representation 
was admissible in cases regarding private rights, provided that 
the representatives had proper qualifications. 
123 
At the present time, representation is, in practice, under- 
taken mostly by relatives and professional lawyers who must be12L. 
Saudi Arabian subjects. However, a foreign lawyer may, on 
permission, represent a party when no Saudi Arabian lawyer is 
available. 
125 A former judge, or a person attested to have 
sufficient legal knowledgel26 can also act as representative at 
court . 
127 
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9- Evidence must be put before court 
As a general rule, the judge must base his judgment upon 
evidence put before him in the court so that it may be examined 
closely and the parties are enabled to debate it. Hence, the court 
must not initiate its judgment wholey or even partly, on any evi- 
dence which is unknown to the party against whom it is given, or 
on evidence of which this party was told but was not given 
opportunity to refute. 
128 According to this rule, any knowledge 
obtained by the judge outside his court affecting evidence related 
to the proceedings is not admissible unless it concerns the 
character of a witness. Although some Muslim\jurists129 are of 
the opinion that the personal evidence of the judge is as admis- 
sible as any evidence, official ljanbali law excludes this evidence 
whether it was perceived before or after the appointment of the 
judge. 13o This opinion is applied by the Saudi Arabian judges. 
131 
10 - Speed in the handling of cases 
One of the characteristic features of the Saudi Arabian 
judiciary, especially the Shar3`a courts, is said to be the 
efficient and speedy handling of cases. This fact has attracted 
the attention of some legal experts who encounter the Saudi Arabian 
courts. 
132 
It is true that Article 47 of the Law of 1952(A) determines 
that: No cases whatsoever shall remain in the court awaiting trial 
for more than one month". However, this rule has not been applied 
in every kind of proceedings. Its significance may be in reminding 
judges of the necessity of deciding cases as speedily as possible. 
The student of Saudi Arabian legal practice cannot fail to notice 
that some trials may take much longer than one month since justice 
requires that a case, especially a serious one, must be carefully 
considered and both parties given adequate time to present their 
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cases. Moreover, the SharI'a courts may not necessarily apply 
the laws which limit the time given to a party to produce his 
evidence if they feel that this is contrary to equity. However, 
the Shar! 'a courts apply several measures to speed their trials: - 
(a) The judge must examine a case one day prior to its hearing 
so that he may have a general idea of what is needed at the 
hearing. 33 
(b) The majority of the criminal cases tried by these courts 
are not serious, so that the court may not spend a long time 
considering every single particular in the proceedings. 
(c) Most cases are heard by a single judge. 
(d) The contending parties may go together to the court and 
ask it to decide on their case, especially if it is trivial, and 
the judge must agree to this if the case does not require a preli- 
minary investigation and if he has time to look into it at the end 
of the office hours on the same day. 
134 Where a hearing has to be 
adjourned for a party to prepare his plea or to produce his 
evidence, the judge ought not to adjourn it for a longer time than 
the end of the working hours of the same day if this is possible. 
Furthermore, where the court fixes a certain date for the hearing 
and both parties appear before the date the court ought to look 
into their case, if it has time. 
135 
(e) where a defendant refuses to give a complete answer to a 
question or request, or if he gives an irrelevant answer, the judge 
must request him three times to give a proper answer. If the 
defendant does not respond to the judge's request the court must 
proceed with the hearing in the same session. 
136 
(f) if a party fails to appear, the court may secure his 
presence by force if necessary. Once the court realises that a 
party is behaving contumaciously or he is outside its jurisdiction, 
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it must try him by default if he is a defendant, and must drop his 
case if he is a claimant, without wasting time. 37 
(g) If a party who must take an oath refuses to appear, he 
must be compelled to appear. 
138 
(h) The Shar3`a judges hold that detention is a type of 
punishment and no accused should be punished before his guilt is 
legally established. This principle leads them to take all legal 
measures to speed up the trial of a detainee, especially if the 
proceedings relate to a public crime. 
(i) The public prosecutor should not prosecute the defendant 
until the evidence for the prosecution is available. Thus, most 
of criminal cases are decided on in one session. 
(j) Generally speaking, a defendant must appear and defend 
himself if he is charged with a public crime. Yet, in a crime of a 
private right, he may be represented, but once the court realises 
that his representative is trying to cause delay, the court may 
order the defendant to appear personally and complete his case. 
139 
Thus, it can be said generally that the Shari`a courts handle 
cases in a speedy manner. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EVIDENCE 
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Introduction 
"In common speech evidence is merely that which makes evident 
something to someone. But in law evidence is something which makes 
evident a fact to a judicial tribunal. "' Though this definition is 
general and vague, it may be a good definition. Moreover, it is 
consistent with that adopted by the jurists of the SharT'a, and 
therefore relevant to this study. Evidence is classified as 
follows: - 
(a) Direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence of a fact 
is (i) a valid testimony of a person who perceives this fact and 
(ii) the production of a document which is not treated as a 
presumption. Circumstantial evidence in the Shari`a has a very 
wide scope. Every evidence from which a fact in issue may be 
inferred falls within this category, i. e. presumptions - including 
most documents and real evidence. 
2 
(b) Oral, documentary and objective. Oral evidence is that 
given by word of mouth, e. g. testimony. Documentary evidence is 
that obtained from a document - including the evidence derived from 
it as to its existance. Objective evidence is evidence afforded 
by the inspection of a material object. 
(c) Primary and secondary. In relation to a document, 
primary evidence is usually the original document, whereas the 
secondary evidence of a document is usually either a copy of it, 
or oral evidence of its contents. 
Now, we may turn to the question: what facts may be given in 
evidence? 
3 They are facts in issue, and facts not in issue 
admitted for their relationship with the former facts .4 
Facts in issue are: - (i) the constituents of the crime as 
alleged by the claimant or the prosecution and denied by the 
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defence; (ii) facts alleged by the defence and denied by the prose- 
cution as an alibi or matters of justification or excuse. 
Facts not in issue but permitted come under the following 
categories: 
(a) Facts relevant to the facts in issue. These are facts 
which may form the actual details of a fact in issue, 
5 facts which 
may support or refute an inference or presumption relating to the 
existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, and facts which 
explain a fact in issue. 
(b) Factsy similar to facts in-issue. 
6 
(c) Other relevant facts. Briefly, these facts may be 
treated for convenience in the following groups: - (i) surrounding 
circumstances, or res gestae, (ii) state of mind of a party or a 
witness, (iii) identity of a party, a witness, or a relative in 
the case of murder, (iv) character and convictions of a defendant 
or a witness, (v) general reputation of a party, (vi) opinion of 
witnesses, and (vii) their conduct. 
Having referred to facts which may be proved, we may refer to 
the burden of proof. As a general rule, the person who affirms a 
matter must prove it. Thus, the burden of the proof-of a fact in 
issue rests upon the prosecution or the claimant throughout the 
proceedings. However, when the defendant adduces a-fact for his 
defence in order to refute an evidence, justify or modify his 
action, to show his legal inability of committing the crime, or to 
establish the probity(`adäla) of his witnesses, he must prove it. 
Therefore, it can be said that the burden of-proof with regard to 
a particular fact lies on the party who alleges this fact. The 
party on whom lies the burden of proof of the issue has the right 
to begin; that is to say makes the opening speech and renders his 
evidence first. The burden of proof may be dispensed with by an 
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admission, or by a presumption. 
The burden of proof has a certain connection with the standard 
of proof. It has been mentioned above that the party who affirms 
a fact must prove it. The proof here has to be evidence 
introduced to make out a prima facie case; in other words, he must 
render the minimum of evidence capable of proving his allegation. 
As a general rule in criminal proceedings, the prosecution has to 
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond reasonable doubt does not imply absolute certainty as to 
the guilt of the accused, but it implies the establishment of the 
truth of the accusation to the satisfaction of the judge, since the 
establishment of absolute certainty is almost impossible. 
The standard of proof required to establish the fact that the 
accused has confessed to the commission of the crime has to be 
treated on the same grounds as that required to establish the guilt 
of the accused. 
Burden of proof on the defence may be lighter than that on 
the prosecution, especially in regard to hudüd, as will be 
examined below. 
Finally, it may be useful to mention that, for convenience, 
evidence will not be categorized into evidence as means of proof 
and evidences as not means of proof, as some other laws do. 
7 This 
is because Saudi Arabian law sometimes treats evidence which is a 
means of proof together with evidence which is not so., as in the 
case of rea evidence where it comes under the evidence of 
presumptions. Moreover, informal confession, which is a means of 
proof, is treated on the same footing as formal confession which is 
not a means of proof. 
- 158 - 
A. CONFESSION 
Confession (or admission) is divided into two classes: - 
formal confession, which is made before the trial tribunal, and 
informal confession which is usually made outside the tribunal. 
According to the law of Saudi Arabia, both formal and informal, 
confessions are to be made only by a party or his representative, 
where legal representation is permitted. The difference between 
these two kinds of confession is that, informal confession must be 
proved in the same way in which a fact is proved. Unlike some 
other laws, 
8 informal confession in Saudi. _Arabianlaw 
is not 
considered as a type of hearsay, 
9 but it is classified as 
confession since, when proved, it is as conclusive as the formal 
one in most cases. Therefore, when reference is made to confession, 
both formal and informal types are included. This fact will be 
first seen when referring to the stipulations regarding confession. 
Stipulations Regarding the Confessor 
(1) Sanity. Confession is not admissable unless it is made 
by a sane party, so that it may have an effect on him. 
10 Where a 
party or even his relatives, especially in a criminal proceedings, 
claim that he is not mentally sound, the court must investigate 
thoroughly the claim before receiving his confession, and if he is 
found to be insane his confession must not be received. 
11 Yet, 
the court may exclude the claim of a party that he is insane if the 
court does not have a firm reason to believe that he is so. A 
mental depression does not affect the admissibility of the 
confession of a party. 
12 The confession made outside the court by 
a murderer that he had killed the deceased was received, although 
he claimed that-he was not aware of this confession which he could 
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have made while in a state of shock after realizing the latter had 
died. 13 
It is to be noted here that the power of the court to examine 
the mental state of a party is not limited to a specific method. 
The judge himself may undertake this examination, but if a 
complicated and technical examination is needed, he has to commit' 
the party to experts. 
14 
(2) Attainment of awe of majority. 15 A confession concerning 
the commission of a crime of hadd or retaliation (gisäs) is 
inadmissible, unless the confessor is of full age. 
16 Nevertheless, 
in proceedings regarding ta`zir, the confession of a mumayyiz, i. e. 
a minor who knows reasonably the consequence of his action, may be 
admitted in the Shari`a courts. It has been held that a 
confession to stealing by a minor was received, and hence he was 
sentenced to a punishment of ta`zir. 
17 
(3) Ability to speak. The confession of a dumb party is 
admissible if it is written. Where it is adduced by means of signs 
which can be understood, its admissibility may differ from one type 
of crime to another. In ta`z! r a signal may be admissible, but in 
proceedings concerning a hadd., the matter is controversial. 
Muslim jurists have differed on this question. Some of them held 
the view that a confession with clear signs was to be accepted even 
in udtld. Others refused to accept it in view of a general rule in 
budüd, which implies that doubt is to be held for the benefit of 
the accused. 
18 The Iianbali jurists differed on this issue in 
turn. 19 In Saudi Arabia, judging by the carefulness of the judges 
and the application of the above mentioned rule, one may conclude 
that an admission of a dumb person by eignes is not valid, except 
in ta 'zir. 
(4) Consciousness. A confession of an unconscious person 
- 16o-- 
has no evidentiary weight at-all. Thus, a statement made during 
sleep or unconsciousness or under the effect of anaesthetics or 
drugs is inadmissible. Equally, the admission of a party who is 
hypnotized is not valid. Nevertheless, there is an exception to 
this rule, that is the confession of'a drunken prisoner which is 
admissible in criminal proceedings, except in huddd other-than the 
1add of defamation. 
20 
Stipulations Regarding Confession 
(1) A confession must be made by a party. A confession may 
have weight only if it is made by a party against whom it may be 
taken or by his representative, if representation is allowed. A 
confession by a third person is not admissible especially in 
criminal proceedings. It has been held that a confession of a 
principal accomplice against a party was inadmissible. 
21 Equally, 
the confession of an accessory accomplice was treated on the same 
footing. as that made by a principal. 22 The confession made by a 
co-respondent that he has committed a sexual crime with the 
respondent does not bind the latter, and the confession by the 
latter does not bear any consequence as to the former. 
23 
(2) It must be voluntary. Confession is not to be regarded 
as having evidentiary weight when it is made involuntarily, and 
thereupon it is not valid. An admissible confession must be made 
by a party by his own free will without any inducement. According 
24 inducement is through imprisonment (or even detention), to Shah, 
confiscation of property, beating (even if it does not amount to 
torture), or a threat to commit a party to any of these three types 
of inducement. The Saudi Arabian judges refer quite frequently to 
the definition of inducement as cited in the above mentioned book. 
25 
A promise of advantage from confession is not determined by the 
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majority of Muslim jurists as an inducement, but some of them hold 
that such a promise is reprehensible. 
26 A threat of disadvantage, 
a promise of advantage, or a hope of forgiveness may not be regarded 
by the Saudi Arabian judiciaries asa means of inducement. 
27 
Offering money by an accomplice is not at all a means of 
inducement, since a confession made for the purpose of obtaining 
money is made voluntarily, and therefore it may be admissible. 
The inducement must emanate from any person who is able to carry 
out his threat, whether or not he is in authority. 
29 
The judges are very cautious as to accepting a confession, 
even if it may appear to be voluntary, so much so that they 
usually ask a party who confessed outside the court if he has made 
his confession freely without being induced. 
30 But although 
detention according to the Hanball law is a means of inducement, 
the judge may sometimes receive the confession of a detainee, in a 
non-serious case if he does not state in his plea that his 
confession was caused by an inducement. However, when a party 
confesses inside the court, he is usually asked by the judge if 
he is confessing voluntarily, without duress or pressure. 
31 In 
serious crimes the judges themselves usually administer the 
confession. 
32 By so doing, the judges have, to a large extent, 
succeeded in disciplining the executive when interrogating or 
investigating a suspect. 
33 
A party who has made an informal confession and claimed that 
he confessed under an inducement has to prove his claim if the 
3 
confession does not appear to the judge to have been so made. 
Otherwise, the confession is to be valid35 (except in the afore- 
mentioned hudüd). The inducement does not have to be exercised 
only during the confession but it may also be exercised before the 
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confession has been made since a party who has been subject to an 
inducement and did not confess then may confess later in fear of 
being subject to it again. Fear based on previous inducement has 
been treated as being a sufficient reason for invalidating a 
confession, even though it was made judicially, that is with no 
inducement. 36 Yet, if a prisoner claims that he has made his 
confession out of fear but he had not been subject to an 
inducement before he confessed, his confession is to be 
admissible. 
37 The Court of Cassation in Riyadh, 
38 
when referring 
to the validity of such a confession, stated that the Hanbali 
jurists related that fear without a previous inducement was a mere 
imagination, and not a legal excuse. 
Here the question may be asked: since the judges condemn the 
extortion of confession, why do some Muslim jurists and the Saudi 
Arabian executive authorities sometimes permit, or even demand, 
that an accused who refuses to confess be committed to some 
flogging or long detention? In answering this question, we may 
refer firstly to the fact that, according to the Hanball law, the 
accused who may be so treated is one who is known to have committed 
crimes such as theft, highway robbery, or murder. Secondly, in 
Saudi Arabia this treatment is usually employed when there are 
strong evidentiary indications that the accused has committed the 
crime, but these indications are not the evidence prescribed for 
the crime by the Law. 
39 Yet, what is the value of a confession so 
obtained since any confession made under inducement is inadmissible? 
It seems that its value is that the accused may not retract his 
first confession in the court after he has committed himself to it 
and after he has been confronted with the other evidence against 
him. Indeed, there is a very slim chance that an accused may keep 
his confession when he appears in court in such a circumstance. 
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Apart from this, there seems to be no other reason for obtaining 
a confession in such a manner. Furthermore, although some Muslim 
jurists are of the view that the confession of an accused who 
admits stealing and brings the stolen object after he has been 
subject to such a treatment is admissible, the majority of the 
Hanbali jurists hold the opinion that such a confession is not 
admissible in the case of the hadd of theft. 
40 
The Saudi Arabian 
judges do not accept this kind of confession at all. 
41 
Even if the extortion of confession was conducted by mild 
treatment, and only after strong evidentiary indications have 
risen, it may be suggested that this mode of obtaining admission 
is not always practical, and above all it is unfair. 
(3) It must be express. A statement which falls short of a 
plain acknowledgment of a fact is not to be construed at any rate 
as a confession; that is to say Saudi Arabian law does not 
recognize42 implied confession. 
43 
Where an accused who is faced 
by an allegation of committing a crime does not deny it and does 
not answer it, he should not be taken as having made an implied 
confession. 
4 Equally, the conduct of a party is not to be 
constituted as a confession. An accused who suborns a witness to 
perjure in his favour is not considered as having made a confession. 
4' 
But confession must be explicit in order to be admissible, and 
when the words are ambiguous it will-not have any effect. 
According to the judicial practice, an express confession is 
usually oral. Yet there is an exception to this rule, where an 
accused is dumb. A confession of a dumb person may be construed 
as express when he makes it, explicitly in the form of writing or. a 
signal, provided that the proceedings do not involve a crime of 
hadd other than that of defamation. 
46 
() Compatibility with allegation. Where the confession 
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does not appear to be completely consistent with the fact in 
issue, the court will not accept it on the grounds that there is 
no truth in it, or at least that there is a suspicion as to its 
truth. Muslim jurists state that the confession of an accused of 
Zinn who has not a sexual organ at the date given for the 
commission of the crime is not admissible. 
47 In theft, the 
admission of an accused that he has stolen a sum of money or 
property which is more in quantity or value than what had been 
alleged may not be admissible. It has been held that such an 
admission was inadmissible for the reason that there was no 
Hanbali authority for the view that he who admitted more than had 
been alleged by the claimant was to be liable for the charge, 
since the charge and the contents of the admission were to be 
compatible. 
8 The President of the Judiciary49 and the Court of 
Cassation5° in Riyadh opposed for some time this opinion, but they 
both approved it afterwards. 
(5) It must take place inside the court. Before referring to 
the confessions which are to be made in court during the trial, it 
should be mentioned that as soon as a prisoner confesses, he is to 
be taken by the police to the nearest SharT'a court to record his 
confession therein51 for use in the trial, especially if his crime 
is serious. The reason why this measure was adopted was explained 
in 1953 by the Crown Prince, 
52 
who was at that time entitled by the 
King to run the country, and by the Viceroy. 
53 They explained 
that when a prisoner made a confession before the police and was 
put into custody with others, he could often be persuaded to deny 
his confession before the court, or to claim that he was induced 
to make his confession. To avoid this, a confession was to be so 
recorded before the prisoner was detained. When a confession was 
made outside office hours the prisoner was to be detained alone 
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until his confession was recorded. The task of the trial court 
would be easier when accepting a confession recorded by it 
beforehand or by another court, since the confession would not 
have been accepted by the recording court if it was not duly 
made. By so recording a confession, it was to be regarded as 
having the effect of the one made before the trial court, except 
in 1udüd other than defamation. 
54 In other words, it was valid55 
even if it concerned a crime of retaliation (gip, The 
confessions which are accepted if only made before the trial court 
are those concerning the crimes of hudUd, with the exception of 
the add of defamation which is treated in this respect as a crime 
of retaliation. The trial court is to ask the prisoner, who has 
duly made a confession outside it, whether he confirms his 
confession-57 Where there is no way of invalidating the confession, 
the court has to be absolutely sure, and to satisfy its conscience, 
that the confession is an authentic one. This caution in 
receiving a confession to the commission of a crime of a 4add is 
easily felt when examining the judicial practice, particularly if 
the hadd. is zinä58 or theft. 
59 
However, unlike the confession to the above mentioned udU. d, 
the confession regarding the majority of crimes, may be admissible 
when made outside the trial court, even if it is extrajudicial 
confession, as long as it is proved by witnesses. It happens 
frequently that a prisoner confesses before the police, and when 
he is taken to court to record his confession he denies it. When 
his trial opens, the police officer before whom the prisoner has 
confessed may give evidence in the court as to the confession. 
When the court is satisfied with the truth of the evidence, the 
confession is received. 
60 
Similarly, a confession made in the 
presence of officials6l or ordinary persons62 is to be treated in 
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the same aforementioned manner. 
Retraction of Confessions in Hudüd 
The majority of Muslim jurists are of the view that there is 
no objection to the judge hinting to a confessor to a crime of 
hadd to recall his confession. One of these jurists is Ahmed b. 
Hanbal. 
63 Others relate that it is not only unobjectionable to- 
make this hint, but preferable. Shaykh Mu4ammad b. Ibrahim, when 
asked by the King as to a suggestion made by a . purist that a 
confession must be. valid after it was made, argued that this 
suggestion was contradictory with the Sharl'a. His reasoning was 
that the Prophet-warded a man off several times when he was 
confessing before him. that, he had committed zinä; that the Prophet 
hinted for the man. to retract his confession as follows: - "Perhaps 
you just touched"; that the Prophet said to a thief who had 
confessed: "I do not imagine that, you have done so"; that `Umar 
(the Second Caliph), when a thief. was brought before him, inquired: 
"Have you stolen? Say no. " Then the man replied "no", and `Umar 
set him. free. 
64 
In Simrän v. al-QaVarl, the Grand Sharl'a Court 
of Mecca 
65 
added "that some-of the Prophet's Companions did the 
same with thieves as the Caliph `Umar did; that `All (the fourth 
Caliph) rebuked, or as it has also been related, drove away, or 
rejected, a thief when he had confessed. " However, the aformen- 
tioned acts of the Prophet and his Caliphs and Companions are the 
only justification for the allusion by judges for the retraction of 
confessions. As there are no other reasons for this allusion and 
as the Hanball law does not concretely prefer or reject the 
allusion, judges in Saudi Arabia are left to use their own 
discretion as to this matter. A close examination of the judicial 
practice shows that the rule of allusion to retract confession is 
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usually limited to the 1add of zinä and that of theft. Although 
the ýadd of highway robbery is treated, so far as evidence is- =, 
concerned, as the hadd of theft, the judges do not seem to be--, 
willing to operate the rule as to the confession to the former 
]add. The 1add of 'intoxication is not different from highway 
robbery, as the judges do not usually show any mercy to their° 
offenders. This attitude of the. judges may be attributed to the 
fact that such an allusion made by the Prophet and his Caliphs 
happened 
-to 
be regarding the add of zinn and the hadd of theft, 
and operating the rule of allusion to these, the judges will do 
nothing different from the deeds of the Prophet and his Caliphs. 
It may be also--attributed to the lack: of mercy to the offenders of 
the other tudUd, probably for one of the following reasons: - 
(a) Their comparatively mild punishment, such as that of the 
badd of intoxication. 
(b) Their hideousness, as in the case of highway robbery., 
(a) The ever-increasing number of offenders, as evidently 
noticed in the number of those who consume alcohol. 
Indeed with regard to alcohol consumers and highway robbers, the 
judges seem to be as harsh as the law permits. However, judges do 
not always hint to the confessor to zinfl or theft to retract his 
66 
confession, since they are not under obligation to do so. 
However, when a confessor retracts his confession, he has to 
be exempted from the punishment of the 1add on the-ground that he 
might have falsified his confession; in "other words there exists a 
doubt as to its truth. This is an implementation of the tradition: 
"Avert ye the hudla on account of dubious circumstances. " 
67 
In 
order to observe this tradition and other similar ones, the 
68 
decision is 'to include that the punishment of the hadd should not. -. - 
be carried out if the prisoner retracts his confession. 
69 The 
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retraction of a confession may not only be by words, but also by. 
conduct. A prisoner who intends to flee when he is being prepared 
for the execution of his sentence or after he has received part of 
his sentence, is to be regarded as having retracted his confession. 
The retraction by conduct is based on the tradition concerning 
MU'iz, who was the first man to confess to have committed zinn. 
When MU'iz was committed to the punishment and felt the pain he 
fled, but he was not let by the executors to escape the full 
sentence. Having been told by the executors of Ma'iz's attempt to 
flee, the Prophet said: "Why did you not let him go? "7° 
Since the right of retracting a confession to a hadd extends 
to the end of the execution of the sentence, a representative of 
the trial court, 
71 
who is an authority on the Shar! 'a, has to 
attend the process of the execution of the sentence, so that he 
can stop the execution if the prisoner retracts his confession. 
72 
Indeed, a large number of confessors retracted their confessions 
when they were about to be punished, and were averged from the 
punishment of the hadd, so much so that the President of the 
Council of Ministers commanded that any final judgement by a 
Shari`a court, even if it concerned a $add, must be carried out 
without the presence of any representative73 (hinting at the 
representative of the court). But- the President of the Judiciary 
and the Mufti reacted to the command of the President of the 
Council of Ministers and informed the Minister of the Interior that 
"If the convicted party withdraws his confession before the 
execution of his sentence, the execution must not be accomplished, 
and he must be committed back to the trial court to consider his 
retraction-" 
74 
Finally, it may be relevant to mention that after a confession 
to a crime of $add has-been retracted, the crime may be commuted 
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into a crime of ta`zir, and the retracted confession may then be 
admissible, since the role of retracting the confession does not 
apply to ta` zir. 
Repetition of Confession 
(1) The YSadd of zinä. According to the Hanbali law a 
confession regarding the add of zinn is invalid unless the 
prisoner confesses folir times that he has committed the crime, 
since the Prophet had not punished the confessors to zinä till they 
had confessed four times. 
75 All the Saudi Arabian judges held this 
view in a very strict way. In their judgemerrs based on confession., 
they determine that the convicted persons have admitted the crimes 
"four times", and sometimes more than four. 
76 It is not sufficient 
that the court may mention only that a prisoner confesses several, 
or a few, or many times, but it must explicitly determine the 
number of times of his confession, as prescribed by the law. 
77 
(2) The $add of theft. As to this crime, repetition is also 
stipulated, but only twice. The judges usually mention in their 
judgements that the convicts have confessed. "twice". Yet, a 
judgement which states that a convict has confessed "more than one 
time" or "several times" is valid, since this implies that the 
confession has been made twice. This principle of repetition has 
been received from the Hanball law. The Presidency of the 
Judiciary, 
78 
when arguing about the inadmissibility of a single 
confession, referred to Kashshäf, 
79 
which relates that a confession 
of an accused of the hadd of theft must be made twice. Yet, the 
judges of the Grand Sharl'a Court of Riyadh80 in 1966 (1386), 
when arguing with the Court of Cassation, 
81 
held the opinion that 
this hadd could be inflicted upon a prisoner who confessed only 
once. But this opinion did not go beyond the argument, and it 
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could not have gone further, since the Court of Cassation and the 
High-Judicial Authority would have revoked any judgement based on 
a confession made only once. However, in practice, all judges - 
including those of the Grand Shari`a Court of Riyadh - have never 
passed a sentence regarding the hadd of theft unless the confession 
has been made at least twice. 
(3). Highway robbery. As the hadd of highway robbery stands 
on the same footing as the hadd of theft o as far as evidence is 
concerned, 
82 it is tobe said that the confession to the former 
hadd. must be made twice, otherwise it is not receivable. 
(4) Retaliation. (qis'6s). Muslim jurists differ in their 
view as to the repetition of confession regarding retaliation. 
The IHanbali authoritative opinion does not indicate that it is 
stipulated that such a confession must be repeated. By close 
examination of the judicial practice, one finds that all confessions 
concerning crimes of retaliation have been made repeatedly, but 
this does not mean that a confession of this type has to be 
repeated. All the judgements state in their recitals that 
confessors are convicted upon their confessions, without giving 
weight to their repetition. 
83 
(5) The 4add. of defamation. (gadhf) . Since it is not 
necessary that a confession to a crime of retaliation is repeated 
on the ground that this crime involves mainly a private right, the 
confession to a $add of defamation which also involves mainly a 
private right cannot be expected to be admitted in a stricter 
manner than the former; that is to say, a confession made once to 
a hadä of defamation may be admissible. Indeed, Muslim jurists 
unanimously agree to this rule, 
84 
and so do the Saudi Arabian 
judges. 
85 
(6) The badä of intoxication. The add of intoxication is 
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absolutely of a public right. As we have seen, a hadd of a public 
right, such as zing and theft, is to be confessed to a specified 
number of times. But that of intoxication is different in this 
respect. Kashshäf, 
86 for example, states that a confession to 
this hadd may be made only once exactly on the same footing as the 
add of defamation. By examining the practice in Saudi Arabia, a 
judgement concerning the hadd_of intoxication does not mention 
that a confession has been repeated, even if it has been. 
87 
The conclusion is that in this add confession may be admissible 
if it is made only once. 
(7) Ta`zir. The confession to the remainder of crimes, the 
crimes of to'zzir, is obviously not to be more strict than that 
concerning retaliation or : the i}udUd of defamation and 
intoxication, for two reasons. Firstly, ta`zir is not as serious 
as hudüd or retaliation, since its punishment is left to the 
discretion of the judge, whereas the punishments of the latter are 
fixed by the law. Secondly, the repetition of a confession in some 
hudttd, such as zinä and theft, is required partly for widening the 
ground for dubious circumstances to avert the punishment prescribed 
for the sadd. Since ta` zir does not come under these 1 udUd, there 
is no significance in trying to avert its punishment. Therefore, 
the confession to a crime of ta`zTr is admissible when made 
without repetition. In practice, the confession to a crime of 
ta'zir is usually received by the judge more easily than even the 
confession to a crime of retaliation or to the 1add of defamation 
and intoxication. Indeed, there is no indication that a confession 
to ta`z3 has not been recieved till it was repeated. 
88 As crimes 
and offences tried by the semi-judicial tribunals come under 
ta`z"Ir, reference may be made to the question of whether these 
tribunals may require the repetition of a confession. Briefly, it 
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is not necessary that such a confession be repeated, and its 
admissibility does not depend on its repetition at all. 
From all that has been said, we may conclude that confession 
may be admissible when it is made even once only, except where 
it regards the hudüd of zing, theft, and highway robbery. 
Before ending the discussion on the repetition of the 
confession, there is the question as to whether this repetition 
has to be made in different sessions, as held by some Muslim 
jurists. The Hanbalis are of the view that a separate session 
for each confession is not necessary. They argue that the 
Prophet did not require the multiplicity of sessions. 
89 In 
Saudi Arabia, it can be said that each time a prisoner confesses, 
this is likely to happen in a separate session, since the court 
is inclined to give a confessor a comparatively long time to 
reconsider his confession. Irrespective of this coincidence 
and irrespective of the fact that judges are extremely careful 
not to admit a confession unless it has been repeated, it may be 
suggested that the plurality of sessions is not required. Thus, 
the Saudi Arabian judiciaries are not different from their 
Hanbali predecessors on this question. 
B. TESTIMONY 
Stipulations as to Witnesses 
(1) Sanity. A person whose testimony is tendered in the 
proceedings must be sane when he first witnessed the commission 
of the criminal act, and when he gives his statement in court. 
In other words, the testimony of an insane person is inadmissible. 
90 
(2) Attainment of the age of majority. Although some 
minors may show intelligence, perception of the relationship 
between things, independent thinking, and a sense of discretion, 
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their testimony is inadmissible. The only exception to this is 
when minors are involved in a fight which results in bodily 
injuries, provided that they were still on the site of the 
fight. 91 However, some judges are of the opinion that the 
evidence of a minor may be admitted if he is able to give it in 
a way that will satisfy the judge, provided that the evidence 
does not concern a serious matter. 
92 Nevertheless, this opinion 
does not seem to have ever been put into practice. 
(3) Ability of Speech. Though the signal of a dumb person 
may be received in the confession, as we have seen, it is not 
receivable in testimony. However, his evidence in writing may 
be admissible. 
93 
() Islam. 94 The statement of a non-Muslim cannot be 
considered evidence of good testimony in criminal proceedings 
by a Sh arl'a court. 
95 But the semi-judicial tribunals may 
receive such evidence. 
96 The Forgery Committee accepted a 
statement made by a non-Muslim, an American employee, as testimony 
against a Saudi Arabian97 employee. 
98 
(5) Memory. A witness must have a reasonable memory. If 
he is known to be forgetful or of erroneous perception, his 
statement of what he has witnessed will not be received. 
(6) Probity. (`adäla). Briefly, the probity of a person 
can be demonstrated by his compliance with religious duties, the 
avoidance of great sins and.. excess In venial sins, 
99 
and by 
behaviour according to the standards of morality and dignity in 
an Islamic society. The Shari`a courts apply the rules of 
probity strictly, so that any evidence is to be excluded when the 
witness-does not fulfill the principles of probity. The semi- 
judicial tribunals do not apply the rule of probity strictly. 
The Commercial Council of Jeddah is an exception. 
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Finally, it is to be mentioned that a person held to be with 
no probity (ghayr `adl) may regain his probity by no longer 
sinning and by behaving according to the standards of morality and 
dignity of his country. In the Saudi Arabian law, there is no 
specific time within which a person with no probity may regain his 
probity, but this is left to the judge to decide. 
100 
(7) Masculinity. According to the Hanbali sources the role 
of women-in the field of testimony with regard to criminal 
proceedings is very limited. Their testimony is limited to 
personal matters which concern only women and which do not usually 
occur in the presence and sight of men. 
101 The commonly accepted 
view is that the evidence of a medically qualified woman (c bila) 
is receivable, and so is the evidence of a trustworthy experienced 
woman. 
102 
The question is how much weight can be placed on the direct 
deposition of women in criminal proceedings regarding matters 
other than those just mentioned. The answer is that Hanbali 
sources do not hold that it is admissible either in udüd or in 
ta` zir. 
1 C3 Yet, the First Magistrate Court of Tayifl 
04 had 
received the deposition of two women, without any corroboration 
from a man, upon which the punishment of ta`zlr was inflicted. It 
is true that the evidence of a woman tendered in criminal 
proceedings is not regarded technically as testimony but as a 
presumption whose admissibility depends largely on the discretion 
of the judge. Nevertheless, the least that can be said regarding 
the testimony of a woman is that it may be accepted as sufficient 
evidence in criminal matters, whether it is classified under 
testimony or presumptions. 
The practice of the Sharl'a courts shows that the deposition 
- 175 - 
of a woman is inadmissible to prove facts in issue regarding hudüd 
or retaliation (gipdc); but that it can be an important presumption 
of strong, suspicion (lawth) as far as murder is concerned. 
105 
The question of the admissibility of testimony given by a 
woman in semi-judicial tribunals is obscure, since their statutes 
and regulations do not refer to evidence at all. The exception to 
this is the Commercial Law106 which is similar to the practice of 
the Shari`a courts. As a general rule, evidence given by women is 
very rare, even in the Sharl'a courts, since they rarely 
participate in public life. This fact lessens the researcher's 
chance of finding enough material to arrive at an accurate, 
conclusion regarding, the testimony of women, particularly with 
regard to the semi-judicial tribunals. However, since the Shari`a 
courts, which are stricter in admitting evidence, receive the 
statement of a woman in ta`ztr - at least as a presumption - and 
since crimes tried by the semi-judicial tribunals come under 
ta`zir, it may be concluded that such a statement may similarly 
be received by these trihunals. 
Stipulations Regarding Testimony 
(1) Awareness of the fact testified to. The witness must be 
fully aware of the fact to which he is testifying when he first 
perceived it, and must remember this fact beyond any doubt when he 
gives his evidence, otherwise his evidence will be weightless. He 
must be well aware of the nature of the fact in issue. He must 
also be-able to identify the alleged defendant, and the claimant 
if necessary, otherwise the evidence will not be valid. 
107 It 
was held that the evidence of the witness who gave his deposition 
against the prisoner in the preliminary investigation, and who 
deposed later in the court that he was not exactly sure of his 
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person, 
108 
was not valid as conclusive evidence. 
log 
(2) Voluntary Rendering. Evidence tendered in the form of 
testimony must be given of the witness. ' free will. Shar! 'a courts 
hold that testimony given under threat is inadmissible. 
110 Even 
courts have no power to compel a witness to give evidence because 
evidence made by force is invalid. Where evidence concerns murder, 
the court may ask witnesses to appear, In other proceedings, the 
courts leave the matter of producing witnesses to the party 
concerned. 
III If the witness who has given evidence°outside the 
court denies, or declines to confirm, his evidence in the court, 
the court will exclude this evidence and will not admit it. The 
inadmissibility of this evidence is based on the grounds that: 
(i) when the witness has denied or declined to give his evidence 
the truth of this evidence then became doubtful, and such evidence 
is not receivable; (ii) when he has denied that he had evidence and 
afterwards he was willing to depose it, he has lied, and the 
testimony of a liar is not valid. Where the witness does not 
respond to the request of the court to appear within a reasonable 
length of time, the court will usually decide on the case if-it is 
regarding a crime cCa public right, without delaying the proceedings 
to hear his evidence. 
112 
According to the Shari`a, it is obligatory to give testimony 
in any proceedings concerning the case of a private right. As to 
public criminal proceedings, it is held by many Muslim jurists, - 
including the Hanbalis, that it is preferable not to give testimony 
in the case of a public crime. Moreover, some Hanbalis are of the 
opinion that judges are permitted to invite a witness to abstain 
from giving his evidence in 1udüd. 
113 Where a case involves both 
a private right and a public right of a hadd punishment, witnesses 
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are obliged to give evidence on the private issue only. This 
matter is apparent in the case of theft. It is suggested by some 
jurists that the witnesses, when tendering their evidence, use the 
word "take" (akhadha) instead of "steal" (saraca), so that the 
private right, the stolen property, may be recovered, whereas this 
form of testimony is not sufficient to prove the crime of the add 
of theft. 
114 Nevertheless, if the offender is a habitual criminal, 
witnesses are then obliged to give their evidence against him in 
all kinds of proceedings-115 Generally, witnesses are not obliged 
to give evidence (i) when they know that they are incompetent 
witnesses, (ii) when considerable harm may be inflicted upon them 
if they reveal their evidence, or (iii) if they realize. that other 
witnesses have given admissible evidence. 
116 The obligation of a 
person to testify is a religious and moral one. But as the 
concealment of testimony, except in what has just been mentioned 
above, is a sin, 
117 
a witness who is known to be in the habit of 
concealing such evidence must be punished-for it. 
From all that has been said, evidence by a witness is not 
admissible unless it is tendered voluntarily. Thus, a witness is 
held responsible for his deliberate evidence and he is liable to 
be punished if his false deposition has constituted the whole, or 
even part, of the conclusive evidence upon which the accused was 
punished. However, if he contradicted his evidence by declaring 
that it was false, or if it was discovered before the execution of 
the judgement that it was so, he is to be punished for giving 
false evidence. 
118 
(3) The utterance of the word "testify". According to the 
Hanball Law, it is stipulated that a testimony has to include the 
formula: "I testify" (ashhadu 
11'9 Theoretically, the Shari`a 
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courts must apply this rule strictly. 
120 In practice, the courts 
seem to observe this rule in most cases, but a testimony could be 
accepted without this formula. 
121 Other similar phrases are quite 
frequently used to introduce the evidence. 
122 However, the 
testimony including these forms is not regarded by the judges as 
evidence on oath, but as evidence on affirmation. As to the 
testimony of experts the Shari`a courts, in theory, can accept it 
only if the word "testifyº' or any of its derivatives is included. 
123 
In practice, the testimony of experts is usually accepted without 
such restriction. 
124 The Commercial Law does not differ from the 
Sharl`a courts in this respect. Other semi-judicial tribunals are 
not usually concerned with the mode in which testimony is given. 
125 
(4) Compatibility of testimony with the allegation. According 
to the Shari`a, testimony must not be accepted unless the judge is 
satisfied with its compatibility with the facts in issue. If the 
court deems that the testimony is not compatible with these facts, 
it must be excluded. 
126 Indeed, the Shar! 'a courts apply this 
stipulation very strictly. 
127 
(5) Freedom from interest or motives. Testimony must be free 
from any interest or motive except that of securing justice. 
Accordingly, the evidence of a parent or a grandparent, an offspring, 
a spouse, or even of a distant relative who may tend to take the 
side of his relative is not admissible. 
128 The evidence of a 
member of a tribe may not be receivable since loyalty to the tribe 
may amount to prejudice. 
129 The evidence of a person against his 
enemy is not valid. Equally, the testimony given by a person 
against his opponent is not admissible. 
13° A privy is an 
incompetent witness for his partner. According to the Sh, 
the evidence of an employee for his employer may not be admissible. 
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This rule is now practically limited to the evidence of a witness 
who is employed by the party for whom he gives evidence. 
131 Under 
the SharT'a rules, and by the practice of its judges, -a party 
cannot testify for, or against, himself. The semi-judicial 
tribunals may also not receive the evidence of a witness who may 
seem to have an interest or motive behind his evidence. 
132 
(6) A testimony must be given inside the court. The general 
rule is that testimony must be tendered inside the court; in other 
words, any testimony given outside the court is inadmissible.. The 
reason for this stipulation is to enable the judge to observe the 
way in which the evidence is given, and to enable both the judge 
and the concerned party to examine the witnesses. Nevertheless, 
there are some exceptions to this rule, but they do not apply to 
the hudUd other than the 4add of defamation. These exceptions are 
the following: - 
(a) Testimony attested by a Shari'a authority. Where the 
deposition of witnesses has been given directly before, or even 
attested by, a Shari'a authority, 
133 it is usually received. The 
Shari'a examining magistrates of the Grievances Board are regarded 
as Shari as authorities since they have a long association with 
Shari`a affairs. 
134 A testimony made before, or attested by, any 
authority other than the former is not usually valid. 
135 
., 
(b) Testimony received by istikhläf i. e. a request from the 
trial court made to another court to carry out the hearing of 
testimony in its place. 
136 Some Hanbali jurists hold the view that 
this kind of testimony is not admissible in criminal proceedings, 
137 
but according to "Shark"138 and "Kashshäf"139 it is admissible in 
criminal issues other than Xiudüd except defamation. In practice, 
the judges follow these two authorities. 
11° Moreover, in 1972,, 
the High Judicial Committee issued a dictum 
141 determining that 
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evidence received by means of istikhläf may, for convenience, be 
accepted even in hudUd. 
(c) The testimony given by experts. - A close examination of 
the judicial practice of the Shari`a courts shows that expert 
. witnesses are classified into three categories with regard to the 
way they give their evidence: - (i) female medical experts, whose 
appearance in court is not usually required since their written 
evidence is normally received, 
142 (ii) tracers of footsteps -- 
(gap$ä§u al-athar), 
143 
whose appearance is usually required, 
14 
and (iii) other experts, such as doctors and engineers, whose 
appearance may or may not be required. This matter seems to be 
within the discretion ofühe judges who usually request the appearance 
of witnesses in serious cases: - This is most noticeable in Hijäz. 
145 
. 
But in Najd, the judges146 do not seem to be so much concerned 
with the appearance of expert witnesses, except in serious cases 
or when a party requests their appearance. 
Although the testimony of ordinary witnesses is, according to 
the Commercial Law, 
147 tendered in the same way as in the Shar31a 
courts, the testimony of expert witnesses must be submitted to the 
Commercial tribunal in the form of a written report. 
148 The 
testimony concerning Customs crimes is normally to be given inside 
the trial committee, whether tendered by an ordinary witness or by 
a Customs officer. 
149 Yet, the evidence given by a police 
interrogator may not be tendered in the committee, but submitted to 
it in a written report-150 The Bribery Committee does not usually 
receive testimony unless it is tendered inside it. The Forgery 
Committee seems to be less concerned about the appearance of wit- 
nesses. In practice, if the witnesses reside outside the town in 
which the Committee is instituted, their evidence may be admitted 
as cited in the reports of the interrogators or investigators. 
151 
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It usually receives the evidence of expert witnesses-from their 
reports without asking them to appear. 
152 With regard toýthe 
Grievances Board, the testimony is not given inside the trial 
tribunal. 153 
(7) Being rendered viva voce. Since it is generally stipu- 
lated that testimony must be given inside the Shari'a court, it 
has subsequently to be rendered orally. One of the objectives of 
the appearance of a witness in the court is to give his evidence 
orally to enable the judge to see how aware is the witness of the 
facts to which he is testifying. But, there are exceptional 
instances where testimony may not be given viva voce. These areas 
follows: (i) Where it is not necessary to give testimony inside 
the court. (ii) Where the witness is dumb. (iii) Where the 
witnesses are police testifying on the confession of a prisoner 
or experts whose evidence is in writing. This usually happens if 
their statements are likely to be complicated, or if-a long time 
has passed since they were written. Yet in these circumstances, 
the evidence will be read out in the presence of the witnesses, 
who will be asked to confirm whether-what has been read is their 
evidence-154 
How to Administer Testimony 
(1) On An oath sworn by a witness is essential in 
some laws. In the SharT'a, the majority of the jurists are of the 
opinion that a witness should not be requested to give his evidence 
on oath. Some of them, however, hold the view that the judge may 
insist on a witness taking the oath. 
155 The Shar3`a courts are 
not in favour of using oaths. Yet, some Shari`a judges maintain 
that the oath is permitted if suspicion arises as to the truth of 
the testimony, or as to the probity of the witness. This is 
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entirely within the discretion of the judges. 
156 However, they 
seem to be reluctant to administer the oath on the grounds that 
the Qu`rUn157 determines that a witness should not be 'troubled', 
and by being asked to testify over the oath, he may be considered 
to have been 'troubled'. Thus, the oath in testimony is admissible 
in theory but not in practice as far as the Shari`a courts are 
concerned. According to the Commercial Law; 
58 the translator of a 
foreign language speaking for a party must take the oath. The 
translator is, to some extent, classified as a witness, since he 
testifies to the statement of that party. Other semi-judicial 
tribunals may require witnesses to take the oath. As there are no 
specific rules determined for these tribinals in this respect, the 
necessity of taking the oath is left to the discretion. of the 
members. 
1 59 
(2) Separation of Witnesses. The opinion of the High 
Judicial Authority is that the court may separate witnesses from 
each other, when giving evidence if there is suspicion as to the 
truth of their evidence. 
16o This is to prevent one witness from 
hearing the depositions of the others, or their statements when 
cross-examined, 
161 
as this may result in inconsistencies in 
evidence which could make it worthless. The idea of separating 
witnesses upon suspicion had been held before by some Muslim 
jurists, 162 among whom-were the Hanbalis. 
163 In practice, the 
Shari`a courts usually separate the witnesses whenever such 
suspicion exists and wherever the proceedings concern a serious164 
matter. Although it is well known among all Sharl'a judges that 
the members of the Committees of Enjoining the Right and Forbidding 
the Wrong are trustworthy, 
165 they have been separated when giving 
testimony irrespective of the nature of the fact in issue. 
166 The 
semi-judicial tribunals separate the witnesses when giving their 
- 
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evidence, except when they are confronted with each other in 
cross-examination. 
(3) Examination. In the judicial laws and regulations there 
are a few principles as to the examination of witnesses in the 
court. But in practice, the Sharl'a judge has a very large 
jurisdiction which is not limited to any specific manner of 
examination. Examination in chief as known in the laws of some 
countries167 is not a feature of the Saudi Arabian Law. The party 
who produces the witnesses, or his representative, is not usually 
allowed to examine them in chief. This procedural rule may be 
interpreted in light of the fact that the judges are rather 
cautious as to the evidence of a witness, and any suspicion may 
affect his probity. As the party who produces the witnesses could 
ask leading questions which could affect-the truth of the testimony 
if he were allowed to examine them in chief, the judge himself 
assumes the examination. However, it is thought that the party 
for whom the evidence is rendered will-not be prejudiced by this 
procedure of examination since the purpose of examination in chief 
is to ask a witness to give his own account of the matter in 
question. 
This power of the judge in questioning witnesses leads Hart 
168 
and Solaimi69 to claim that there is no cross-examination in the 
Saudi Arabian judicial system except by the judge himself. But an 
insight into the judicial practice will clearly show that cross- 
examination, not only by the judge himself 
opposing party or his representative, does 
restriction on this examination is that it 
request to, or by order of, the judge. In 
permits a party to cross-examine a witness 
with the full meaning of the word. Advoca- 
but also by the 
exist. The only 
should be made upon a 
practice, the judge 
for the other party, 
to Baroudi of the 
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Arabian-American Oil Company, who has many years practice in the 
Sharl'a courts, noticed the flexibility of the judge in permitting 
even the advocate of a party to cross-examine the witnesses for 
the opposing party. 
170 
One objective of the separation of witnesses is to insure a 
thorough examination whether by the opposing party or his 
representative, or by the judge himself. 
As one of the objects of the cross-examination is to attack 
the probity of a witness, no one with a basic knowledge of the 
Sharl'a courts will fail to notice that a party is permitted to 
cross-examine the opponent's witnesses so far as their probity is 
concerned. In actual fact, a party will find more room in a 
Sharra court to attack the probity of witnesses than in any other 
tribunal, as will be seen below. Indeed, a party plays a more 
active role in this respect than the judge himself since the party 
is the one to initiate the attack on the probity of the witnesses 
for the other party. The role of the judge in cross-examination 
lies mostly in questions which may affect the truth of the 
evidence and, to a less degree, the probity of the witness. 
Cross-examination is also not limited to the facts in issue 
or to those directly relevant to them but may extend to any fact 
which may affect the evidence. But, it is to be mentioned here 
that the judge does not often administer this type of question 
unless the case is a serious one, and there is a reasonable ground 
'\ for him to suspect the truth of the evidence. 
171 
In re-examination, the judge usually asks questions whether 
they concern matters left in doubt after a witness has been cross- 
examined, or concern restoration of his probity. In principle 
the 
party or his representative may, with the leave of the judge, 
re-examine his witnesses, but 
this is not common in practice. 
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The kind of questions which may be asked in re-examination are 
those relevant to the matters which have been put in examination 
in chief or in cross-examination. But there is no restriction 
whatsoever on the way the judge may re-examine witnesses. 
Finally,, it may be necessary to mention that the semi- 
judicial tribunals follow a similar procedure to that in the 
Shari`a courts in examination in chief, cross-examination, and- 
re-examination. But there is a fundamental difference between the 
two procedures. In cross-examination, the semi-judicial tribunals, 
with the exception of the Commercial Council of Jeddah, do not 
usually implement the. rule of attacking and establishing the 
probity of witnesses (al-jarl} wa al-Ta`dil). 
Attacking and Establishing the Probity of Witnesses 
After a witness has given his evidence, the Shari`a judge 
must invite the party against whom the evidence was adduced to 
attack the probity of this witness. This can be effective if the 
party proves that the witness has any interest or motive behind his 
testimony, or that he is not a witness of probity. This rule of 
evidence must be applied, in theory, against any witness in Saudi 
Arabia except the personnel of the Committees of Enjoining the 
Right and Forbidding the Wrong, who are assumed to be of probity. 
172 
Yet, this exception is not absolute in every respect. The 
testimony of any of these personnel is subject to challenge if a 
personal motive or interest lies behind their testimony. 
173 In 
practice, expert witnesses are not always subject to challenge, 
174 
although in theory they are to be subject to examination with 
regard to their probity. However, if a party himself moves for 
permission to attack their probity, the judge must grant him such 
permission. 
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Where a party has nothing to say against-the probity of the 
witnesses of his opponent175 or if he is unable to challenge their 
probity, the judge must ask the party who has produced the 
witnesses to-prove that they are witnesses of probity (`udül). 
176 
Here, it is to be mentioned that a party must be given ample time 
to seek knowledge of the character of the witnesses of his 
opponent. If his challenge as to their probity is frivolous, he 
will be asked by the judge if he has other grounds for attacking 
their probity. 
177 
Where the party attacks the probity of the witness of his 
opponent, he has to produce at least two witnesses testifying to 
the truth of what he has said in his attack. 
178 These latter 
witnesses are called the witnesses for the attack on probity, 
"shuhld al-jarh". The party who is requested to prove that his 
witnesses are competent-must also produce at least two witnesses, 
called the witnesses for the establishment of probity, "shuhUd 
al-ta`dil", who have to testify that the original witnesses are 
of probity. 
The witnesses' attacking probity'are not usually subject to 
any attack on their own probity, but in `Ammäsh v. al-Hargän they 
were attacked on the request of the judge. It has also been held 
that the probity of the witnesses . for establishing probity must 
in turn be proved by at least two witnesses. 
179 
However, as a general rule the court will not permit a party 
to produce evidence that will prove the probity of his witnesses 
whose probity has been legally attacked. This is simply an 
implementation of the Shari`a rule "attacking the probity of 
witnesses has priority over establishing itll. 
180- 
One interesting characteristic feature-of the SharT`a 
jurisprudence is the inquiryaboat the probity of a witness conducted 
- 187 - 
both publicly (tazkiya al-`alUniya) and secretly (tazkia al-sirr) 
by the judge himself. 181 This is usually applied if the party 
concerned cannot legally attack the probity of the witnesses for 
his rival. The Saudi Arabian judiciary has recognized this rule, 
182 
but modern judicial practice shows no sign of it being administered 
by judges. The knowledge of the judge regarding probity, if not 
legally attacked, is valid. 
183 
A comparison between the ordinary witnesses and_the witnesses 
for attacking or establishing the probity of the original witnesses 
shows the following facts.. Firstly, an ordinary testimony of one 
woman may be sufficient to prove certain facts in issue, but the 
evidence for attacking or establishing the probity of a witness is 
to be given by two male witnesses at least. Secondly, the judge 
cannot be an ordinary witness in his own court, 
184 
whereas his 
knowledge of-the. -probity of a witness which is not challenged, 
by, a 
party is admissible-185 Thirdly, both kinds of witnesses`-are 
responsible for their false evidence. 
Finally, it may be important to cast a glance at the 
differences between the Shari`a courts and other tribunals in 
attacking and establishing the probity of witnesses. Under the 
Commercial Law, the rules adopted by the Shari'a courts are 
applicable. Other semi-judicial tribunals do not question the 
probity of a witness from a religious point of view. 
Number of Witnesses 
According to the Hanbali law, the testimony concerning ta x' 
is not sufficient unless it is given by two male witnesses. 
186 
The majority of the judges follow the Hanball law in this respect. 
187 
The Court of Cassation in Riyadh (for example) held that a 
punishment of ta`zir could not be inflicted upon the prisoner unless 
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there were two witnesses. 
188 It reversed a judgement of a court 
of first instance on the grounds that it passed a sentence of 
ta`zir according to the evidence of one witness. 
189 
Other crimes tried by the Shari'a courts, i. e. those of gi94 
and hudUd except the hadd of zinä, must be proved by at least two 
male witnesses if the proof rests on a testimony. 
19° With regard 
to the hadd of zinTI, the Shar3`a fixes the number of witnesses as 
at least four males. They must describe the way in which zing was 
committed, and if they fail to do so to the satisfaction of the 
judge, they are liable to the hadd of defamation (qadhf). 
191 As a 
result of this difficulty of proving zinn, it has never been 
known to have been proved by witnesses. Other sexual crimes may 
be proved by only two witnesses since they lie under the category 
of ta` zir. 
Under the Commercial Law, the testimony must, in every respect, 
be in accordance with the Shari`a; in other words the number of 
witnesses has to be at least two for the Commercial crimes coming 
under ta__zir. However, the evidence of one witness may be sufficient 
to prove a criminal charge put before other semi-judicial tribunals. 
C. OATHS 
According to authoritative Hanball law192 and the practice in 
Saudi Arabia, 
193 the oath is only usually received in civil 
proceedings regarding money or property. Where the claimant is 
not able to prove his claim, the defendant then has to swear an 
oath denying it. 
194 Thus, an oath here is not admissible to prove 
facts but to dispense with, or to counter, the claim of the 
plaintiff. Where the defendant refrains (nakala) from taking the 
oath when required by the claimant, the claim is to be regarded as 
valid. However, if the claimant does not require the oath, which 
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is often suggested-by the judge, his claim will automatically be 
dropped. Yet, it can be reconsidered when he finds evidence and 
wishes to make a fresh claim, or if he decides later to demand the 
oath from his opponent. 
195 
In criminal proceedings, a defendant is not liable to oath 
since the rule is that-the accused_ is innocent till proven 
guilty. 
196 However, in the absence of evidence in the charge of 
murder, the-defendant may. be asked to take the oath. 
197 Where the 
defendant admits that. the killing was not intentional, and the 
claimant alleges that it was, intentional but he is not able to 
produce valid evidence to-substantiate his claim, the defendant 
can rebuff the claim by taking the oath that the killing was not 
intentional. 
198 As held by Al mad b. $anbal, if the defendant 
refrains from taking the oath, the punishment of retaliation will 
not be inflicted-upon him, 
199 but he has to pay the blood-money. 
This is demonstrated by the practice in Saudi Arabia. Thus, in a 
case which involves both civil and criminal action, an oath is to 
be required only in the civil issue if there is no evidence for 
the claimant, but it is not required to counter the allegation by 
the prosecution in the criminal. issue. 
200 
The general rule is that the oath is not admissible in proving 
the facts-in issue as far as criminal proceedings are concerned. 
However, there are two exceptions to this rule, where oaths can 
conclusively prove the facts in issue in criminal proceedings. 
These are the cases of gasäma and li`än. 
1. Qasäma (Reiterated Oaths 
The word "gasama" is derived from "aasam", which means 
oath. 
201 Technically it refers to reiterated or multiple oaths 
made in regard to the killing of a person. QasUma had its 
202 
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origin in a tradition of the Prophet related to an incident in 
Khaybar, an oasis inhabited by Jews, when a Muslim was found 
killed. The relatives»of the man complained to the Prophet, and 
the Prophet said to them: "Fifty of you shall swear the oaths that 
one of the Jews had killed him, and the (alleged) killer will be 
surrendered to you. " They said: "This is a matter which we did 
not perceive, how can we then take the oath? " The Prophet said: 
"Then the Jews shall be absolved by the oaths of fifty of them. " 
Stipulations for Qas$ma 
(a) The existence of imeriminating circumstances (Lawth). 
Ahmad b. Hanbal has two opinions regarding the significance of 
lawth. Firstly, that lawth is an apparent hostility between a 
deceased person and his alleged killer. Therefore, if there was 
no hostility, the Qasäma will not be applicable. Secondly, that 
lawth is any circumstance which strongly indicates the likeliness 
that the accused has committed the killing. Thus, lawth can arise 
from any of the following facts: - (i) an apparent hostility; 
(ii) the dispersal of a crowd from a killed person, and here an 
accusation of the killing may be raised against any one of them; 
(iii) the finding of a person in possession of a sword or a knife 
or any other offensive weapon stained with blood near a newly dead 
body without there being another man, animal, or object in the 
vicinity which might have caused his death; 
203 (iv) fighting 
between two groups which may have resulted in the killing; and 
(v) the evidence given by women, minors, or persons with no 
probity (`aa)"20I4 Lawth, when . regarded as an apparent 
hostility, 
is an issue on which Saudi Arabian judges will not disagree. But 
when it is regarded as the presence of incriminating circumstances, 
although this opinion is not confirmed by Shar 
205 
and Kashshäf, 
206 
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we find that in actual practice Saudi Arabian judges regard it 
also as binding. 
207 
(b) The description of the death. The claimant must describe 
the circumstances relating to the killing. This description 
enables the court to reach a conclusion as to, whether lawth 
exists. 
208 At the present time, it is the police who provide most 
of this information. 
(c) The claim by all the heirs of the deceased. All the 
heirs of the killed person must claim that their legator was 
murdered, and demand retaliation (gipffp) against the alleged 
killer. If some of them deny that the killing was intentional or 
if they do not demand retaliation, then there will be no gasama. 
209 
(d) The accusation of a specific person. The claimants 
must accuse a specific person of killing their legator in order 
to be able to demand retaliation. This is the rule generally 
agreed upon by the Hanbali authorities. 
210 Some courts, such as 
the Grand Shari`a Court of Riyadh, do not always apply this rule. 
However, the Court of Cassation has reversed the judgements in 
cases in which this rule was not applied. Furthermore, the Court 
of Cassation holds the view that when the claimants directed their 
accusation against a person and afterwards they accused another 
there should be no gamma, on the ground that the first accusation 
falsifies the other. 
211 
(e) The existence of male relatives. Ahmad b. Hanbal holds 
two opinions as to the relations of the deceased who take the 
oaths. The first is that the relations who take the oaths must 
be, only agnates 
(`asaba), whether they, inherit from the deceased 
or not. The second is that they must be male heirs only, whether 
they are agnates or cognates. 
212 This latter opinion is upheld by 
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"Shark"213 and "Kashshäf"21 
l 
and it prevails in Saudi Arabia, - 
although the practice has varied from time to time. 
215 However, 
in 1969, the Court of Cassation in Riyadh determined that: "Where 
the oaths of gasäma are to be sworn, they are only to be taken by 
the heirs, for this is their own concern. The oaths taken by those 
who are not heirs are weightless. 11216 
How to administer gasäma. Muslim jurists differ on how the fifty 
oaths of ag sgma are to be administered. Some hold the view that 
it is the accused party who is to take these oaths. 
217 Others, 
such as the Hanbalis, hold the view that the oaths must be sworn 
by the relatives of the deceased, and this latter opinion is 
applicable in Saudi Arabia. In most cases, it is unlikely that 
there will be as many as fifty competent male heirs to swear the 
fifty oaths. As a result, the oaths are to be allotted to them in 
accordance with their shares in the inheritance. 
218 In conformity 
with this opinion, it is possible that all the fifty oaths may be 
taken by one man where he is the only male heir. 
219 
Where any of the relatives qualified to swear declines to 
take his oath(s) or revokes the oath(s) he has taken, 
220 
or where 
there is no male relative or the male heirs are legally 
incompetent, 221 the defendant has then to swear all the oaths, one 
by one, denying that he has caused the death of the deceased. 
222 
Having so sworn all the oaths in the presence of the claimant(s), 
the defendant must be acquitted. 
2. li`än (Oaths of Condemnation) 
Li_lln is derived from the word la'n (curse), and it is 
included in the oaths sworn by a husband who has accused his wife 
of committing adultery223 that his charge against her is true. 
Where a man accuses a woman other than his wife of committing 
- 193 - 
adultery and has no proof, he is to be prosecuted for the hadd' of 
defamation (gadhf) upon her request if she does not admit the 
accusation. But if he makes this accusation against his wife, he 
can avert being punished by swearing the oaths designated for 
Li `än. The oaths of li `än sworn by the_ husband and those sworn 
by the wife, whom he accuses of adultery, are stipulated in the 
Qur'än (Ch. 24., verses 6-9). The husband must say four times; 
"I testify by . t; 
öd ' that my accusation against my wife of adultery 
is true. " He is to repeat this oath for a fifth time, ending with 
these words: "The curse of God shall be upon me if I am of the 
liars. " Having completed his oaths, he is to be acquitted. Then, 
his wife must counter them by swearing four times as follows: 
"I testify by God that he (her husband) is of the liars in accusing 
me of adultery. " She is to repeat this oath for a fifth time 
adding to it these words: "The wrath of God shall be upon me if he 
is of the truthful. " Where she refrains from taking these oaths, 
she is to be detained till she confesses to having committed 
adultery, or swears the oaths. 
224 
Stipulations for li`Un 
(1) Legal competence of both spouses during their matrimony. 
Li`än cannot be operative unless the accusation of adultery is 
made by a legally competent husband against his legally competent 
wife. Therefore, if either spouse is, for example, a minor or 
insane, the oaths of li`Rn have no evidentiary significance. 
225 
(2) Clear accusation of adultery. The accusation of 
adultery must be made expressly with the word "'zinä" or any of its 
derivatives. 
(3) Denial by wife. When the accused wife confesses to 
having committed adultery, the accusation by her husband is to be 
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held true and the oaths of li`Un are not operative. However, if 
the wife denies the accusation and takes the oaths, li`än will 
then have its criminal and civii226 effects. 
227 
D. DOCUMENTS 
Documents include writings, figures, or symbols, provided 
that they are capable of being utilized as evidence. They are 
divided into two categories - private documents which emanate from 
private persons or public persons in their private capacity, and 
non-private documents which emanate from public officials and 
bodies. 
Muslim jurists have dealt with documents. Some hold that 
they cannot be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. Others 
hold that documents are admissible, arguing that they had been 
recognized by the Prophet and his Companions and Pious Followers. 
Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya enthusiastically argued that by 
invalidating documents "we could not have received the Hadith 
(Tradition) of the ProphettI228 which was a major source of the 
Shari'a. 
Irrespective of this difference among Muslim jurists in the 
past, there is no reason for disregarding documents as evidence at 
the present. In principle, documents have been accepted in Saudi 
Arabia even in criminal proceedings. However, the Sharl'a courts 
do not easily accept a document containing evidence concerning the 
matter in issue if this evidence is against the defendant. It has 
been mentioned earlier in this chapter that the testimony or 
confession written or attested to by a non-Shari`a authority is not 
usually acceptable. The Court of Cassation in Riyadh229 made it 
clear that documents regarding affidavits or depositions could be 
reliable only if adduced or made before a Sharl'a authority. 
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However, the Shari`a courts may receive a document in favour of 
the defendant though not issued by a Sharl'a authority. 
230 
Similarly, a Shari'a court may receive a document duly executed by 
any authority if it is not directly concerned with the establish- 
ment of the fact in issue. For example, the written evidence of 
experts regarding a traffic accident or regarding the presence of 
alcohol in the blood of a person accused of drinking alcohol, may 
be received. 
The semi-judicial tribunals may receive, without restriction, 
any official document - whether from the police, an examining 
magistrate, a court, or a public authority. 
231 Moreover, they may 
admit private documents which purport to be genuine. For example, 
the Customs committees usually receive the commercial corres- 
pondence between businessmen or between companies as valid 
evidence. 
232 
In pursuance of the rule: "the one who asserts must prove", 
a document as a means of proof must be produced by the party for 
whom it is given. But it appears that this rule is applicable 
only when a document is concerned with purely civil proceedings. 
A document concerning criminal proceedings may he produced at the 
request of the court from its official custody. Although the 
tribunal may request the production of the original or the copy of 
a document, there is no explicit statutory rule to compel an 
authority or even an individual who possesses the document to 
produce it. Yet, there is only one exception to this rule 
determined in Article 498 of the Commercial Law which provides that 
a Commercial judicial authority may request the production of a 
document either from private or public custody. However, public 
departments and corporations usually respond to the request of the 
tribunals to send in-relevant documents, since they mostly accept 
-196- 
copies of these documents. Thus, the copy of a document produced 
as evidence may be as acceptable as the original. 
Primary Evidence 
An original document may be the only document of its kind 
in existence, such as a personal letter. It may also be of a 
multiple origin as, for instance, when an agreement is drawn up in 
duplicate, and both documents are executed by both parties. 
Memoranda and circulars are usually typed and a copy of them which 
is duly signed and sealed is regarded as the original. 
Before receiving any document whether private or non-private, 
its execution has to be proved. The proof of execution of a 
document may concern either, or both, the signatureswhich it bears 
or the handwriting of the document. 
233 This can be proved by the 
testimony of witnesses who are acquainted with the handwriting or 
the signature, 
234 
or by experts. 
235 
By Article 501 of the Commercial Law, it is provided that 
whenever the alleged executor of a document denies his association 
with it, or if allegation of falsification or alteration of a 
document arises, the tribunal must set up a commission of at least 
three experts of repute to investigate the signature and writing 
of the alleged executor and compare them with the ones appearing 
in the document. The alleged executor of the document in issue may 
be asked to write words, similar to those appearing in the document, 
several times so that the commission can draw its conclusion. If 
his writing and signature are known to many people, four ordinary 
witnesses at least are to give evidence that the writing or the 
signature on the document is that of the alleged executor. 
The execution of a document may be established on the 
admission of the party against whom it is produced. 
236 The 
- 
admission of a defendant that the handwriting of a document is his 
own but that he does not remember having written it may be used as 
evidence against him. 
237 
- 
For an official document to be duly executed, it has to be 
typed, sealed, and signed by the head of the establishment. With 
regard to the judicial document of a judgement issued by a Shari 
court, it must be written by hand on official. paper, sealed with 
the seal of the court and the personal seal of the trial judge, and 
signed by him and by the Chief Judge of the court if he is different 
from the former . 
238 When so executed, a document is to be 
regarded as admissible evidence, and its content is irrebuttable, 
unless it is alleged to have been falsified. 
239 Where a document 
is alleged by the opposing party to have been falsified, he has to 
prove this, and the tribunal is also to inquire as to its 
authenticity from the authority which issued it before it can be 
received. 
240 A mark appearing on a piece of property, such as-a 
brand on an animal, may only be proved by witnesses who testify- 
that such a mark is used by a certain person, family or tribe. 
21 
Foreign documents are officially accepted when signed by the 
Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry, but the Shari`a courts are cautious 
in dealing with such documents. Where a document concerns a matter 
relating to criminal proceedings such as the legal status of heirs 
living outside Saudi Arabia who demand retaliation against the 
murderer of their testator in Saudi Arabia, the court would not 
receive it unless it was duly issued by a Sharl'a authority 
therein, if there is any, and signed-by the Foreign Ministry. 
242 
Proof of the identification of a person may be accounted for by 
his identity card ( afTZa nufüs)243 if there are no witnesses to 
testify to his identification, or if the court wants more evidence 
than witnesses. 
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Secondary Evidence 
In the absence of the original document whether caused by 
destruction, loss, inconvenience, or any other means, secondary 
evidence is to be admissible. Secondary evidence can be in the 
form of a testimony, but the usual form in non-private documents 
is a copy244 or an extract of the original. Here, we shall deal 
only with documents which are usually submitted to tribunals. 
(a) Judgements. A judgement of conviction or acquittal 
rendered by a Shari`a court is usually proved by a copy of the 
record of this judgement 
245 
or by a sakk thereof, or by both if 
they are referred to an appellate authority. Where a party has to 
produce a judicial document which has been mislaid or which he 
does not possess, this document can be proved by a certified copy 
taken from the register of the respective court. 
246 Where a 
sentence was passed by a judge who died after it had been entered 
on the record of the court or written in a rakk and before it was 
entered on the register, it will have no weight unless it is 
acknowledged by both parties or evidenced by witnesses. 
247 As a 
general rule, a copy of a judgement will have no evidentiary value 
unless it carries the signature of the first clerk 
248 
and the 
seals of the trial judge and court. 
249 A conviction cannot be 
proved before a Shari'a court by a copy of a document taken from 
the criminalrecord of a convicted person which was prepared by the 
police, except when the person against whom the document has been 
adduced acknowledges its contents. Similarly, a decree made by 
any tribunal other than a Shari`a authority is not necessarily 
accepted by Sh`a courts. The semi-judicial tribunals accept 
any judgement rendered by a Sharl'a court, even without the 
admission of the convicted or the evidence of witnesses. 
250 
(b) Depositions and affidavits. Generally, the Shari'a 
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courts do not receive any document regarding a statement made by a 
witness or by a prisoner except the evidence of some experts, as 
mentioned above. But the semi-judicial tribunals usually admit 
such a statement, as has been referred to earlier in "Confession" 
and "Testimony". 
(c) Written evidence. Written evidence here means testimony 
or confession which has been recorded prior to the trial whether by 
the trial court itself or by another court. Where a court other 
than the trial court receives a testimony and records it, the record 
of this testimony has to be proved by a formal letter and a copy of 
the testimony as it has been entered on the record. 
251 Where a 
confession is made before any Shari'a court other than the trial 
one, it is to be entered on the record of the court and proved by 
a certified copy of the record. 
252 
(d) Bankers Books. Copies of documents in the custody of 
Bankers are constantly needed by the Committee for Securities. 
With the purpose of causing the least inconvenience to the daily 
work of banks when they are not parties and with the object of 
easing the task of the Committees, the Committees receive certified 
copies to prove documents. These copies take the form of formal 
letters from banks with the entire contents of, or an extract from, 
the originals. Finally it is to be mentioned that these copies 
are only regarded as prima facie evidence if the banks issuing 
them are instituted in Saudi Arabia. These hanks can be both 
foreign as well as national. 
253 However, the Sharl'a courts may 
only accept such documents when they are represented through the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. 
254 
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E. REAL EVIDENCE 
Real evidence means material objects other than documents 
produced as evidence in court. An object or a thing, as it may be 
called sometimes, is not confined to an inanimate object but may 
include an animal or even a human being. The inspection of an 
object is not usually made by the court. It is true that the 
mental condition or the discretion of a party is often decided by 
the court. Similarly, the court decides on the probity of a 
witness, partly by his reactions to questioning in court. 
Theoretically, the court may move out of its seat to look into a 
case. 
255 In actual practice, however, this rarely happens in civil 
cases and less so in criminal cases. 
According to the Shari'a, real evidence falls within the 
sphere of the evidence of presumptions, as will be seen later when 
dealing with presumptions. This being the case, and since the 
evidence of presumptions is valid only in ta`zir, it is to be 
concluded that real evidence is admissible in proceedings regarding 
a crime of ta`zir only. However, real evidence concerning a matter 
which is not in issue but which relates to it may be accepted in 
any type of criminal proceedings. 
256 However, the semi-judicial 
tribunals treat real evidence as a separate class other than that 
of presumptions. These tribunals refer to real evidence as 
"mu'", or inspection, and"khibra", or the finding of experts. 
But none of these tribunals usually inspect an object which may 
constitute real evidence either inside or outside of them. 
In the absence of an admission by the party against 
257 
whom real evidence is given, the material object must 
be proved by oral evidence identifying the object. This 
evidence may be given by individuals, or by the police and 
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other investigating authorities, 
258 
or by experts. 
259 
F. PRESUMPTIONS 
Presumptions are divided into two classes: presumptions of 
law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are categorized 
as irrebuttable and rebuttable. The irrebuttable, or conclusive, 
presumptions are not evidentiary at all, being rules of substantive 
law, and consequently they have no place here. For example: a 
minor cannot be subject to punishments of hudUd or of retaliation, 
on the presumption that he is incapable of performing acts 
constituting crimes of 1udüd or retaliation. 
Rebuttable presumptions can only be drawn in the absence of 
rebutting evidence; in other words their evidentiary effect may be 
negated by a contrary inference from some other facts. 
Besides the rebuttable presumptions of law, there are also 
rebuttable presumptions of fact. The distinction between these 
two classes is that presumptions of law are prescribed by law, 
whereas presumptions of fact are not so prescribed but drawn by 
judges and recognized by the law. 
Rebuttable Presumptions 
1. Presumptions of Law. Before referring to the presumptions 
regarding particular crimes, it is suggested that reference should 
be made first to the rebuttable presumptions of law which have 
general applications. 
(a) innocence. 260 Generally, the law presumes that a person 
accused of a crime is innocent until he is proven guilty. 
Therefore, the accused does not have to establish his innocence 
by any evidentiary means, but he who asserts must prove. 
261 Thus, 
it is presumed that suspicion is in no way evidence. 
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(b) Sanity. According to the law it is presumed that a 
person is sane, but if a plea that he is not so is made, his 
insanity has to be proved. The burden of proving this plea is 
cast upon the defence. Where such a plea is made in the proceedings 
regarding a. crime of. 4add, the court will immediately respond to it 
and will accept the proof of insanity or mental subnormality. 
262 
But if the proceedings concern another class of crime, the judge 
may not permit such a proof unless he himself-is convinced that 
the accused is insane. When the judge is in doubt, he has to 
consult experts and base his decision upon their reports. 
263 
(c) Intention. A normal human being is presumed to intend 
the natural and probable consequences of his acts, and therefore 
is responsible for them. Yet, this presumption may be rebutted by 
any evidence which shows that his act was not intentional. This 
can be seen quite obviously in cases of killing, where the killer 
admits his act-but claims that he did not intend to commit it. 
Presumptions264 as well as oaths265 are commonly considered as 
satisfactory rebutting evidence in this case. Where the act is 
not normally intended, such as the breakdown of a vehicle which 
results in the injury or death of passengers, there is no need for 
rebutting presumptions, provided that (i) the driver was qualified, 
(ii) he possessed reasonable senses, (iii) he did not violate 
traffic laws, and (iv) he kept his vehicle under normal check. 
Indeed, contrary to the rule of the presumption of intention, such 
a driver is to be considered innocent till proven guilty. 
266 
(d) Legitimacy. According to the lianbali law, it is 
presumed that a child born after six months of marriage or within 
four years267after divorce is legitimate, provided that the parents 
have cohabited. But if the child is born six months before the 
date of marriage or four years after divorce, the child is 
* See special footnote on page 218 
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considered illegitimate. Moreover, where it is impossible for the 
child to belong to the husband, for example if the latter has not 
met his wife, the child is also regarded as illegitimate. If the 
child is born dead or dies immediately after its birth within six 
months after the marriage, it is presumed that it was conceived in 
a legal manner. Should the husband be too young or sexually 
defectiveto. the degree that he is incapable of producing children, 
the child born to his wife is illegitimate. Yet, if the husband is 
not less than ten years of age when the conception took place, the 
child is legitimate. 
268 
(e) Death. A presumption of the continuance of life is 
terminated by that of death. A person who has not been heard of 
for at least four years and is most likely to have died is presumed 
to have ceased to live. The answer to the question of how a person 
is most likely to have died is when he has been missing unexpectedly 
from his family, or in a desert or in war. If the missing person 
has attained ninety years of age and his absence is inexplicable, 
he is to be presumed dead, even if his death is only assumed on no 
reason other than his decrepitude. 
269_ Hence, the marriage of the 
spouse of a missing person who is considered to have died will not 
give rise to any incriminating or any other circumstances. 
Here we turn to the special presumptions of law which may 
concern the crimes of hudüd and retaliation. 
(a) Illegitimate pregnancy. The 1add of zin$ can be proved 
by the pregnancy of an unmarried woman, or a married one whose 
conception is not illegal, 
270 in the way mentioned before. However, 
the accused may rebut quite easily this presumption by claiming 
that she was raped. 
271 According to Kashsh'f, 272 the presumption 
may be rebutted by a plea of any reasonable excuse. Yet, this 
presumption may be valid in a crime of tazTr, even though the 
4* See special 
footnote on page 218 
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prisoner claims that she was raped. 
273 
- 
(b) Intoxication. According to the law271 and practice, 
275 
vomitting alcohol is indisputedly presumed to be an admissible 
evidence for the hadd of intoxication. As to the smell of alcohol 
emanating from the mouth, it is recognized by some judges as 
sufficient evidence for this hadd. 
276 The Mufti, Mutmmmad, b. 
Ibräh! m, ruled277 that the smell of alcohol in one's breath was 
sufficient evidence to prove the add. Yet, he stated that the 
judgement of a trial judge who insisted on disregarding this 
presumption could not be reversed since this opinion was held by 
Sharh278 and Kashshnf. 
279 However, although the Mufti gave 
preference to the idea that such a smell was to be valid evidence 
for the establishment of the add of intoxication, his ruling has 
opened the door wide for the judges to accept or disregard the 
smell of alcohol as valid evidence as far as the hadd is concerned. 
Indeed, the majority of judges do-not receive the presumption of 
the smell of alcohol, even if it is corroborated by other280 
presumptions. 
281 
(c) Refraining from taking the oath. As has been mentioned 
above, the refraining of an accused from taking the oath in the 
charge of murder does not prove legally and beyond doubt that the 
accusation of murder is true. 
282 Similarly, the refusal of taking 
the oaths of li`An by a wife is not regarded as conclusive 
evidence for the }add. of zinä. The only admissible presumptive 
refraining from oath in a 1add is when a husband, accusing his wife 
of zinä, refrains from taking the oaths of li `Un, where his 
refraining is held as valid evidence to prove the badd. of defamation 
against him. 
283 
2. Presumptions of Fact. In uddd and retaliation the judge has 
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no discretion to extend the scope of evidence beyond what is 
prescribed by the law. But presumptions may be received in 
proceedings regarding any crime of ta`zir. Indeed, there is no 
limitation imposed upon the judge in this field. The range of 
presumptions of fact is so wide that it includes what is categorized 
in some laws as real evidence or evidence of things, 
284 
and to 
some extent the documentary evidence. 
285 It may be important to 
mention that some evidence which has fallen short of proving a 
hadd. or retaliation may be received in ta`zir as presumptive 
evidence. For example, the testimony of women286 or the evidence 
of one man 
287 
may be admitted as valid evidence in the sphere of 
ta`zir. 
Conclusion 
From all that has been mentioned in this chapter, the 
cogency of the evidence adduced in different kinds of crimes tried 
by the Shar! 'a courts and by the semi-judicial tribunals may be 
summarized as follows: - 
(1) The crime of the 4adrl of zinn may only be established by the 
evidence of four male witnesses, or by express confession made 
four times by the prisoner, or by only one presumption, 
288 i. e. 
289 the conception of an unmarried woman. 
(2) The hadd. of theft and the 4add of highway robbery may be 
established only by express confession made twice, or by the 
evidence of two male witnesses. 
(3) The hadd of intoxication can indisputedly be established by 
confession, the evidence of two male witnesses, or vomiting 
alcohol. According to some authorities it can also be established 
by the smell of alcohol emanating from the accused's mouth. 
(4) The retaliation imposing capital punishment can be established 
206 - 
only by confession or by the testimony of two male witnesses, and 
in the case of ag säma by fifty oaths. The retaliation involving 
a limb of the body may be evidenced only by confession or by the 
testimony of two male witnesses. 
(5) A crime of ta`zir can be established by any kind of evidence 
mentioned above, but if the evidence is testimony it must be given 
by two male witnesses. 
(6) In matters confined to women, which have been mentioned 
above, the evidence of one woman is cogent. Similarly, the 
evidence of one expert (c bila) may be treated as effective 
evidence. 
(7) Any kind of evidence produced in a semi-judicial tribunal may 
be regarded as cogent when it satisfies the tribunal. 
4 
- 207 - 
References and Comments 
1. Nokes, G. D., An Introduction to Evidence, London, 1967, p. 3- 
2. According to English law, documents and real evidence are 
direct evidence. 
3. Matters of common knowledge or of the law of Saudi Arabia are 
matters of which proof is not required, but the court will 
take judicial notice of them. 
4. About these facts see Palmer, H. A., and Palmer, H., 
Wilsher's Criminal Procedure, London 1954, pp. 88-93. 
5. Al-Dawsari v. Khalaf and Khälid, G. S. C. ( aiyl), S. No. 208/3 
of 1386 (1966). 
6. "In ... v. al-Hä. rith3" , B. C., D. of 1388 
(1968). 
7. Such as the English law. 
8. Such as the English law. (See Palmer and Palmer, p. p. 96,100. 
9. According to the Saudi Arabian law, hearsay is only testimony 
transferred from the original witness to a person who has not 
himself perceived the matter on which the evidence may be 
given. However, the formal Hanball authority is against 
receiving hearsay in criminal proceedings. (See, al-MuEhni, 
vol. XII, pp. 87-88). 
10. See al-Yamäni v. al-zahränl, G. S. C. (M), R. of 1381 (1961-62), 
vol. II, p. 9. - 
11. P. P. v. al-Yam-1, P. J. , D. No. 447 of , 1360 
(1941). 
12. P. P. v. Dirbäs, the Judicial Commission set up. to try the 
defendant, S. No. 11/1 of 1386 (1966). 
13. Al-Subay`i v. al-Subay`3, G. S. C. (R), S. No. 169/1 of 1388 
(1969). 
14. L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 1305/1 of 28/8/1383 (1964). 
15. The age of majority is reached on attaining puberty or 
fifteen years. 
16. Al-Vusayn3 v. Husn3, C. D. , D. No. 189 of 22/8/1360 
(1941) . 
17. P. P. v. T hä and others, F. M. C. (T), D. No. 320 of 1388 
(1968). See also, P. P. v. al-Yamäni, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 
982/1 of 1389 (1970). 
18. Bahnass, pp. 141-142. 
19. Al-Mug ni , Vol- X, pp. 171-172. 
20. Kashshäf, p. 454; al-Mahäbi v. al-Mirwa`i, G. S. C. (M), C. R. 
of 1392 (1972), Vol- III P p. 33. 
21. "In ... v. Sa`3d Sägär and 
Jum`Un, G. S. C. (R), R. of 1387 
(1967), vol. XII, p. 15. 
22. Hadhdhäl v. Hamad and Muthab, C. C. (R), D. No. 614 of 1386 
(1967-) and D. No. I3 of 1387 (1968) . 
23. P. P. v. MunIra, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 882/2 of 1387 (1968); 
p. p. v. Zalikha and al-Haddad, GIS. C. (M), R. of 1385 (1965), 
vol. 1, p. 697. 
24. Vol. III, p. 570. 
- 208 - 
25. See, e. g. t1in ... al-Zahräni and al-Mutayri", G. S. C. (R), 
D. No. 261 of 1383 (1963); M. of Judge Muhammad al-Badr of 
G. S. C. (R) to its Deputy Chief Judge No. 205 of 17/3/1384 
(1964). 
26. Bahnast, p. 151. 
27. P. P. v. Turk-1 and b. Rashid, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 88 of 1384 
(1964). 
28. See, P. P. v. al-Yamäni, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 9 of 1384 (1964). 
29. Al-`Unayzan v. A: G; of al-AflU j, G. B., D. No. 249 of 1375 
(1956). 
30. P. P. v. al-Kurdi, G. S. C. (M), session held on 15/6/1392 
(July 27,1972), to which the author had access:. 
31. P. P. v. al-Barm$wi and others, G. S. C. (M), R. of 1385 (1965), 
vol. I, p. 68. 
32. P. P. v. al-Barq, w3, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 122/20 of 1386 (1966). 
33.. L. of P. J. to P. C. M. No. 1699 of 6 3/1374 1954 , quoted in L. 
of P. C. M. to M. I. No. 4668/2 of 9%10/1374 (1955) " 
34. Decision of the Judicial Commission set up to try b. Khucayr 
of 1389 (1970) " 
35" P. P. V. b. Rashid, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 23 of 1383 (1963)- 
36. "In ... v. al-Zahrän3 and al-Subay`3"1, C. C. (R), D. No. 365 
of 1384 (1964). 
37. P. P. V. Mud'ith and Muhammad, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 95 of 1384 (1964). 
38. "In ... v. al-Zahräni and al-. Subay`i", C. C., (R), D. No. 36 
of 1384 (1964). 
39. M. of M. I., to P. C. M. No. 1156 of 1/2/1378 (1958); L. of P. J. to P. C. M. No. 403 of 1/5/1378 (1958). 
40. Al-`Asimi, 'A. b. M., MajmU'a Fatawa Shaykh al-Islam Ibn 
Taymiyya, Mecca 13867-(1966) vol. 35, p" 104. 
41. See e. g., P. P. v. al-Yamdn3, G. S. C. (T), yq. No. 289 of 
28/12/1387 (1968). 
42. Al-`Amildl v. Bäkarim, C. C., D. No. 12 of 1352 (1933)- 
43. As to implied admission or confession in English Law, see 
Nokes, pp. 292-293- 
44. Law of 1952(A), art. 20; al-Jayzäni u.. al-J zäni, and. alz 
Jayzäni, F. M. C (R) , D.: No. 873 of 1384 (1964. 
45. A1-MuZayfrät v. al-`Ayäyda, G. S. C. (M), D. of 1389 (1969). 
46. Interview with Shaykh QRlih al-Luhaydän, supra. 
14.7. Bahnasi, p. 141. 
48. M. of Judge Muhammad al-Badr of G. 8. C (R) to its Deputy 
Chief Judge No. 205 of 17/3/1384 (1964). 
49. Interview with Shaykh $älih al-Lu4ayd3n, who was the Deputy 
Chief Judge of G. S. C. (R), supra. 
50. "In ... v. al-Zahräni and al-Subay`l, D. No. 36 of 1384 and 
D. 365 of 1384. 
0 - 209 - 
51. Concerning the recording of confessions, see: P. J., C. No. 
3222/3 of 19/10/1382 (1963); M. J., C. No. 45/l/T of 5/3/1392 
(1972); L. of M. J. to . D. M. I. No. 20211/1/N of 12/6/1392 (1972); Maryam v. 11nis, G. S. C. (M), C. R. of 1391 (1971) 
vol. Is p. 32. 
52. L. of Sa'Ud to Faisal No. 713 of 18/1/1373 (1953)- 
53. L. of Vic. to G. S. C. (M) No. 1051 of 26/1/1373 (1953), 
quoted in M. of M. I. to P. C. M. No. 3366 of 5/7/1382 (1962). 
54. See e. g., P. C. M., C. No. 16151 of 7/8/1388 (1968). 
55" P. P. v. al-Yamnn3 and al-Shammar3, F. M. C. (T), No. 282 of 
17/5/1388 (1968). 
56. A1-Barmakl v. al-Barmaki, C. C. (R), D. No. 505/1 of 1387 
(1967)- 
57. "In ... v. b. Sägar and Jum`Un", G. S. C. (R), R. of 1387 (1967). vol. XII , p. 15- 
58. See e. g., P. P. v. `Umar and FaVima, G. S. C. (M), R. of 1376 
(1956). Vol. II,, p. 81. 
59. P. P. v. al-Y`ami, _. 
P. J., D. No. 447 of 1360 (1941). 
60. See., al-Suwa v. Misk3, G. S. C. (J), R. of 1387 (1967-68). 
61. Al-`USaymi v. al-Ruways, G. S. C. (R), R. of 1386 (1966-67), 
vol. Is p. 95. 
62. L. of P. J. to P. C. M. No. 1699 of 6/3/1374 (1954-55), guoted 
in L. of P. C. M. to M. I. No. 4668/2 of 9/10/1374 (1955); 
P. J. , D. No. 297 of 22/7/1358 (1939)- 
63. Al-Mughni, vol. X, p. 294; L. of the Mufti to P. K. O. No. 106 
of 16/10/13711. (1955). 
64. L. of the Mufti to P. K. O., supra. 
65. ý. No. 21 of 1385 (1965). 
66. Some of them operate the "allusion" under certain circum- 
stances, but do not do it under others. The Grand Sharl'a 
Court of Mecca sitting under the same presiding judge had made 
allusions to confessors to zing to recall their confession, 
but did not make such an allusion to another confessor 
committing the same kind of crime. By examining the case in 
which the allusion was made, one will find that both the man 
and woman were adult, unmarried; that the intercourse was by 
mutual consent of both of them. In the other case, the 
confessor kidnapped -a girl of nine years of age from a city to a 
suburb, kept her for twenty days till he was discovered, and 
raped her several times. Moreover, he was a married man, and 
he tried to mislead the Court by claiming that he was single, 
and had never been married. Obviously, if the judges made an 
allusion to the confessor, in the first case, probably out of 
mercy, they had no reason to have such mercy on the confessor 
in the second case, which could have caused them to hint to 
him to recall his confession. (See: al-Yamanl v. al-ZahrUn3, 
S. No. 2 of 1381 (1961), and P. P. v. Zallkha and al-Barnäwl, 
4. No. 105 of 1385 (1965). 
67. See e. g., P. P. v. al-Qatari, G. S. C. (M), D. of 1386 (1966); 
L. of P. J. to P. C. M. No. 3394/1 of 14/10/1387 (1968). 
- 21 0- 
68. - Al-Manäwi, p. 227. 
69. See e. g., L. of P. J. to G. S. C. (R) No. 2107/3/1 of 
7/6/1386 (1966). 
70. See, L. of the Mufti to P. K. O. No. 106 of 16/10/1374 (1955)- 
71- P. P. v. al-Jayzäni, C. C. (R), No. 189/1 of 1388 (1968). 
72. About-. the Commission which attends the execution of udu7d, 
see D. of C. C. No. 5 of 6/3/1376 (1956) approved by 
C. M., D. No. 123 of 20/7/1379 (1959). 
73. H. O. No. 9707 of 25/5/1389 (1969), quoted in C. of M. I. 
No. 2103/S of 12/7/1389 (1969); L. of P. C. M. to *M. I. No. 
14401 of 14/7/1389 (1969). 
74. M. of M. I. to P. C. M. No. 3161/s of 22/9/1389 (1969). 
75" Sharh, p. 347- 
76. P. P. v. al-Jayzanl G. S. C. (R), R. of 1388 (1968), vol. XII, 
p. 22, and C. C. (R), D. No. 189/1 of 1388 (1968). 
77. L. of P. J. to G. S. C. (R). No. 2107/3/1 of 7/6/1386 (1966). 
78. P. P. v. al-Yami, D. No. 447 of 26/6/1360 (1,941) . 
79. P. 144. 
80. M. of G. S. C. (R), to C. C. (R). No. 3875/1 of 14/9/1386 (1966). 
81. D. No. 492 of 1386 (1966) and D. No. 593 of 1386 (1966). 
82. Sharh, p. 375; P. P. v. S3Mn and others, G. S. C. (M), R. of 
1375 _ (1955), vol. III, p. 53. 
83. See e. g., al-Haýraml v. al-I ac rams, G. S. C. (R), $. No. 150 
of 1377 (19573; al-Yamäni v. al-Yamäni, G. S. C. (M), D. of 
1386 (1966); al-Barmakl v. al-Barmaki, C. C. (R), D. No. 505/1 
of 1387 (1967); al-YamänT v. al-Yammn'i, G. S. C. (T), R. of 
1388 (1968), vol. I, pp. 92-95. 
In P. P. v. al-Yamäni and MunTra, who were charged of murder 
and zing, the Grand Sharl'a Court of Riyadh, supported by-the 
Court of Cassation, held that the former prisoner was convicted 
of retaliation upon his confession without mentioning how 
many times he had confessed. As to the hadd of zing it was 
mentioned that he was convicted after he had confessed four 
times. (See, G. S. C. (R), D. of 1389/1969; C. C. (R), D. No. 
6/1 of 1390/1970). Thus, an unrepeated confession to a crime 
of retaliation, whether it concerns the life or a part of the 
body, is admissible. (About the confession to the crime of 
retaliation regarding a part of the body, see: al-Iärith3 v. 
al-Varithi, G. S. C. (T), R. of 1387/1967, vol. VI, p. 6. ) 
84. Bahnass, p. 155- 
85. Al-Buraydi v. Nüra, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 470 of 1388 (1969). 
86. p. 118. 
87. p. p. v, al-Tuwayjrl and al-IiawtT, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 170 
of 1384 (1961-), and P. P. V. al-Jarbi, D. No. 893/2 of 1388 
(1968). and P. P. v. al-Harbl, D. No. 428/1 of 1388 (1968), 
and P. P. v. b. Jum a, D. No. 365/2 of 1389 (1969), and P. P. - 
v. al-Dawsar3, D. No. 445/1 of 1389 (1969). 
- 211 - 
88. See e. g., P. P. v. al-Khaybari, F. M. C. (R) D. No 216 of 
1383 (1964 ; P. P. v. äl-`Umari, F. M. C. (R5 D. No. 312 of 
1383 (19614); P. P. v. al-Rash-ad-i. F. M. C. (Rý, No. 340/2 of 
1389 1969 ; P. P. v. Dawsari, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 1445/1 of 
1389 
(1969). 
89. See, al-Muhni, vol. X, p. 167. 
90. Kashshäf , pp. 416-1417. 
91. Muntahä, Vol. III, p. 545; Interview with Shaykh `Abdullah 
b. Duhaysh, (1970). 
92. Interview with Shaykh ýUlih al-Luh. aydän, supra. 
93. Kashshäf, p. 417- 
94. Abü $anifa is of the opinion that a Jewish or Christian woman 
may give testimony in virginity and in women's defects. (Ibn 
al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Al-Turuq al-IIukmiyya fi al-Siy! Zsa 
al-Shar `iyya) , Cairo p1 953 , p. 80- 
95. Kashshäf, p. 417. 
96. See, C. L., art. 26, s. III. 
97. The whole population of Saudi Arabia are Muslims. 
98. D. No. 112/89/T of 1389 (1969). 
99. Shar , p. 547. 
100. Law of 19319 art. 15; Law of 1936t arts. 48-49. 
101. Such as matters relating to bodily defects covered by dress, 
virginity, menstruation, accouchment, and inflicted violence. 
(Shat , pp. 556-558; Kashshäf, pp. 433-436. 
) 
102. L. of the Mufti to P. C. M. No. 403 of 1/5/1 78 (1958); L. of 
P. J. to M. I. No. 3551/1 of 10/9/1387 (1967). 
103. Sharp, p. 558; Kashshäf, pp. 433-436. 
1014.. P. P. v. Fayhän, F. M. C. (T), D. No. 339 of 1388 (1968). 
105. Interview with Shaykh $äli}i al-Luhayd n, supra. 
106. Art. 506. 
107. Al-Subay`i v. al-Qa}Jtäni, C. C. (R , D. No. 
671 of 1385 (1966) 
al-Narb! V. al-Mutayri, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 148/2 of 1389(19695. 
108. The prisoner became ill immediately after he was arrested. 
. 
He stayed in hospital for some three months before he was 
tried. Both his illness and the elapse of time made the 
witness uncertain of his person when testifying in court. 
109. P. P. v. zayd, G. S. C. (Dhahrän), D. No. 8 of 1385 (1965). 
110. , In .,, v, b. Jabir', 
' S. C. (al-3 aqu) , D. No. 19 of 1380 
(1960), 
- quoted in 
L. of M. I. to D. P. J. in Mecca No. 14489 of 
9/11/1380 (1960). 
111. al-yguw V V. Miski, G. S. C. (J), R. of 1387 (1967), Vol. It p. 7; 
p. p. v. Mud'ith and Mu}aammad, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 95 of 1384 
0964). 
112. P. P. v. al-Qarni, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 188 of 1383 (1964). 
113. Al-Mughni, Vol. XII, pp. 4-5. 
114. Bahnani, PP* 17-18. 
- 21 2- 
115. Ibid, p. 19. 
116. Al-Mughni, Vol. XII, pp. 3-4. 
117. Qur'än, al-Bagara (the Cow), verses 282-283. 
118. The case of Al-J-udallah, G. B., D. No. 103 of 1375; al- 
Muzayfirät v. al-`Ayayda, G. S. C. (M), S. of 1389 (1969). 
119. Kashshaf, p. 447- 
120. L. of P. J. to Vic. No. 2142 of 9/8/1357 (1938). 
121. Al-Dawsarl v. Khalaf and Khälid, G. S. C. (Häyil), Q. No. 
208/3 of 1386 (1966). 
122. These phrases are: "I testify that, " "I testify in the name 
of Allah", "I testify for Allah the Exalted. One", "I testify 
in the name of Allah the Almighty" and "I testify in the name 
of Allah the High, the Almighty". The testimony may not begin 
with any of these phrases, but it ends with the phrase: 
'land thus I testify". 
123. L. " of P. J. to Vic. No. 2142 of 9/8/1357 (1938). 
124. See e. g., P. P. V. Mut'ib, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 362 of 1384 
(1964). 
125. See e. g., "in ... v. al-Shihri and b. Mut`ib", B. C., D. of 
1386 (1966). 
126. Bahnast, pp. 45-46; Raghib, M. `A., J rN'im al-IIudüd fi 
al-Tashri' al-Islämi wa al-Qänün al Wao-'! Cairo, 1961, p. 74. 
127. "'In ... v. Khurd", P. J., report No. I of 17/1/1359 
(1940); 
P. P. v. Yahyä, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 206/2 of 1385 (1965); 
P. P. v. al-`Aw11 and al-Räbighi., M. C. (D), R. of 1389 (1969), 
vol. II., pp. 95-101 
128. See, Bahnasi, pp. 77-80; P. P. v. Yahyä, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 
256/2 of 1385 (1965). 
129. Ä1-Jiru v. b. Qurmut, G. S. C. (R), Q. No. 67/1 of 1386-(1966). 
130. "In ... v. Khurd", P. J., D. No. 81 of 1359 
(1940). 
131. b. Mu`addl and al=. `Anazl v. b. `A, yy5f, C. C. (R), D. No. 
694 of 1385 (1965)o 
132. In al-'ArTfi v. The Administrative Governor of al-Quway'iyya 
(a town), the inhabitants of that town were divided into 
two groups, one group supported. the Governor and the other 
was hostile to him. The evidence. of all the inhabitants was 
not accepted on the ground that they might have had interests 
or motives behind their evidence. (G. B., D. No. 206 of 1375 
(1955). 
133. L. of P. C. M. to M. I. No. 4668/2 of 9/10 1374 (1955); 
L. of G. S. C. (T) to G. S. C. (R) No. 2822/22/377 of 6/5/1388 
- 
(1968). 
134. Interview with Shaykh `Abdullah b. Duhaysh, supra. 
135. b. D-dyil v. al-Muhäwish and b. Qublän, C. C. (R), D. No. 
6/3 of 1390 (1970). 
136. IstikhlRf was known amongst most of Muslim. jurists as the 
"Letter of a Judge to a Judge" "KitAb al-Q. ädi J. 1ä al-QUdi". 
137. Ibn Quddma, S., vol. XI, p. 469. 
213 - 
138. P. 503. 
139. P. 361 . 
140. See e. g., P. P. v. b. `Abdullah, G. S. C. (al-Ahsl'), R. of 
1384 (1964). Vol. II., pp. 24-28p and R. of 1385 (1965)t 
vol. I. pp. 82-83- 
141. No. 118 of 14/4/1392- 
142. L. of the Mufti to P. C. M., No. 403 of 1/5/1378 (1958) 1j1963)- 
143. 
L. 
of S. C. of Baljurshi to its A. G. No. 879 of 6/3/1383 
A tracer of footsteps is often called in Saudi Arabia 
"marr311. The word "marr3" is attributed to the tribe of 
"al-Murra", whose men have shown great skill in the science 
of tracing'footsteps. It is true that most of the tracers 
of footsteps have been members of "al-MurraI", but there have been 
some tracers who do not belong to this tribe. 
144. Al-`A ama v. al-ShayäbTn, G. S. C. (R) S. No. 1539/1 of 1379 
1960 ; P. P. v. al-Qarni, P. M. C. (R), D. No. 188 of 1383 
1964. 
145" al-Yäfi`l vo al-Yamän3, G. S. C. (M), D. of 1386 (1966), and 
- al-Muzayfir$t v. al-`Ayayda, 
S. of 1389 (1969). 
146. The case of al-Shurayy3f and Musim, G. S. C. (R), S. No. 19/1 
- of 1387 
(1967). 
147. Art. 505. 
148. Art. 501. 
119. C. R., art. 258. 
150. Cust. v. al-Furay1 and others, A. C. C., D. No. 76 of 1389 
0970). 
151. "In ... v. al-Jarb3n and al-MarhUn", F. C.., D. 
No. 11.2/89/T 
of 1389 (1969). 
152. "In ... v. al-Duhaym and others", F. C., D. No. 
144/90/T of 
153.7, 
and'"in .. V. Hasan", D. No. 139/89/T of 1390 M78- 
1389 
Internal Regulations of G. B., arts. 4,8; "in ... v. Tähir 
and others, D. of 1387 (1967), and "in ... _v. 
`Ajlän and 
3Iasan, B. C., D. No. 1103 of 1386 (1967). 
151. Al-`Usayml v. al-Ruways, G. S. C., (R), C. -R. of 1386 
(1966=67), vol. I, p. 95, and C. C. (R), D. No. 225 of 
1386 (1966). 
155. See, Ibrähim, A. I., Turuq al-Qadä` fi al-Sharl'a al-Islamiyya, 
Cairo, 1928, PP. 314-315. 
156. Interview with Shaykh Säli1i al-Luhayda-n, supra. 
157. A1-Bagara, verse 282. 
158. Art. 483. 
159. In 1970. in the case against b. Khudayr, when the member of 
the Forgery Committee who was conducting the trial began to 
administer the oath to a witness, his attention was drawn by 
the representative of the Grievances Board who was a former 
Shari`a judge to the fact that the witness did not have to 
- 214 - 
take the oath. As the other members were in favour of the 
oath, the witness had to swear the oath. 
160. L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 1305/1 of 28/8/1383 (1964). 
161. Sara v. Zäfi, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 1031/2 of 1387 (1968). 
162. Bahnass, pp. 50-51 . 
163. Al-Mu ghni , Vol. XI,, pp. 452-453. 
164. Al-Habddn v. b. Ghuwaynim, F. M. C., (R), D. No. 156 of 1384 (1964). 
165. P. J., C. No. 3402/3/) of 26/8/1383 (1964). 
166. P. P. vo b. Suwayd1n and b, Rashid, F. M. C., (R), D. NO. 472 
of 1384 1964. and P. P. v. Nä7eir and `Ubayd, D. No. 449/2 
of 1388 
(1968 
. 
167. Such as the English law, (Palmer and Palmer, p. 100). ' 
168. P. 171. 
169. P. 124. 
170. Baroudi, p. 31o 
171. See, al- urayn3 vo al-Qurayni, G. S. C. (R), g. No. 3838/1 
of 1386 
(1966) 
. 
172. P. J. , C. No. 3402/3/) of 26/8/1383 (1964). 
173. See, L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 1556/1 of 20/11/1383 (1964). 
174. See e. g., P. P. v. al-Shihri, F. M. C., D. No. 738/2 of 1389 (1969). 
175. 
. See e. g., 
P. P. v. Mu4ammad Thabit and others, F. M. C. (R), D. 
No. 769/2 of 1388 (1968). 
176. See e. g., al-Subay'! vo al-Subay`I, G. S. C., (R), S. No. 
169/1 of 1388 (1968)o 
177. Ibid. 
178. Al-Gharlb v. A1-Huzaym, G. S. C. (R)R. of 1384 (1964-65) vol. 
XVIII, p. 10; Sära v. Hädi, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 1031/2 of 
1387 097)- 
179- G. S. C. (R), R. of 1384 (1964-65), vol. V. p. 19; C. C. (R), 
D. No. 429 of 1385 (1965-66). 
180. Al-jar} muqaddam `alä al-ta`dIl. See, "in ... v. Khurd", 
P. J., D. No. 81 of 1359 (1940)" 
181. See, Bahnass, pp. 34-37. 
182. The Judicial Commission, D. No. 3 of 7/1/1347 (1928). 
183. P. P. v. ' Nara, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 729/2 of 1386 (1966); 
Interview with Shaykh gSlih al-Luhayddn, supra. 
184. Shalfän v. Ghänim and BudätL, C. C. (R) p D. No. 1914/2 of 1388 (1969). - 
185. P. P. v. Nilra, supra. 
186. Shar , p. 556" 
187. Interview with Shaykh gäli4 al-Lu. }, }aydän, supra. 
188. =P. P. v. b. Sa 'gn, C. C. 
(R), No. 61 of 1384 (1964), quoted in 
M. of F. M. C. (R) to P. J. No. 2000 of 13/9/1388 (1968). 
- 215 - 
189. P. P. v. al-`Awfi and al-Ra'"biii, C. C. (R), No. 174/2 of 1389 (1969). 
190. Sharh, p. 556. Also see e. g., al-Yamani v. al-Jayzani, 
C. C. (R), D. No. 41/1 of 1387 (1967); Simrän v. Südan and 
others, G. S. C. (M), R. of 1375 (1955-56), vol. III, p. 53. 
191. Al-Fut111u.., Vol. II9 p. 466. 
192. Al-Muglini , Vol. XII, p. 126. 
193" Q-abüs v. al-asir, P. J., D. No. 300 of 1358 (1939); 
b. Khunayz=an v. Ghurm Allah, S. C. of Zafir, D. of 1358 
(1939), quoted in C. D., D. No. 300 of 9/8/1358 (1939). 
1914. Al-Mu hnl, Vol. XII, pp. 123-124. Also see, NEVir v. 
Bä Khashwayn, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 220 of 1384 (1964); 
al-SttIrl v. Vatam, F. M. C. (R) t D. No. 876 of-1389 (1969). 
195. `AmmUsh v. al-Vargän, G. S. C. (R), R. of 1384 (1964-65). 
196. P. P. v. al-Nufay`i and others, S. M. C. (M), D. No. I of 
1382 (1.962). 
197. Al-Jiru v. Ban! W hib Shaiträn, C. C. (R), D. No. 661 of 
1386 (1967). 
198. L. of P. J. to G. S. C. (R), No. 3706/3/1 of 14/10/1386 (1967)- 
199. Al-Mughni Vol. X, pp. 6-7, and Vol. XII , p. 126; Shalfun 
v. Ghanim and Budtth, G. S. C. (R), S.. No. 86/1 of 1388 (1968), 
and, C. C. (R), D. No. 134/2 of 1388 (1968). 
200. Ibrahim v. al-Yamäni, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 482/1 of 1387 
(1967); P. P. v. al-Yamän3, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 1483/1 of 
1387 (1967)- 
201. Al-Shawkä. ni, M. b. A. b. M. Nayl al-Awtär, Cairo, 1952, 
Vol. VII, p. 38. 
202. Sharh, p. 332. 
203. In modern times, this can be detected by an efficient 
scientific method in most cases. 
2014. Al-Mughn3, Vol. X, pp. 9-11. 
205. See, p. 332. 
206. See, p. 68. 
207. Muhsin v. `Agil, G. S. C. (M), S. No. 96 of 1385 (1966), 
affirmed by C. C. (M. ), D. No. $1 of 1386 (1966); al-Suwät v. 
Miski, G. S. C. (J), R. of 1387 (1967-68), Vol1 p. 7, 
affirmed by C. C. (R), D. No. 77/2 of 1388 (1; 685 . 
208. Al-Burayk v. Al-Burayk, G. S. C. (R), S. No. 64/1 of 1388 
(1968) and C. C. (R), D. of 1388 (1968). 
209. Muhsin v. `Agil, supra; al-SuwUt v. Miski, supra. 
210. Kashshäf, p. 67. 
211. Al-Qurayni v. al-Qurayni, C. C. (R), D. No. 596 of 1386 (1967)- 
212. Al-Mugýini, Vol. X, pp. 26-27. 
213" P. 334. 
214. P. 74. 
- 216 - 
215. See e. g., Hadhd_hRl v. ýIanmad and Muthab, G. S. C. (R), S. No. 
57/1 of 138611966); al-Quraynl v. al-Qurayn3, supra: 
216. Shalfän v. Ghanim and Budäh, D. No. 194/2 of 1388 (1969). 
217. Bahnasi, p. 209. 
218. Shark, p. 334. 
219. Mu4sin v. `Agil, supra. 
220. Shalf$n v. Ghnnim and Budäh, supra. 
221 . Fatwä. No. 1527/3/1 of 4/8/1382 
(1962). 
222. See, al-Mughni, Vol. X, p. 37; Kashshgf, p. 76. See. also, 
HadhdhR1 v. Hamad Supra. 
223. See, al-Mughn3, Vol. IX, p. 2. 
224. Kashshäf, , p. 210. 
225. P. P. v. Nür, G. S. C. (MI, &I. No. 185/7 of 1391 (1971) . 
226. The most important of these civil consequences are: (i) an 
immediate divorce, (ii) the prohibition of their re-marriage, 
and (iii) the illegitimacy of the child born as a result of 
the alleged adultery. 
227. Kashshäf, pp. 208-210. 
228. Al-Turuq- al-Hukmiyya, pp" 204-213. 
229. b. Däiyl vo al-MuhRwish and b. QublRn, D. No. 6/3 of 1390 
(1970)- 
230. P. P. vo b. Khudayr, supra. 
231. See e. g., Cust. v. al-Qash`am'i and al-Furayl; i, A. C. C., D. 
No. 76 of 1389 (1970). 
232. Cust, v. al-Jawhari, C. C. (J), D. No. 2 of 1390 (1970). 
235. "In ... v. al-Jarbän and al-MarhUn"", P. C.,, D. No. 112/89/T 
of 1389 (1969). 
234. Ibid. 
235. "In ... v. Hasan", F. C., D. No. 139/89/T of 1389 
(1970). 
236. P. P. v. al-Dawsari, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 401/2 of. 1388 (1968); 
"in ... v. al-Shihr3 and Ibn Mut 
`ib" , B. C., D. of 138b (1966). 
237. The Judicial Commission which tried Walid DirbHs in Riyadh, 
S. No. 11/1 of 1386 (1966). 
238. P. J., c. No. 1607/3/M of 20/6/1386 (1966). 
239" See e. g., Law of 1952(B), art. 65. 
240. See e. g., "In ... v. Rozina", P. C., D. No. 137/89/T of 
1389 (1970). 
241. Al-Qawäwda v. al-DamänIn, C. D., D. No. 401-of 29/8/1358 
(1939)- 
242. See e.. g.,, -Ghal19t1-v. Yaslam,, G. S. C. (R)., R. of'1386 
(1966-67), Vol. I, p. 82. 
243" M. J., C. No. 27/2/T of 1LI/2, /1392 (1972). 
244. A copy may take the form of (i) an examined copy, which has 
to be compared with the original, (ii) a certified copy, that 
- 217 - 
has been certified to be a true copy, or (iii) an office 
copy which is an official judicial document. 
245" C. C., D. No. 183 of 27/10/1353 (1935). 
246. Law of 1952(B) art- 71- 
247- Ibid, art. 76. 
248. Ibid, arts. 94,106. 
249. Ibid, art. 77. 
250. See. e. g., "In ... v. Bakr", G. B., D. of 9/7/1381 
(1961); 
"In ... v. -b. 
Mughim", Forgery Committee. D. No. 140/89/T 
of 29/12/1389 (1970)- 
2514, P. J. , C. No. 34/3/J of 2/8/1383 
(1963). 
252. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad be Jubayr, supra. 
253. See e. g., M. F. v. al-Rawgi, C. S., D. No. 27/90 of 1390 
254.9; 
Fakhru v. al-Mani'!, C. S., D. No. 28/90 of 1390 890- 
M. J. , C. No. 894 of 15/2/1392 (1972). 
255. Law of 1936, art. 128; Law, of 1938, arts. 99,142,196; 
Law of 1952(A), art. 86; Law of 1952(B), arts. 80,1209 173. 
256. Al-`Agama v. al-ShayUbin, G. S. C. (R), D. No. 1539/1 of 
23/8/1379 (1960). 
257. P. P. v. al-Zayd and others, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 377 of 1384. 
(1965), affirmed by C. C. (R), D. No. 83 of 1385 (1965); 
P. P. v. al-Qahtäni, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 357/2 of 1388 (1968). 
258. See. e. g., "in ... v. Mahds and `Abduh, B. C., D. of 1387 (1967; - 
259- P. P. v. Munif, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 7551.,. of 1387 (1967)- 
260. This presumption is based on the principle of "al-baril'a 
al-asliyYa". 
261. L. of the Mufti to P. K. O. No. 38 of 16/9/1374 (1955); 
Fatwa included _in 
L. of the Mufti to the King No. 2000 of 
13/9/ 1388 (1968). 
262. P. P. v. al-Qäsim, C. C. (R), D. No. 593 of 1386 (1966). 
263. L. of P. J. to M. I. No. 1305/1 of-1383-(1964). 
26l4. `Ubayd v. Hays, G. S. C' (R), U. No. 134/1 of 1388 (1968), 
and C. C. (R) p D. No. 476/1 of 1388 
(1968). 
265. Al-Zamil v. al-Sikhän, G. S. C. (R), R. of 1385 (1965-66), 
Vol. I, p. 65. 
266. Fatwa determined in Letter from the Mufti to the king, No. 
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(1968-69) , vol. Il t pp. 192-194. . 
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278. P. 358. 
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285. P. P. v. al-Dawsarl and Midi, F. M. C. (R), D. No. 101/2 of 
1388 (1968). 
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as far as SharT'a courts are concerned. 
289. See, Decision of the Judicial Commission formed from P. J. 
and G. S. C. (M), No. 161 of 25/11/1354 (1936). This 
Commission was formed according to a royal will of which 
P. J. was informed by L. of Vic, No. 11326 of 29/9/1354 
(1935) - 
* As we have seen, it is generally presumed that a child 
born four years after divorce is illegitimate, and 
therefore the mother may be prosecuted for committing 
zinä (illegal sex relations). By examining the sources 
on which this opinion was based, we shall find that it 
was not based on valid grounds. Some jurists, such as 
Ibn Hazm, upheld that a child born more than nine 
months after the termination of marriage would be 
illegitimate, and the mother would be charged with zing. 
Thus, the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, according to 
which a child could be legitimate only if born within 
two hundred and eighty days after marriage, was not 
alien to traditional Islamic law. As it is only just 
to abolish a rule which was based on inaccurate infor- 
mation and whose validity is challenged by modern 
medicine, it is suggested that there is need for reform 
in this matter. (See, Ibn Hazm, al-Muhallä, Cairo, 1352 
(1933), Vol. X, pp. 315-316; Indian Evidence Act, s. 112. 
Chapter Six 
APPEAL 
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Historical 
The concept of appeal is not strange to the Shari'a. The 
parties to a certain case which had been decided by a judge1 
complained to the Prophet of the judgement. The Prophet heard the 
statement of both parties and he affirmed the judgement. 
2 If 
appeal, in substance, had been alien to the Shari'a, the Prophet 
would not have accepted the complaint of the parties in the first 
place. `Umar, the Second Caliph, in his letters to the governors 
and judges of the provinces, laid down some of the most fundamental 
rules of judicial procedure. 
3 In his instructions to Abü Müsä 
al-Ash`ari, he instructed him in the following words: "Let not a 
judgement in a case which you have given, but which you reviewed 
again in your conscience, and were guided in it to a more sound 
judgement, be a hindrance to you from returning to the decision 
which you know is right, for what is right can never be annulled 
by anything.! 
'' 
Anyone acquainted with Islamic jurisprudence cannot fail to 
realise that Muslim jurists have recognised appeal in principle. 
They have dealt with the attack on, and the. reversal of, judgements. 
The question to be dealt with here concerns appeal in form, i. e. 
whether there was a court of appeal in Islamic judiciary. Some 
writers claim that the tribunal of wäli al-mazälim had appellate 
jurisdiction. 5 Others maintain that this tribunal had exactly the 
same jurisdiction as that of a supreme appellate court in modern 
times. 
6 
However, the examination of the power7 of wäli al-maZälim 
shows that he was not, at all, entitled to review the judgement 
of a judge. He merely had the power to expedite the execution of 
such a judgement and only then if it was awarded against a person 
who used, or tried to use, his influence to avoid or delay its 
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execution. Wall al-mazälim was also empowered to decide personal 
quarrels or disputes as a tribunal with original jurisdiction. 
These two functions of wä11 al-maZRlim have probably confused 
those writers and made them think that the institution of al- 
mazAlim was an appelate tribunal. Therefore, the claim that the 
jurisdiction of wgl al-maZRlim was a supreme, or even an ordinary, 
appelate tribunal does not seem to be accurate. In the classical 
Islamic judiciary, there was no judicial institution which had 
only appellate jurisdiction. Muslim jurists allocated the power 
of reversing a judgement to the same judge who awarded it, or to 
another judge of the same rank as the former. However, although 
the traditional Islamic judiciary was not familiar with separate 
appellate institutions, the Sharl'a opens the door for the adoption 
of an appellate system suitable for the need of the times. Thus, 
the contemporary Muslim states which apply the Shar-V a. wholly, 
such as Saudi Arabia, or partly, such as for example the Sudan, 
8 
have adopted appellate institutions in their judiciaries. We 
shall now consider the functioning of these institutions in Saudi 
Arabia. 
The Right of Appeal 
Although the laws regulating the SharT'a judiciary mention 
explicitly the right of the defendant to appeal against any 
appealable criminal sentence, they do not refer clearly to the 
right of the claimant to appeal. But a royal will9 issued in 1932 
determined that if either of the two parties felt aggrieved by a 
decision below, he had the right to appeal against this decision. 
The Presidency of the Judiciary decided in the same year that the 
claimant would be entitled to demand appeal if the lower court 
decided to dismiss his claim. 
10 In 1971, the Ministry of Justice 
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made it clear that the claimant possessed the right to appeal. 
11 
In practice, the. right of the claimant to appeal against criminal 
judgement has been recognized fully by the judges12 in much the 
same way as appeal against a civil decision. 
13 
The Commercial Law also does not determine that the claimant 
has the right to appeal. Nevertheless, in practice, the claimant 
has been entitled, exactly like one who has his case before a 
Sharl'a court, to appeal against the decision below. 
14 
The question to be asked is whether the prosecution has the 
right to appeal. The laws governing the procedure of the Shari`a 
courts do not refer to this question. Besides this, the practice 
of these courts before the conversion of the Presidency of the 
Judiciary into the Ministry of Justice in 1970 showed no evidence 
of appeal by the prosecution against an appealable decision. 
15 
The President of the Judiciary told the Minister of the Interior 
who is the chief authority for the public prosecutors that he had 
no right to object to any decision given by a Sharl'a court. 
16 
Denying the prosecution the right to appeal did not evolve 
from any law or regulations, but it was deeply rooted in the 
judicial practice. Here, one may ask: why did the judiciary in 
many respects regard the public prosecutor as being on the same 
footing as a claimant, but treat him differently in the sphere of 
the right to appeal? The possibility of committing an error in law, 
which necessitates the recognition of the right of a claimant to 
appeal, exists when the charge is brought by the prosecution. 
Therefore, the denial of the right to appeal by the prosecution 
does not seem to have any reasonable grounds. 
However, the Minister of Justice, who succeeded the President 
of the Judiciary in presiding over the judicial authority in 1970, 
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recognized the right of the prosecution to appeal. 
17 Since then, 
the practice of the judges makes it clear that the prosecution may 
now object to a decision below and request the committal of the 
case to the Court of Cassation. 
18 
Unlike the laws of the Shari`a judiciary, the Customs 
Regulations19 state clearly that the representative of the 
government, the Customs General Directorate, has the right, just 
as the defendant20 has, to appeal against a decision below. In 
practice, the Customs General Directorate has been very active in 
the sphere of appeal. 
21 This fact may not be unexpected since 
most of the members of the original Customs committees do not have 
any legal education nor any long legal experience. 
It may be relevant here to note that a party who feels 
aggrieved may appeal in the form of a complaint to the "High 
Authority", al-Magäm al-SämT, the King or the President of the 
Council of Ministers (who happens to be the King at the present 
time), or to certain Ministers. The "High Authority" may also 
receive any complaint against any decision. 
22 A party who feels 
prejudiced by the decision of a Shari`a court can, in principle, 
complain to the High Judicial Authority. 
23 A complaint against 
the decision of a Commercial tribunal other than that for the 
Committee of the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
24 lies to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
25 A person convicted by a 
Customs committee, whether original or appellate, may appeal to the 
Minister of Finance. 
26 
Period for Appeal 
The period for appeal in SharI'a courts has varied from 
time to time. The Law of 192727 determines that this period must 
not be more than twenty days. The Law of 1936 
28 
shortened the 
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period to ten days, and this was confirmed by the Instructions 
of 1962.29 The Instructions of 196730 gave the original court the 
right to fix the period for appeal, provided it was not less than 
ten days and not more than fifteen days. 
According to the Commercial Law, 31 the period for appeal is 
thirty days. But an appeal against a decision concerning the 
violation of the Law of Weights and Measures and the Law of 
Commercial Agencies must be made within fifteen days. 
32 
The Customs Laws33 and Regulations3 ' provide that the period 
for appeal must not be more than fifteen days. But if the domicile 
of the defendant is unknown, or if he refuses to receive the 
decision served on him outside the tribunal, the period is thirty 
days after being notified of the decision. 
35 
In practice, the Sharl'a courts do not always apply the laws 
regarding the period for appeal. Although accepting an appeal 
after the prescribed period may lead to delay, the judges seem to 
be in favour of allowing a party who feels aggrieved by the original 
decision an extra period. The underlying idea may be that when a 
case is looked into by more than one court of different degrees, 
this may ensure a greater justice. Thus, the judges find this 
type of delay justifiable. However, appellate judges may not 
accept an appeal after the prescribed period if the sentence 
appealed against is trivial or if the appeal itself does not seem 
to be bona fide. 
36 
The semi-judicial tribunals do not accept any appeal made 
outside the prescribed period. 
37 Hence, with the expiry of the 
period for appeal their decision becomes final, unless the appellant 
complains to the High Authority and this authority agrees that the 
case be re-examined. 
It is important to consider the question whether the execution 
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of a decision under appeal is to be held in abeyance while it is 
pending examination by the appellate authority. The criminal 
decision of a Shari`a court pending review must be arrested till 
it has been affirmed by the appropriate appellate court. 
38 
According to the Commercial Law, 39 decisions under appeal are not 
liable to execution, unless the "temporary execution"40 of a 
decision has been ordered by the original tribunal. . 
It is true 
that in 1967 the decisions regarding securities given by the 
Committee for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes had to be 
carried out immediately after they had'been awarded, even if they 
were under appeal. 
41 
However, since 1968 when the hearing of 
cases involving securities was invested in the-Committee for 
Securities, decisions concerning securities have been subject to 
arrest while being reviewed. 
l2 
As to the Customs committees, an 
appeal shall, in theory, operate as a stay of execution. 
43 
In 
practice, the decisions below may be carried out immediately after 
they have been awarded, 
44 
but the decisions given by the Appellate 
Customs Committees must stay while they are pending the review of 
the Minister of Finance. 
45 
Method of Appeal 
1 
Review in the Shari a courts system may be classified into 
two categories, automatic and ordinary review. The automatic 
review lies against sentences imposing death, mutilation, or any 
punishment on a juvenile. It is also applicable in convictions 
regarding a trustee of endowment (waaf), or the principal of 
bast al-mä1,46 and in decisions concerning real estate, and 
decisions given by default. 
47 Appeal to -a Grand Sharl'a Court 
from the decision of a magistrateb court comes under this category, 
since the latter court, used to commit some of its criminal 
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decisions to the former for revision before 1957, even without 
any request from either party. 
48 
The original court must 
automatically refer any decision which comes under this category 
to the appropriate appellate court, which must in turn review it. 
Although some judges may commit their decisions for review to the 
appellate court before the party concerned has served an appeal, 
and the appellate court may review such decisions, 
19 this type of 
review is not categorized under automatic review. It only lies 
under the category of ordinary review, since neither the trial 
court nor the appellate court is obliged by the law to take any 
measures to review these decisions. 
As the decisions of the Bribery Committee50 and those of the 
Forgery Committee51 must be committed to the President of the 
Council of Ministers: (the High Authority) for revision, this 
process may be classified as automatic review. Similarly, since 
both the decisions given by the Committee for Securities, and 
52 
the decisions awarded by the Appellate Customs Committees53 must 
be subject to revision by the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
and the Minister of Finance respectively, such revision may fall 
within the category of automatic review. 
The ordinary review is that which does not arise without 
demand from a party who has the right to appeal. Thus, when 
dealing with the question of how to appeal against a decision, 
reference will be made only to ordinary review. Having awarded 
its decision and informed both parties of it, the Shari`a court 
must ask them to state whether or not they object to the decision. 
The statement of each party must be entered, and each of them must 
apply his signature or affix his seal on the record. 
54 The 
entry of-ý. such a statement is probably made for two reasons. The 
first is to speed the submission of the appeal (lä'iha al-i`tiräý). 
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In this case, the court usually requires an intending appellant to 
include in the statement in which he demands appeal an undertaking 
that if the prescribed period elapses before he has submitted his 
appeal he forfeits his right to appeal. 
55 The second reason is to 
deny leave to appeal, if it seems fit, to a party who did not 
object duly to the decision but later demanded appeal, 
56 
since he 
has renounced his right to appeal by accepting the decision. Yet, 
the SharT'a judges57-may sometimes grant leave to appeal to a party 
who has renounced his right, especially if he requests appeal within 
the prescribed period, or if the case is serious. However, when a 
party wants to appeal against an appealable decision, the Shar! 'a 
court must give him a document called sakk. 
58 Although the sakk as 
a whole gives only the substance of the record, 
59 those sections 
relating to the evidence and the grounds for the judgement are 
mentioned in detail, with the evidence given verbatim 060 
The sakk is provided for an appellant who will-study it in 
the preparation of his appeal. In theory, the appeal is necessary 
to commit a decision for review61 with only one exception. That 
is when an appellant claims to have mislaid the Pakk before he 
prepared his appeal and if he requests a copy thereof within the 
prescribed period to enable him to write his appeal. If, in such 
a case, the time limit fixed for appeal expires, before he has 
submitted the appeal, the court must then commit the decision to 
the appellate court. 
62 
In practice, judges may refer the case to 
the appellate court without an appeal after the prescribed period 
has passed, or even when they feel that this period will elapse 
before the intending appellant serves his appeal. 
63 
Now, we may refer to the nature and the form of an appeal. 
According to Article 75 of the Law of 1936, the appeal should give 
the grounds for which an appellant objects to the decision below. 
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The exact form of an appeal is not referred to by this law or by 
any other law governing the Shari'a courts. In practice, an appeal 
varies from a very sophisticated64 to a very simple one. It may be 
prepared by a lawyer, or by an expert, who may argue logically in 
order to impress the appellate judges. But on the other hand, 
quite frequently an appeal is prepared by the appellant himself or 
by a layman who does not know the appropriate legal approach. In 
actual fact a considerable number of appeals take only the form of 
notice 
65 
to the original court stating that the appellant demands 
appeal, without setting out any grounds for his objection to the 
decision. 
66 
However, the appeal should be compiled with any supporting 
data which the appellant did not produce in the trial, whether it 
is old data or data discovered after the original court had given 
its decision. Having received the appeal and the supporting data, 
if there are any, the court below must study its decision and 
re-examine the case in view of the appeal and other relevant 
documents. If it then feels that its decision must be altered in 
any way, it ought to alter it itself without referring it to the 
appellate court. 
67 
But if it thinks that the decision is, proper, 
it must then commit the appeal and its enclosure, the pakk, a copy 
of the record, 
68 
and the file of the case to the appellate 
authority, 
69 
as soon as possible. 
7° 
Prior to 1963, the original courts had to commit their 
decisions which were being appealled against to the appellate court 
through the Presidency of the Judiciary. 
71 The Presidency was 
acting merely as a connecting link between the original and the 
appellate court. 
72 But this method of reference seems to have 
created delay, which was the reverse of the original intention of 
Article 3 of the Instructions of 1962. In 1963, the Presidency 
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instructed both the original court and the appellate court to make 
their contact directly, unless the sentence involved death or 
mutilation where it had to be referred first to the Presidency. 
73 
By Article 6 of the Instructions of 1967, it was provided that an 
appealable sentence must be committed directly to the Court of 
Cassation without exception. Yet in practice, a sentence involving 
death or mutilation was still referred first to the Presidency 
until the Presidency ceased to exist in 1970. However, the 
Ministry of Justice (established in 1970) does not act as the 
Presidency did in this respect; that is to say, decisions appealed 
against are referred directly by the original courts to the 
appellate ones 074 
Having examined the mode in which a party may appeal against 
an original decision in the Sharl'a courts system, it may be 
necessary to refer to the question of how an appeal is to be made 
against the decision of a semi-judicial tribunal. According to 
Article 544 of the Commercial Law, an appellant must submit a 
petition to the administrative governor appended to his appeal 
75 
which must give the grounds on which the appellant objects to the 
decision. The administrative governor shall then refer the appeal 
to the trial tribunal. 
76 The trial tribunal must provide the 
respondent with a copy of the appeal in order to enable him to 
prepare his counter-statement, which is to be submitted to this 
tribunal within one week. Having received the counter-statement, 
the original tribunal must commit the relevant documents of the 
case to the appellate tribunal. 
77 
Unlike the Shari'a court, the Commercial tribunal cannot 
reconsider its decision in view of the appeal, but must transfer 
the case to the appellate tribunal. 
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The move for appeal against the decision of a Customs 
committee varies from one appellant to another. Wherethe appellant 
is the General Customs Directorate, the appeal is referred directly 
to the appellate tribunal. 
78 If the appellant is the defendant 
then he must, according to the Customs Regulations, 
79 
submit his 
appeal to the administrative governor, who shall refer it to the 
appellate tribunal. Yet, in practice, the defendant may also 
submit his appeal to the Customs house sited in the locality of 
the trial tribunal, which will send it to the General Customs 
Directorate, and the Directorate will refer it to the appellate 
tribunal. 80 Additionally, he may submit the appeal directly to the 
appellate tribunal. 
81 
Neither the Customs Law nor the Customs Regulations specify 
the nature and the form of an appeal. However, in practice an 
appellant should set out, in any form, the grounds for his 
objection to the decision below. 
Scope of Reveiw 
The decisions below which are subject to appeal are as 
follows: - 
(a) The decision of a lower tribunal which determines the 
non-receivability of a claim, 
82 
or determines its dismissal after 
it has in principle been accepted. 
83 
(b) The decision of a Sharl'a court which is given on the 
acquittal or the conviction of one accused of dealing with narcotic 
drugs or of committing a traffic offence. 
84 
(c) The decision concluded after trial. 
A decision other than any of these three types will not be 
subject to review even if it forms a basis for the judgement, but 
it will only be reviewed together with the final decision. This 
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appellate rule has probably been adopted as a measure to restrain 
any interruption in the trial and to secure, to some extent, a 
speedy handling of the matter in issue. It is true that in 1927, 
a royal decree85 vested the Reviewing Committee with the power to 
interfere with the proceedings below once it was brought to its notice 
that the lower court was proceeding with a case contrary to the 
procedural principles of the Sharl'a. Nevertheless, in practice, 
the appellate courts have not been in the habit of interfering in 
the proceedings below. 
However, when the laws refer to the appellate power over 
such a decision, they mention that this power is the affirmation 
or the reversal of a decision below. They do not mention whether 
or not this power extends to the variation of a sentence. By 
interpreting the laws literally, the appellate review should only 
lie against a conviction and not a sentence. Yet, in practice, 
the appellate power is not-restricted to the affirmation or the 
reversal of a judgement, but it may sometimes extend to include 
the variation of a sentence. 
86 
When the case is committed to an appellate authority this 
authority must, according to the law, bear in mind that the 
appellate purpose is to secure justice irrespective of which issue 
was appealed against, and which party made the appeal. This 
appellate concept has given rise to the following consequences: 
(1) The entire content of the decision on appeal is open to 
the review of the appellate authority, even if the appeal was only 
directed against a part thereof. 
87 According to this norm, the 
common practice has been that an appellate objects to the decision 
as a whole without objecting to a specific point. 
(2) The appellate authority may alter the offence charged 
on appeal when it believes that a finding of guilty of one offence 
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is to be changed to a finding of guilty of another offence. 
88 
Thus, the sentence, having been reviewed, may then be increased 
as well as decreased, provided that it is a sentence which could 
have been passed below. 
(3) No party to appeal may be allowed priority over the 
other since appeal may be to the advantage or the disadvantage of 
either party. Consequently, the judgement appealed against by 
the defendant alone or by the prosecution in his favour may 
however be amended to his disadvantage, insofar as kind and amount 
of punishment are concerned. The principle that an appellant 
cannot be prejudiced by his own appeal is thus not acceptable to 
the Saudi Arabian judiciary. 
89 
(LE) An accused person who has not requested appeal may, 
just as though he has made a request for appeal, benefit from the 
reversal or the alteration of the judgement appealed against by 
another accused if the reversal or the points altered are 
applicable to the former. 
(5) A judgement is not reversed on a purely technical error 
if the original tribunal could have come to the same conclusion 
without it. 
9° Yet, there are some appellate members of semi- 
judicial tribunals who may reverse a decision on a technical error, 
as will be seen later. 
Having seen that a judgement on appeal may be affirmed, 
reversed, or varied, we may now examine the question of when 
affirmation, reversal, or variation may be applied. 
A. By a Sharl'a appellate authority 
For convenience, the question of when to affirm a judgement 
will be dealt with after dealing with those of when to reverse it. 
Generally speaking, a decision below may-only be reversed when it 
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contradicts the Qur'än, the Sunna or consensus (ijmM), 
91 
or when 
it is against what the trial judge believes to be a proper 
Judgement,, 92 in cases where determination of the sentence is left 
to the judge himself. 93 The Muft194 and the President of the 
Judiciary of Najd, having acted as an appellate authority, 
, maintained 
that the decision of the trial judge ended the case; 
that the grounds just mentioned were the only valid grounds for 
reversal. Article 6 of the Instructions of 1962 adopted the 
opinion followed by the Mufti. Article 13 of the Instructions of 
1967 did not refer in this respect to whether a judgement could 
be reversed if the judge ruled in a case contrary to what he 
believed to be the proper judgement. This does not, by implication, 
mean that the judgement of a judge, who did not resort to his 
discretion when he ought to have done so, may not be reversed. 
It seems that this ground for reversal is not mentioned in the 
Instructions because usually a judge does not pass a sentence 
which does not seem to him to be the proper one, unless he has 
been subject to pressure of some sort. But, as we have seen, the 
Saudi Arabian judge is immune from any pressure. However, it will 
be seen that the determination of sentences of most crimes are 
left to the discretion of the trial judges as they see fit; that 
appellate judges cannot reverse such sentences merely on the 
ground that these judges have different opinions from those of the 
trial judge. This implies that if a trial judge did not so 
determine the sentence, for some reason, when he ought to have 
done so, his judgement must be reversed if the appellate authority 
feels that the judgement is improper. 
However, the grounds for the reversal of a decision can be 
found more clearly in the practice of courts. Generally, these 
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grounds may be classified into the following categories: - 
(a) The dismissal of a prima facie case, or the receiv- 
ability of a non-preponderant claim or charge (da'wa ghayr mu}iarrara), 
which usually does not specify adequately the alleged offender 
or his wrong. 
95 This has been a common ground for the reversal of 
judgement concerning murder. 
(b) The violation of the stipulations and the procedural 
rules: regarding evidence. Indeed, most reversed judgements have 
been reversed on the grounds that trial courts did not observe 
these stipulations and rules. Since these have been examined 
earlier, we shall not refer to them here. 
(c) The non-observance of the principles concerning trial, 
with almost only two exceptions, "open trial" and "speedy handling". 
Appellate courts usually do not give any consideration as to 
whether the trial was in public or in camera when they feel that 
both parties were given equal opportunity to state, and prove, 
their claims and counter-claims. Similarly, if the appellate court 
thinks that the trial court delayed the proceedings unnecessarily, 
the appellate court cannot reverse the decision on this ground 
alone inasmuch as the party was not prejudiced by the delay. 
(d) The arrival of the court at a wrong judgement, even if 
it was based on valid evidence. 
(e) Excess of jurisdiction with regard to the type of offence, 
the person accused, and the place in which the offence was commi- 
tted. The appellate court may not reverse a judgement merely on 
the ground that the trial court has erroneously assumed its 
competence, if the case is not serious, and the appellate judges 
deem that the proceedings below, were not prejudicial to either 
party. 
96 Yet if the appellate authority feels that a sentence 
given by an incompetent court is not proper, even if its 
- 235 - 
determination was left to the trial judge to decide, it will then 
reverse it. Where a case decided by an incompetent court is 
serious, and the appellate authority is not satisfied with the 
judgement, the latter will reverse it even without giving any 
reason for the reversal other than the incompetence of the court 
below. 97 
(f) Newly discovered evidence, or even evidence which was 
not produced before the trial court. 
When dealing with the question of when and how a sentence 
may be varied, one should distinguish between a sentence fixed by 
the law and a sentence which is not so fixed but is left to the 
judge to decide. The power of an appellate authority with regard 
to the variation of a sentence only lies when the sentence is thus 
fixed. In the criminal sphere, the fixed sentences are those 
concerning retaliation or a hadd.. A sentence imposing a fixed 
punishment is usually varied for any of the following reasons: - 
(a) Where the evidence on which the decision below was 
based does not amount to the standard of proof prescribed bas the 
law for imposing a penalty of retaliation or a hadd on the accused, 
but it indicates that the accused. is, however, guilty. In this 
circumstance as a punishment of ta`zlr ought to have been applied 
by the original court, the appellate court will then decide that 
the sentence must be varied to comply with the available evidence. 
98 
(b) Where the accused, whose perpetration of the crime has 
been established, is legally incompetent, the sentence imposing 
retaliation or a hadd must then be commuted into that of ta= on 
the ground that such a sentence is inapplicable therein. 
99 
(c) In the case of a sentence passing a hadd, the sentence 
must be commuted into a sentence of ta`zir if there has been any 
dubious circumstance, for the Prophet says: "Avert ye hudüd on 
- 236 - 
account of dubious circumstances". 
The question to be asked here is whether or not a sentence 
imposing a punishment of ta`zir, which is left to the judge to 
decide, can be varied. Where the Court of Cassation disagrees 
with a sentence of ta'zlr, it usually states in its decision that 
it cannot object to the sentence because the trial judge had the 
right to impose it as he felt appropriate. 
100 Even if the supreme 
appellate authority does not agree with this type of sentence it 
usually states that its opinion does not concur with the sentence, 
101 
but if the trial judge insists on his sentence it should be carried 
out. 
102 On a few occasions, the High Judicial Authority has 
disagreed with sentences of ta`z! r concerning rather serious crimes 
or recidivists on the grounds that the sentences were too lenient 
to deter a criminal. Yet, the sentences had to be carried out, and 
all that the High Judicial Authority did was only to advise the 
judges to adopt non-lenient sentences where the crimes were 
serious, 
03 
or where the defendants had relapsed. 
o4 
The fact that a sentence of ta`zir is not liable to variation 
has given consequences. The first is that the appellate judges 
may sometimes be tempted to find any defect on the face of the 
record, upon which they may invalidate the judgement which they 
feel is too severe-105 Second, although presumptions are in 
principle considered as admissible1o6 evidence as far as ta'zTr is 
concerned, the appellate judges may reverse a severe judgement 
based on presumptions. These judges justify this reversal on the 
grounds that the guilt of the accused cannot be inferred from 
these particular presumptions. 
107 However, since the law in this 
respect gives the trial judge the power to impose any sentence 
within the range allowed by the law, the only alternative measure 
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open to the appellate judges is to reverse the conviction even if 
their real objection does not lie against the conviction, but only 
against the sentence itself. 
The attitude of appellate judges towards presumptions has 
led them to be accused. of what has been thought by some trial 
judges to be double-standards, since they may accept presumptions 
as sufficient evidence in some cases, and not in others. 
108 
Irrespective of this accusation, the appellate judges may find 
justification for the revocation of the conviction of an accused, 
whose guilt seems evident, in three principles of the Sharl'a. 
The first is so-called al ma$älih al-mursala, 
lo9 i. e. the general 
welfare, which "represents a moderate form of the modern idea of 
equity as adopted by English law". 
110 This principle aims at 
general justice allowing a bad action to be committed in order to 
prevent a worse one. 
III In the context of judicial review, the 
reversal of a severe sentence below may at worst be regarded as a 
bad action and the severe sentence itself a worse one. To secure 
equity for the defendant whose family' 
12 
may also suffer by the 
execution of the sentence, and to avoid the violation of the law, 
which entitles the trial judge to pass the sentence as he feels 
appropriate, the only door open to the appellate judges is the 
reversal of the judgement, though it may rank as a bad action. The 
second principle, according to which the appellate judges may 
revoke a conviction when they cannot vary a sentence, is based on 
the tradition: "It is better that a judge may err in awarding 
acquittal than that he may err in awarding punishment". 
1'13 Thus, 
when appellate judges believe that a sentence is too severe, they 
may consequently believe that the trial judge has erred in passing 
such a sentence; that the only remedy open to them is to resort to 
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the reversal of the conviction itself, acquitting the defendant on 
the ground. that acquitting him is, at least, better than punishing 
him unfairly. The third principle, upon which the appellate judges 
may reverse a judgement imposing sentence of ta`zir, is the 
"avertion of udüd by dubious circumstances". This principle is 
operative in the sphere of crimes of hudUd by all Saudi Arabian 
judges; its application to ta`z! r is a controversial matter. 
Judges who believe that the term "hudßd" is confined to those 
crimes whose punishments are fixed by the Shari`a do not apply the 
principle, so far as ba`zir is concerned. On the other hand, the 
judges who have the opinion that the definition of "14udüd1' may, in 
its widest sense, 
114 include all public wrongs may also apply the 
principle to ta`zir. Although the judges who hold this opinion 
represent only a small minority amongst Saudi Arabian judges, some 
appellate judges have adopted the latter definition, especially 
those of the Court of Cassation in Riyadh. By including ta`zir 
in "hudUd" in this respect, these appellate judges extend their 
power over the reversal of all kinds of judgements concerning any 
public wrong. 
115 Thus, the principle of the "avertion of $udüd 
by dubious circumstances" may provide the appellate judges with 
the legal justification which they need to reverse a severe 
judgement with which they disagree, especially if it is based on 
presumptions. 
The third consequence arising from the fact that a sentence 
of ta `zir may not be disposed to variation is the tendency of some 
judges to allude, in their decisions, to wRli al-amr, the King or 
the President of the Council of Ministers, to reduce the sentence, 
or even to pardon the prisoner altogether, since both have the 
11,6 They adopt this measure apparently power to do so. in an 
attempt to prevent the execution of a severe sentence, which they 
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think improper, when they have been unable to find any defective 
element in the evidence or on the face of the record. 
Having dealt with the questions of when to reverse and vary 
a judgement, one may briefly mention that a judgement of a lower 
court has to be affirmed by the appellate court when there is no 
error in law or in fact, and where there is no defect on the face 
of the proceedings below. However, if appellate judges state in 
their decision that they have no lawful grounds to reverse a 
judgement for its severity, 
117 
such a statement is treated as an 
affirmation of the judgement below. 
B. By a semi-judicial tribunal 
Now, we may glance at the grounds on which a decision of a 
semi-judicial tribunal may be reversed or varied. The general 
grounds for the reversal of such a decision are the following: - 
(1) The dismissal of a prima facie claim or charge. 
118 
(2) Illegal judgement. 119 
(3) Excess of jurisdiction. 
120 
(Li) Non-observance of the evidentiary rules. 
121 
(5) Insufficiency of evidence. 
122 
(6) The production of valid new evidence. 
123 
(7) The occurance of a procedural error which may affect 
the judgement124 or prejudice the substantial right of a party. 
125 
As we have seen earlier, a purely technical error does not 
in general cause the reversal of a judgement below by an appellate 
tribunal. Nevertheless, the Appellate Customs Committee and the 
Appellate Customs of Riyadh may reverse a judgement upon an 
informal error. 
126 They consider this error as an element of 
doubt t and 
thereupon they give the defendant the benefit of the 
doubt by reversing the judgement. But the main reason for reversing 
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a judgement on a technical point is probably their desire to 
discipline trial members. Though most of the members of the trial 
Customs committees are not legal experts and they may need to be 
disciplined, one may favour the practice of the Appellate Customs 
Committee of Jeddah, 
127 
which does not reverse a judgement upon a 
purely technical error. Indeed, the reversal of a decision on a 
technical error which is not prejudicial to the substantial right 
of the accused- does not seem in agreement with the aim of the 
legislator to keep law and order. The variation of a sentence is 
only open to a semi-judicial appellate tribunal if the sentence 
below is not within the limits specified by the legislature. 
Unlike a Shy appellate authority, a semi-judicial appellate 
authority cannot vary a sentence on questions of propriety, if 
within the legal limits. 
Where there are no grounds upon which a decision below may 
be reversed or varied, the appellate tribunal must then affirm the 
decision. 
How Appellate Authorities May Exercise Their Power 
When dealing with the question of how a Sharl'a appellate 
authority may exercise its power one must distinguish between an 
ordinary appellate authority, i. e. the Committee of Review, the 
Chief Local Judge in the towns of ; Ii jgz, and the Courts of 
Cassation, and between the supreme appellate authorities, i. e. the 
President of the Judiciary prior to 1970, the Judicial Commission 
of 1970, and the High Judicial Committee. An ordinary appellate 
authority possesses the power to order a new trial by a judge 
other than the one whose decision was reversed upon his refusal to 
reconsider the decision in the light of the remarks made by the 
appellate authority, either to vary or to revoke it. 
128 But it 
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does not have the power to initiate a judgement as a substitute 
for the judgement below. Thus, the rule that "the decision of the 
Court of Cassation ends the case""29 is not operated in cases of 
reversal since such a decision only puts an end to the validity of 
the decision below. However, the decision of the appellate 
authority shall not set aside the original decision in the following 
two circumstances: 
(i) When new admissible evidence supporting the decision 
reversed is produced. 
3° 
(ii) When the case is committed to the supreme appellate 
authority because of delay arising from the difference between the 
ordinary appellate and the trial judge(s), and where the supreme 
authority approves the decision below. 
It is true that a case is brought to an end when the Court 
of Cassation affirms the original decision if appeal thereon , 
does not lie to a supreme appellate authority, but this may be" 
attributed to the fact that the original decision is the one which 
ends the case since the Court of Cassation did not object to it. 
The rule that ". all Shar! 'a courts shall follow the judicial 
instructions of the Court of Cassationt' is equally not applied. In 
practice, trial judges are only obliged to observe such 
instructions in two instances. First, when a technical error, 
which does not affect the judgement, has occurred in the proceedings 
below. In such a case the appellate court sends the decision to 
the original court for remedy. 
131 Second, when the instructions 
regard the transfer of a case to another judge or court after 
the 
appellate court has reversed the judgement. 
As to the supreme appellate authority, one should 
differentiate between its power as a final appellate authority for 
sentences imposing death or mutilation, and its power as an 
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authority which ends the difference between an original and an 
appellate court concerning other sentences. In its capacity as a 
final appellate authority one must examine its power when it was 
represented by the last President of the Judiciary, Shaykh 
Muhammad b. Ibrähim (1959-1969), and as it is now represented by 
other authorities. Shaykh Muhammad had the power to affirm the 
concurring decisions of the original and the appellate courts or 
to affirm either one of them if they were different. 
132 It was 
also within his power to reverse both-of the conformable decisions 
of the original and the appellate courts. Where he reversed both 
decisions he often remitted the case to another court for a fresh 
decision, especially if the case was serious. 
133 Besides this, he 
had the power to decide himself on the subject-matter, but he 
rarely exercised this power. Since he possessed such power, he 
was clearly entitled to quash a conviction. Furthermore, Shaykh- 
Mu1}ammad had the power to arrest a- judgement affirmed by the 
appellate court if he was not quite satisfied with it and if he 
was also unsure of the sentence which ought to have been imposed on 
the prisoner. 
13'' He usually arrested the judgement when the 
sentence imposed death in a case of asäma. 
135 Shaykh Muhammad 
probably justified the suspension of such a sentence by the fact 
that his action was not an infringement of either the private or 
the public right since the defendant was still in custody. The 
convicted party himself would probably not be aggrieved by his 
confinement, since there was still a chance that the capital 
sentence might be commuted or that he might even be pardoned. 
The other supreme appellate authorities may affirm the congruous 
decisions of the original and the appellate court, or may affirm 
either of them if they are different. Additionally, it may 
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reverse both of them if they are corresponding, and in this case 
it should follow the same procedure as that adopted by the Court 
of Cassation; that is to say, order a fresh trial by another 
lower court. Unlike Shaykh Muhammad, this supreme appellate 
authority possesses no power to quash a decision and free the 
prisoner. 
When the supreme appellate authority is acting merely as an 
authority to put an end to the difference between an original court 
and an ordinary appellate one (now the Court of Cassation), it may 
only affirm either the original or the appellate decision. 
136 
The appellate Commercial tribunal, having reversed a decision, 
must remit the decision, with its remarks and instructions thereon, 
to the original tribunal to rectify any error in the decision and 
amend the judgement. If the decision has been committed to the 
appellate tribunal for the second time without its remarks and 
instructions being carried out by the trial tribunal, the former 
must again remit the case to the latter. But if the case is 
brought before the appellate tribunal for the third time and is 
still defective, the tribunal must then form its own opinion on 
the subject-matter of the appeal, and substitute it for the opinion 
of the tribunal below. The, judgement of the appellate tribunal 
may be contrary to, or only-partly different from, the original 
judgement. Since the appellate tribunal has power to reverse the 
judgement below and substitute a fresh judgement for the former, 
if the case has been committed-to it for the third time, it may 
then quash the conviction. The reason why the appellate tribunal 
has the power to decide on the subject-matter of the appeal when 
the decision below has been committed to it three times whilst the 
Court of Cassation (in the Shar! 'a judicial system) has no such 
power, is probably because the former is the ultimate Commercial 
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judicial authority, which has to interfere to prevent an excessive 
delay. 
However, if the case is referred back to the appellate 
tribunal after the trial tribunal has examined the remarks of the 
former and insisted on the legality of its own decision, the 
appellate authority may, if it is convinced, dismiss its 
instructions and affirm the decision below. 
The appellate Customs tribunal, when varying or reversing a 
judgement, must make its own decision on the subject-matter of the 
appeal and substitute it for the judgement below. Although the 
appellate tribunal possesses. the power to quash a conviction, 
137 
it does not have power to remit a decision below to the trial 
court for amendment. The lack of this power is probably the most 
important difference between the appellate Customs committee and 
the Court of Cassation (of the Shari`a judiciary) and the appellate 
Commercial tribunal. Yet, the Appellate Customs Committee of 
Jeddah usually remits a decision below, provided that the error is 
only a technical one which does not affect the judgement. 
The Procedure 
According to the laws and regulations governing the Shari`a 
judiciary, no one, including the parties concerned, is allowed to 
attend the sessions of an appellate court. 
138 However, Article 
25 of the Instructions of 1967 entitles the chief judge to permit 
a person whose appearance is necessary to attend the sessions. 
But, like other laws, these Instructions determine that all the 
proceedings must be in camera with regard to the public or even to 
either party. Hence, a party may only appear if he is to clarify 
a point, or provide a document concerning the case in issue. In 
theory, the appellate authority must receive a party, if necessary, 
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in the same manner followed by the original court; 
139 in other 
words, it should receive him in the presence of his rival when 
that is possible. In practice, the appellate authority may, only 
if necessary, summon a party to appear in the absence of his rival. 
Thus, the secrecy of the proceedings of the appellate tribunal 
necessitates the submission of all material documents concerning 
the appeal which have been specified earlier. Besides, the 
appellate authority may ask the trial judge to clarify a certain 
point concerning his decision, 
1 ° 
and the judge must then respond 
as soon as possible. 
1l1 Moreover, a party may file in a fresh 
relevant document while the case is pending review. However, since 
the appellate proceedings are conducted in camera, and no party is 
allowed. to attend the sessions except for questioning, it is 
superfluous to talk about the possibility of oral argument and 
legal representation in appellate courts. 
Here, one may refer to the mode in which the appellate court 
may examine cases. According to Article 22 of the Law of 1938, all 
the judges had to participate collectively in examining a case 
from the outset of the first session until they awarded their 
decision. The presiding judge had to ask the chief clerk to read 
out all the documents concerning the case in question to enable 
the judges to hear and form their opinions. Documents had to be 
examined by the judges in subsequence as follows: - 
(a) The correspondence regarding appeal sent by the lower 
court or by the High Judicial Authority. 
(b) The decision below represented by sakk. 
(c) The appeal, if a written appeal was served on the 
original court. 
(d) The documents submitted by the parties, whether to the 
trial court or to the appellate court. 
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(e) The record of the case if necessary. 
After each document had been read the judges then made their 
remarks thereon, which had to be recorded by the chief clerk. 
142 
When the documents had been so examined, all the remarks had to 
be studied by all the judges before they finally gave their 
decision. 13 
Nevertheless, since the establishment of the Courts of 
Cassation in 1962, a new method of examining a case has been 
adopted. Cases are distributed equally among judges, including 
the chief judge, 
144 
who study them thoroughly and make their 
remarks. Once a judge has completed the study and made his 
remarks, all judges including the chief judge must meet to examine 
the whole case and the remarks of this judge and give their 
decision. 145 Thus, most of the time of an appellate judge is 
spent in doing solitary reading and writing since the preparatory 
study of the case by one judge takes longer than the final study 
by the whole panel of judges. The new method of examining a case 
Is probably intended to avoid delay, and to cope with the ever 
increasing number of cases committed for review. This new method 
allows the appellate court to deal with several cases at the same 
time, according to the number of its judges, whereas the old 
method would not have allowed the court to deal with more than one 
appeal at a time. 
The question why the appellate court deals with documents, 
and does not rehear the case afresh from the parties concerned, 
is not answered by the judicial authority. Yet, it may be 
thought by some authorities to be unfair to subject a person 
to trial twice for one case. It is true that, after the 
reversal of a judgement, a new judge or court must rehear the case, 
but not every case should be so reheard. In actual fact most of 
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the cases sent for review are not reversed, and accordingly they 
are not reheard. 
Although the supreme appellate authorities follow a similar 
procedure to that followed by ordinary appellate authorities, the 
last President of the Judiciary, Shaykh Muhammad b. Ibrähim, 
adopted a different mode in examining a case on appeal. He 
usually referred it to the members" of the Committee of the 
Presidency of the Judiciary to examine it and give their opinions. 
After he himself had examined the case and studied the opinions 
of the members, he gave his decision. 
The appellate Commercial tribunal and the appellate Customs 
committee follow a similar procedure to that of the Shari`a 
appellate courts when they examine a case on appeal. For example, 
they hold their session in camera and they deal only with documents 
without allowing parties concerned to be present. Nevertheless., 
they may request the appearance of a party, if necessary, to 
clarify a statement in his appeal or to provide relevant data. 
When the appellant members feel that an investigation by experts 
is needed, they take the necessary measure to carry out the 
investigation. 
The Decision 
The ideal decision is that which is unanimously awarded, 
but if the judges do not agree rn ane opinion concerning a judgement 
below, the opinion of the majority is the official decision of the 
appellate court. Where there is no majority but the judges are 
divided equally in their opinions, the head of the judiciary will 
give the "casting opinion". 
146 A dissentient judge must give his 
opinion in writing and mention the legal grounds upon which it is 
based. Although the opinion of the dissentient judge does not 
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carry any weight as far as the decision below is concerned, it 
must be kept by the appellate court. 
47 
Theoretically, the 
decision reversing a judgement must be furnished with the legal 
grounds upon which the decision is based. 
1 8 Thus, one may expect 
such a decision to be carefully drafted, lengthy, and well 
documented, but in practice it is usually not so. In general, the 
decision tends to be in-the form of a rather short statement 
containing general principles and a minimum of supporting 
authorities. -. Where the decision is affirming the original judge- 
ment, even with the existence of a dissenting opinion,, it does not 
usually give reasons or supporting authorities, but it states that 
"after studying the case, the judgement was found authentic and 
that it conformed with the legal principles. 
0 49 
Should the appellate court affirm the judgement, it will then 
send a copy of its decision to the original court and, if the 
judgement is not subject to a further review, the judgement must 
be carried out. Where the appellate court disagrees with the 
judgement below, it must first inform the trial court of its 
opinion and accordingly ask it to vary or revelise the judgement. 
Should the trial court find the opinion of the appellate court 
appropriate, it must then alter its judgement. 
150 Where it 
disagrees with the appellate opinion believing that its judgement 
is proper, or even more appropriate, it may send a memorandum, 
elaborating its opinion and defending its judgement, to the 
appellate court. 
15l The appellate court, having examined the 
memorandum and found it convincing, may reconsider its decision 
and affirm the judgement below. 
152 However, if the appellate court, 
after examining the memorandum, still holds its previous opinion, 
it will then immediately reverse the judgement. 
153 Having reversed 
the judgement, the appellate court must remand the case to another 
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judge or court of the same rank as the judge or the court whose 
judgement was reversed. 
154 The decision taken by the new judge or 
court must also be committed to the appellate court for review. 
155 
However, the appellate court may retract its decision, of which it 
has informed the court below, on two bases. First, when new 
admissible evidence is produced, which necessitates the alteration 
of the appellate decision, whether it was affirming or reversing 
the judgement below. Second, when the trial court has reconsidered 
its judgement, already affirmed, according to certain grounds, 
which the appellate court must believe to be sufficient to change 
the judgement. 
56 According to Article 20 of the Law of 1938, the 
appellate court had to obtain the approval of the King or the head 
of his government in order to be able to change its previous 
decision. Yet, in modern practice, the appellate court does-not 
even inform the King or his government when it wants to replace 
its previous decision by a new one. 
The last President of the Judiciary, Shaykh M4ammad, when 
acting as a supreme appellate authority, used to elaborate his 
decision by stating the most important authorative opinions on the 
subject. He usually issued the decision in the form of a letter 
to the respective authority to be carried out. 
If the members of the appellate Commercial tribunal or the 
appellate Customs committee cannot agree on a single opinion when 
deciding on an appeal, the concurring opinions are considered to be 
the official decision. 
157 This decision must set out the legal 
grounds upon which it-is based and-upon which the decision below 
was reversed or amended. Like Shari`a appellate judges, the 
members of an appellate Commercial or Customs tribunal may change 
their decision when new evidence is produced. 
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Delay 
Article 24 of the Law of 1931 determined that the period of 
reviewing a case must not exceed one month. Article 86 of the 
Law of 1936 and Article 145 of the Law of 1952 resolved that the 
maximum period had to be only twenty days. Article 25 of the 
Instructions of 1962, and Article 27 of the Instructions of 1967, 
which are now in force, resort to the one-month period which was 
fixed by the Law of 1931. However, even in one month the appellate- 
court may not always be able to deal with an appeal. In actual 
practice an appeal may await examination for a longer time than 
that prescribed. This delay may be attributed mainly to the 
following reasons: 
(a) The review of cases is not always made in the order of 
their arrival. Cases concerning detainees are to be given priority 
in this respect over other cases. 
158 The review of other cases 
may accordingly take longer than one month. Moreover, criminal 
cases, even if they do not involve detention, have priority over 
civil ones, 
159 
and this may cause an excessive delay as to the 
latter. 
(b) The appellate court may, at any stage, postpone the 
review of a decision on lack of sufficient information or for a 
necessary extensive investigation. 
16o Although the period allowed 
for such a postponement is a maximum of thirty days, this period 
may elapse before the examination of the case under review has been 
resumed. This fact may explain why the Instructions of 1967161 do 
not fix a specific time for the postponement, but they leave it to 
the appellate court to decide. However, this opens the door for a 
postponement even longer than thirty days. 
(c) Before 1963, the appellate court had to make its contact 
with courts below through the High Judicial Authority, and this 
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resulted in unnecessary delay. In spite of the fact that the 
appellate court has been making direct contact with the lower courts 
since 1963, any contact concerning a sentence imposing death or 
mutilation must be made via the High Judicial Authority. 
162 
Although Article 4 of the Instructions of 1962 states that the 
High Judicial Authority shall not examine correspondence and 
documents concerning such a contact, the President of the Judiciary, 
for example, used to examine them. When one bears in mind that 
the President of the Judiciary had many activities and functions, 
one feels that a delay was bound to occur. 
(d) When a judgement below is reversed after the trial 
court has refrained from 
opinion of the appellate 
reheard by another-lower 
the appellate court, the 
the trial judge, the reh, 
altering its decision, to comply with the 
court, the whole case will then be 
court. 
163- The examination of the case by 
argument between the appellate judges and 
Baring of the case, and the committal of 
the new decision below to the appellate court for review 
164 
may 
result in an excessive delay. 
(e) The appellate court (now the Court of Cassation) is not 
divided into several divisions each handling a specific type of 
case. 
Delay is also bound to occur when a case is committed to the 
supreme appellate authorities, especially the High Judicial 
Committee which is operating now, for the following reasons: 
(a) The High Judicial Committee, as mentioned above, 
generally follows the procedure adopted by the ordinary appellate 
authority (now the Court of Cassation), and most of the reasons 
causing delay there are bound to occur in the procedure of the 
High Judicial Committee. 
(b) Since the supreme judicial authority must review the 
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most serious cases, i. e. those involving mutilation or death as 
punishment, or cases which have been the subject of a long dialogue 
between the ordinary appellate judges and the trial judges, this 
authority must examine such cases thoroughly. Indeed, it has to 
examine all the documents pertaining to the case in issue including 
the records and the original and appellate decisions. It may also 
exchange memoranda with the courts. This procedure suggests that 
delay may be inevitable. 
(c) The fact that cases and all correspondence between the 
supreme appellate authority, i. e. the High Judicial Committee, and 
courts below must go through the Ministry of Justice165 creates 
unnecessary delay. 
The delay in the proceedings of the semi-judicial appellate 
tribunals is liable to be greater than in the proceedings of the 
Shar31a appellate authorities. This is because the members of the 
semi-judicial appellate tribunals work part time, and for 
comparatively shorter office hours. 
Automatic Appeal 
A judgement which is automatically committed to a SharT`a 
appellate court is to be reviewed in the same way as a judgement 
subject to ordinary review. Hence there is no need to mention the 
review of a judgement subject to automatic appeal. However, we 
shall briefly deal with the automatic review accorded to the High 
Authority (al-MagAm al-Sämi), who is in this respect the President 
of the Council of Ministers, against the decisions of some semi- 
judicial tribunals. These are the Grievances Board, the Bribery 
Committee, and the Forgery Committee. 
166 We shall also refer to 
the automatic review vested in the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry in respect of both the decisions of the Committee for 
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Securities and the Committee for Applying the Penalties Prescribed 
in the Law of Weights and Measures, and the Law of Commercial 
Agencies. Additionally, we will glance at the automatic review 
vested in the Minister of Finance concerning the decisions of 
appellate Customs committees.. 
(1) Soon after the decision of any of these semi-judicial 
tribunals has been awarded, it must be sent for review without 
notifying the party concerned. Having examined the decision and 
found it appropriate, the High Authority will then confirm it and 
notify the parties, and order the respective authority to carry it 
out. But if the High Authority is not satisfied with the decision 
because of a substantive or even a technical error he may take one 
of two courses. First, he may make his remarks and remit them with 
the decision to the original tribunal to amend it accordingly. 
Second, he may refer the decision to one or more of the legal 
advisors of the Council of Ministers to look into it very closely 
before-he remits the decision to the original tribunal. Having 
received the remarks of the High Authority, the trial tribunal must 
then study these remarks and examine its decision again. Where it 
agrees with the remarks it must accordingly amend its decision. 
But if the trial tribunal does not agree with the opinion of the 
High Authority, it will inform the latter that it believes that 
the original decision is proper. The trial tribunal is under no 
obligation to carry out the remarks or the instructions of the 
High Authority in as far as judgements are concerned. Where the 
trial tribunal insists on its opinion, the High Authority himself 
may not decide on the subject-matter, although his decision can 
finalise the case, but he may refer the case to the Council of 
Ministers as quite frequently happens. The Council of Ministers 
will then examine the case and decide on its merits. However, 
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neither parties nor witnesses will be called in this stage of 
review, but the High Authority or the Council of Ministers, if 
the case is referred thereto, will only deal with the documents 
pertaining to the case 
167 
(2) The appellate function of the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry was assumed, as mentioned earlier, after the Reviewing 
Committee had been abolished in l3aa/1969. The Commercial trial 
tribunal, having given its decision, must commit it to the 
Minister to decide whether it is conformable to the legal 
provisions. The Minister, when reviewing a decision, will not see. 
a party who feels aggrieved by the decision below. Yet the party 
may submit an appeal thereon which must be examined by the Minister 
on the condition that this party serves it within the prescribed 
period for appeal. The Minister, having examined the decision, 
usually refers it to one or more of the legal advisors of his 
ministry for close study and thereafter the whole case is committed 
to him. If the decision below seems to be just, he is to affirm 
it. But if he objects to the decision for any reason, he will 
remit it together with his remarks to the trial committee to 
observe the remarks and alter the decision accordingly. Where 
the remarks concern technical points, the trial committee usually 
observes them; but if they concern the substance of the decision, 
and the committee disagrees with the opinion of the Minister, the 
committee will insist on its decision. In this case, the Minister, 
not having reconsidered his opinion, will finalise the case by 
deciding on the subject-matter. 
168 
(3) The Minister of Finance is to review any decision made 
by the appellate Customs committees by means of examining only the 
decision, but he may, if necessary, request the committal of all 
relevant documents to him. The usual practice is that the Minister 
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will not call a party or a witness, but only decide according to 
the relevant documents. The Minister of Finance examines the 
decision in a similar way to that in which the High Authority and 
the Minister of Commerce and Industry examine the decisions 
reviewable by them. This means that the Minister of Finance may 
decide immediately on the decision cr refer it first to some of his 
legal advisors before he gives his final decision. 
169 
Prerogative Proceedings 
In the absence of the availability of appeal against 
proceedings or a decision, a party can seek further consideration 
of his case only by a complaint, probably in the form of a 
grievance, either to the High Authority or to the High Judicial 
Authority. Such a complaint can be made only by a private party, 
and not by a party who represents the community, such as the Public 
Prosecutor. Although the High Authority tends to give considera- 
tion to any complaint, except when it regards a case pending trial, 
the High Judicial Authority does not accept the complaint unless. 
it challenges, on good grounds, the malfunctioning of the machinery 
of the court. 
Where a complaint made to the High Authority lies against 
the decision of a Sharl'a court, this Authority usually refers it 
to the High Judicial Authority to deal withitinthe way it deems 
appropriate. 
170 But the High Authority may occasionally refer it 
directly to any Shari` a authority, 
171 
or order the formation of a 
Sharl'a judicial commission, 
172 to examine the case. Where the 
complaint is directed against the decision of a semi-judicial 
tribunal, it will be decided on by the High Authority himself, 
after having consulted the experts, or by the Council of Ministers, 
if the tribunal below insisted on its own opinion. 
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The High Judicial Authority may itself decide on the complaint-or 
remit it either to an appellate or to an original court. It may 
also set up a special Shari`a commission to deal with the 
question. 
173 
Generally, this type of complaint occurs when the complainant 
genuinely thinks that the court has failed to exercise its 
jurisdiction judicially. Yet, some persons have used it, 
especially when complaining to the High Authority, to delay the 
execution of a judgement which is not in their favour. Apparently, 
they are encouraged by the fact that they are not liable to any 
physical or monetary punitive measure at the first complaint. 
When the complaint is accepted, an examination of the case 
will be ordered. The order may, for simplication, be classified 
as follows: 
(1) an order made when the court has refused to examine the 
case of the complainant, which is within its jurisdiction, or when 
it appears that the court has neglected it in such a way as to 
amount to refusal. This order is similar to "mandamus" in English 
Law. 
(2) An order made where: - 
(a) a court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not 
possess. However, this order, if it exists in practice, would be 
very rare. 
(b) There has been a defect on the face of the proceedings, 
and this is the most common order. 
(c) A conviction has been awarded fraudently. Such an 
order is not a common one. 
Apparently, orders of this category are similar to 
"certiorari" in English law. 
(3) An order given to restrain a court from proceedings 
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when it is exceeding its jurisdiction, or when it purports to have 
failed to act judicially. This order is the equivalent of the 
English "prohibition". It is usually made only by the High 
Judicial Authority. If, and this is extremely seldom, the High 
Authority accepts a complaint in this respect, he refers it to 
the High Judicial Authority. This may be attributed to the fact 
that the High Authority does not interfere in judicial trials. 174 
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Appreciation of the System of Judicial Proceedings 
Judicial procedure in the Saudi Arabian legal system has 
been the subject of much criticism. Some writers claim that 
it is rigid and shamefully inefficient. Others maintain that 
criminal as well as civil proceedings are inconsistent and at 
variance with the needs of this century, and that judicial 
reform is long overdue. In our view, this criticism is largely 
unjustifiable and stems from a lack of appreciation of the 
historical and constitutional background of the Saudi Arabian 
legal system. A common assumption is. that Saudi Arabian courts 
conduct their proceedings literally in the manner laid down in 
the works of the classical Muslim jurists and in accordance 
with fixed and rigid rules. This is a grave misconception, for 
the classical jurists themselves determined most of the rules 
of procedure according to the needs of their time. At the present 
time, even strict Muslim jurists maintain that most procedural 
rules are not set out in a rigid manner by the Shar3`a, and 
that therefore these rules can be adapted to changing circum- 
stances. As we have seen, Saudi Arabian courts apply procedural 
rules which are, to a large extent,, different from those held 
by the classical jurists, and this indicates the steady evolution 
which has been already achieved. 
In this study, an attempt has been made at an objective 
and critical analysis of criminal procedure in the Saudi 
Arabian legal system, with the object of making a comprehensive 
assessment of its merits and demerits. As we have seen, the 
absolute independence of the judiciary is established beyond 
doubt. This basic fact, together with the supremacy of the 
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principles of the Shari'a constitute, in our opinion, its 
greatest strength. We have seen that both parties enjoy full 
equality before the law and are given the right to prove their 
claims and counter-claims in the full meaning of the term. An 
accused is considered innocent until proven guilty. Most 
cases are liable to appeal to assure a party who feels aggrieved 
that his case will be examined by more than one court of 
different degree. Judges use their discretion in applying 
equity in making their decisions. The process of justice is 
easily accessible to all. If a party makes a false accusation 
or claim, he is liable to pay the cost incurred by the other 
party, and to punishment. A party who loses his case, whether 
in an original or appellate court, is not liable to pay any 
cost to the court. The reason for this is that justice must 
be available freely for every one. Generally speaking, cases 
are handled speedily and efficiently, especially in the Shari'a 
courts, which constitute the main part of the judiciary. 
Although the Saudi Arabian judiciary, especially the 
Shari'a courts, has, on the whole, succeeded in rendering 
justice in the ever-increasing number of cases, there are certain 
aspects and rules of procedure which are open to criticism, 
and which we shall deal with briefly here. 
(1) The Semi-Judicial Tribunals. As we have seen the 
semi-judicial tribunals which exist beside the formal judiciary 
are generally unstable, and lack the experience and the 
efficiency which the Sharl'a courts have. Some of them 
administer their trials in a manner similar to investigation. 
Their members do not have the judicial* immunity enjoyed by the 
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Sharl'a judges. This immunity is essential for guaranteeing 
impartiality. While not wishing to reflect on the impartiality 
of these tribunals, we must emphasize that, where there is no 
judicial immunity, there is always the possibility of being 
influenced by the executive authority. 
The existence of the semi-judicial tribunals has resulted 
in overburdening certain executive officials and authorities, 
who are supposed to concentrate only on their original duties. 
As we have seen, the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, 
the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and the Minister of 
Finance all act as appellate authorities for certain semi- 
judicial tribunals. 
The semi-judicial tribunals are overshadowed by the 
Sharl'a judiciary, which has general jurisdiction. This fact 
has resulted in neutralizing these tribunals whenever a case 
is brought before a Sharl'a court. If a semi-judicial tribunal 
insisted on deciding a case which lies within its competence, 
its action could lead to conflict with the Sharl'a courts, and 
this in turn could result in serious delay. We may conclude 
that the semi-judicial tribunals should be integrated into the 
Sharl'a judiciary, the formal judiciary in Saudi Arabia. 
(2) Interrogation and Preliminary Investigation. Hitherto, 
it has been difficult to draw a distinction between interro- 
gation, the inquiry for establishing the suspicion, and the 
preliminary investigation, the inquiry for establishing the 
accusation, since both are conducted by the police. Experience 
has shown that the police are usually inclined to establish 
the accusation of a suspect somewhat too readily, and this is 
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a sufficient reason to withdraw the power of the inquiry for 
establishing the accusation from the police and to entrust it 
to another authority, which must at least be semi-judicial. 
The police must conduct only the interrogation. But they 
should handle their inquiry without judicial interference since 
they are performing only an administrative task. It is true 
that the prospective judicial law, the Draft Law of the Judicial 
Authority, provides for the withdrawal of preliminary investi- 
gation from the police and for its allocation instead to a 
semi-judicial authority called "al-Niyäba al-`Amma'n, i. e. the 
"Public Prosecution". However, this law has not yet been 
enforced, and even if it were, the complete and effective 
withdrawal of preliminary investigation from the police will 
probably not be easily achieved. Indeed, the prospective law 
itself says nothing concerning the way in which the "Public 
Prosecution"is to administer investigation. It plainly mentions 
that this authority shall function in accordance with a law 
which is yet to be promulgated, the "Law of Criminal Procedure". 
The last indication is that some years may pass before its 
promulgation. As we have seen under "Evidence", the judges 
often do not receive the minutes of the police. If these 
minutes were prepared by a judicial or even semi-judicial 
authority, the judges would be likely to accept them, as they 
usually receive evidence given before another court or before 
the examining magistrates of the Grievances Board. Thus, it is 
important that preliminary investigation must be entrusted to an 
authority other than an administrative one without delay. 
Assuming that the 'Public Prosecution" will soon be 
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entrusted with pursuing the investigation, we still believe 
that this is not the appropriate authority for performing this 
function. This is not to suggest that this authority will 
be unfair to the accused since it is also the authority which 
will prosecute him; but since it will be on the side of the 
prosecution, it may be inclined to see things from the point of 
view of that side exclusively. This possibility leads us to 
the conclusion that the preliminary investigation in a case and 
the decision to prosecute the accused must be undertaken by a 
judicial authority. This does not mean that the court itself 
should perform this task, but that it should be entrusted to a 
judicial officer or magistrate. 
(3) The Bail System. There is no comprehensive bail 
system in Saudi Arabia. While bail is fully recognized in 
civil cases, 
1 it is not so in criminal cases. In 1938 the 
Presidency of the Judiciary held that bail was not acceptable 
in hudüd, retaliation, and in ta`zir. But the Presidency did not 
object to bail if it concerned only minor offences. 
2 This 
kind of bail was granted to the accused by executive authori- 
ties, the police, or the administrative governor. 
In 1961 the Council of Ministers3 decided that a person 
accused of committing a non-serious crime had the right to 
demand release on bail; and that if he had to be detained for 
completing the investigation, he must not be detained for more 
than three days. But not every accused can afford to be 
bailed out for three reasons. (a) The bail in a crime must be 
a personal appearance bail (Kafäla hudüriyya); that is to say, 
someone must sign a written pledge to produce the accused if 
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the police demand his appearance. Should the bailsman fail to 
do so, he may suffer serious consequences - including 
imprisonment. " (b) The country is so vast, and the communi- 
cations in some rural areas are so poor that the accused may 
not be easily able to contact a relative or a friend who may 
stand bail for him. (c) The principle of "habeas corpus", 
which could be used to challenge the refusal of bail, is 
unknown to the Saudi Arabian judiciary. 
It is true that there are three factors which to some 
extent may mitigate the lack of a comprehensive bail system. 
(i) The law and practice give priority to the hearing of a case 
involving a detained person. 
5 (ii) The courts usually insure a 
speedily handling of cases. (iii) The term which the defendant 
served in custody is counted as part of the sentence. However, 
the fact that even non-serious crimes may be referred to courts 
by administrative governors may seriously delay the prosecution. 
Statistics show that there has been a considerable number of 
cases where the defendants were kept in custody for a longer 
duration than their jail sentences. 
6 
With regard to the second factor, it may be argued that 
the speedy handling of a case cannot always be effective as far 
as detention is concerned, since most cases are appealable, and 
since neither the original court nor the appellate court will 
grant the defendant bail. Indeed, in 1939 the Council of 
Deputies7 decided that the trial court must order the release 
of the defendant as soon as it realized that he was innocent, 
even if the decision was liable to appeal. In 1940, the 
Director of Public Security, 
8 
when countering criticism of 
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conditions in prisons, claimed that no one could be confined 
without the order of the court. In 1971 the Ministry of 
Justice9 issued a regulation determining that the court must 
order the release of the defendant as soon as it concluded 
that he was innocent. However, the practice shows that the 
courts, whether original or appellate, do not usually order the 
release of the defendants in serious cases, even after they 
have been acquitted. If it happens that the court orders the 
release of a defendant, the police cannot release him unless 
the administrative governor or the Ministry of the Interior 
agrees, even if the case is not serious. 
10 
Concerning the third factor, it may be argued that not 
every accused is found guilty, and not every guilty person is 
sentenced to imprisonment. Moreover, if the sentence was 
imprisonment it could be for a term shorter than that which the 
prisoner may have served in custody. 
From all that has been said, it is clear that a bail 
reform is urgently needed. The question is whether it is 
possible to adopt a somewhat comprehensive bail system without 
violating the Sharl'a. The reason why the judges do not grant 
bail to a detained person is that corporal punishment or 
imprisonment must not be inflicted on the bailsman if the 
defendant failed to appear. 
i 1 However, the vast majority of 
crimes come under ta`zir, whose penalty can be monetary as well 
as corporal or imprisonment. Where the punishment is monetary, 
there should be no objection to bail in the same way as in 
civil cases. The Sharl'a is concerned only in carrying out the 
punishment which the accused deserves. Whenever it is possible 
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to secure the appearance of the offender, there is no objection 
to bail in the principles of the Shari`a. But it is suggested 
that bail should not be granted in serious crimes. In other 
crimes there seems to be no reason for not granting bail even 
if the sentence is corporal or imprisonment, since it is 
unlikely that the defendant will have any advantage in failing 
to appear before the law. 
In any reform of the bail system in Saudi Arabia, the 
principles of equity and the presumptions of innocence, as well 
as the practical circumstances of society must be given maximum 
consideration. Another important suggestion may be the adoption 
of the principle of "habeas corpus" not only with regard to 
bail but to all kinds of confinement. 
(4) Legal Representation. In Chapter Four, we have seen 
that the SharT'a judiciary does not allow legal representation 
in criminal proceedings, and this fact has resulted in the lack 
of a well-organized legal profession in Saudi Arabia. The 
judiciary has, in practice, succeeded in performing speedy and 
fair trials by avoiding the usual dramatic and lengthy speeches 
and arguments offered by lawyers., This fact is evident to 
persons who have come into contact with the Saudi Arabian 
practice. On the other hand, it may be argued that professional 
representation may speed up the court process. Indeed, a 
lawyer can be an important help to the court in excluding 
irrelevant material, and to his client in offering appropriate 
legal advice. In view of the active role of the Saudi Arabian 
judge in conducting the trial in general, and the cross- 
examination in particular, and his power in dismissing a lawyer 
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who does not behave properly, there seems to be no genuine 
objection to widening the scope of legal representation. 
However, the time has come for the Saudi Arabian law to adopt 
a comprehensive system in which the responsibility, the 
qualification, and the functions of advocates should be defined. 
(5) Rules Concerning Evidence. Certain rules of evidence 
do not seem to be adequate, and there is need for reform in 
this field. 
We have seen that the party concerned must cause his 
witnesses to be present in the court. The cost is incurred by 
the witnesses themselves or by the party for whom they are 
testifying. Since the Saudi Arabian law excludes the idea that 
it is the losing party who is to pay legal costs, we may 
suggest that it would be in the interest of justice if the 
legal costs of witnesses were paid through some system of 
"legal aid", especially if the party is indigent. 
Now we consider the rule concerning the "probity of 
witnesses". Some judges apply this rule so strictly that the 
evidence of people who do not possess fairly high standards of 
religion, morality, and dignity may not be received as conc- 
lusive evidence. Others are not so strict in applying the rule 
of "probity" arguing that it would lead to the exclusion of the 
testimony of a large number of people, and therefore to the 
acquittal of many offenders, and the waiver of the rights of 
others. Some early Muslim jurists had advocated this view 
before. Ibn Taymiyya, for example, maintained that the standard 
of "probity must be according to the circumstances of the 
time. "12 However, the fact that people are becoming somewhat 
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less religious, and that the standards of morality and dignity 
differ from time to time and from culture to culture, requires 
a degree of flexibility in the standard of "probity". 
Next we consider the evidence of women in criminal 
proceedings. There is no space to mention the legal opinions 
of jurists on this matter. Briefly, the main reasons for not 
accepting evidence given by women as conclusive testimony 
proceedings are four: (i) that women are 
generally forgetful; (ii) that they do not usually participate 
in public life, and this makes it rare for them to witness 
actions constituting crimes; '(iii) that they may be dominated 
by men; (iv) that they are more emotional than men. 
That there is no basic difference between the memory of a 
man and that of a woman is a fact proved by modern science, 
psychology, and common sense. As to the second reason, it may 
be said that, with the spread of modern education for girls in 
Saudi Arabia, women will sooner or later find themselves taking 
a greater part in public life. That women may be dominated by 
men, and that they are naturally more emotional than them may be 
true to a certain degree. But these two reasons are not 
sufficient for disregarding the evidence of women as conclusive 
testimony. Some Muslim jurists, such as Ibn Hazm, 
13 
accepted 
the testimony of women even in proceedings regarding hudUd or 
retaliation; that is to say, the acceptance of such evidence 
was a matter of controversy. The jurists who disregarded the 
evidence of women in criminal proceedings accepted it in 
personal matters concerning women. They accepted the testimony 
of one woman, while they held that the evidence of one man was 
- 277 - 
not sufficient to prove even ta'zir. There is no reason why 
the evidence of women concerning a criminal act which was 
committed exclusively in their presence should not be similarly 
accepted. Our conclusion is that the evidence of women should 
be made acceptable, especially in ta`zir. 
As we have seen, in gasäma (repeated oaths) the heirs of 
the deceased must take the oaths required to commit the defendant 
to capital punishment. But even with the existence of lawth 
(incriminating circumstances), it does not seem fair that the 
heirs can swear that the defendant has intentionally caused 
the death of the deceased, whereas they did not witness the 
alleged murder. This fact caused many jurists to allocate the 
oaths to the defendant. It has also caused the supreme appellate 
authorities to take the greatest care and caution before 
affirming sentences of aasäma when the oaths were sworn by the 
relatives of the deceased. This was apparent during Shaykh 
Muhammad b. Ibrähim's office, who withheld such sentences in 
the hope that some extenuating circumstances might have risen. 
Equally, if the oaths are to be taken by the defendant, it is 
not just to acquit him on his own oaths with the existence of 
incriminating circumstances. This fact caused some jurists to 
challenge the validity of Qasäma as a whole. Others argued 
that neither the Prophet nor his Caliphs applied gasäma, and 
that it was first applied by the Umayyad Caliph Mu`äwiya b. 
Abi Sufyän (d. 680). 
14 Our own conclusion is that nasUma is 
not practical, and its application is not precisely determined 
by the Shar'l' a. 
(6) Delay in Appeal. We would like to make the following 
suggestions with a view to reduce delay in the stage of appeal. 
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First, it is suggested that the correspondent not only 
be duly notified of his rival's appeal but also given a copy of 
the appeal, if a written appeal has been made, in order to 
enable him to submit a counter-statement. Besides being just, 
this may help the appellate judges in coming to their decision 
more speedily. 
As we have seen, when the Court of Cassation disagrees 
with the decision below, it informs the trial court of its 
opinion, requesting the alteration of the decision according to 
its remarks and instructions. But the trial judge can insist on 
his own decision if he still believes that it is proper. Since 
the Court of Cassation does not have the power to make a 
decision of its own and substitute it for the original decision, 
it can only demand that the case be reheard by a new judge or 
court. The new decision is also subject to the review of the 
Court of Cassation exactly in the same way as the first one. 
It is then possible that the case may continue to travel 
between the original courts and the Court of Cassation, until 
the supreme judicial authority interferes. Although it is 
appreciated that the trial judge be at complete liberty to 
determine the judgment which he feels appropriate, it is on the 
other hand necessary to end the case as quickly as possible. 
The trial court's disputing of the decision of the appellate 
court would lead to serious delay in some cases. It is 
suggested here that the Court of Cassation be also granted 
power to decide on the merits of the case when a delay is 
liable to occur. 
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Possible Future Developments 
One of the developments which will take place when the 
Draft Law of the Judicial Authority comes into force will be 
the creation of the "Public Prosecution", as a department 
attached to the Ministry of Justice. The Department of "Public 
Prosecution" will consist of the Attorney General, whose office 
is in Riyadh, the Assistant- Attorney Generals, the Chief Public 
Prosecutors, and the Deputy Public Prosecutors, whose number 
will be determined according to need. 
The "Public Prosecution" will undertake the preliminary 
investigation in criminal cases. It will initiate and pursue 
prosecutions regarding the crimes of the public right. It 
will act as a litigant on behalf of Bayt al-Mal and incompetent 
persons, and for the interest of endowments (warf). It will 
also supervise and inspect prisons, listen to complaints by 
prisoners, and take appropriate measures to release detained 
persons or prisoners whose confinement does not seem to be 
legal. 
The members of the "Public Prosecution" must have the same 
qualifications as judges, and therefore they enjoy most of the 
priveleges of judges. Problems concerning the functions of 
the "Public Prosecution" which do not fall within, the competence 
of the High Judicial Council are to be handled by a special 
council comprised of the Minister of Justice, as president, 
and the Deputy Minister of Justice, the Attorney General, and 
two judges of the Court of Cassation, as members. 
15 These 
privileges and immunities are accorded to the members of the 
"Public Prosecution" in order to enable them to be independent 
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of the executive. 
The assignment of a large part of the functions of the 
police to the "Public Prosecution" may lead to conflict 
between these two authorities, at least in an early stage of 
the enforcement of the new law. Such conflict may in turn give 
rise to serious delay in the prosecution. However, the public 
prosecutors are meant to be highly educated and experienced, 
and this will be useful in excluding irrelevant material. The 
prosecution of minor cases can be left to the police, with the 
object of avoiding unnecessary delay. 
The Draft Law of the Judicial Authority will change, to a 
considerable degree, the structure of the administration of 
Justice. The most important change will be the creation of 
The High Judicial Council. (Majlis al-Qaqa' al-`Ali). This 
council will have competence to: 
(a) Issue rulings on questions referred to it by the 
King or the President of the Council of Ministers. 
(b) Find solutions to legal problems referred to it by 
the Minister of Justice. 
(c) Decide on any conflict between the courts and the 
"Public Prosecution", if referred to it by the Minister of 
Justice. 
(d) Review sentences imposing death or mutilation, in 
its capacity as the final judicial authority. 
The Council will comprise two boards - the Permanent 
Board (al-Hay' a al-Dä' ima) , which will consist CC five full-time 
members, and the General Board (al-Hay'a al-`Amma), which will 
consist of the members of the Permanent Board, two chief judges 
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of courts of first instance, the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Cassation or his Deputy, the Deputy Minister of Justice, the 
Public Prosecutor, and the Minister of Justice, acting as the 
President of the Board. The Permanent Board is more active 
than the General Board which only meets when the Council is 
to give solutions to a legal problem referred by the Minister 
of Justice. 
16 The judicial power of the Council is similar to 
that of the President of the Judiciary, and to the High 
Judicial Committee, which now functions as the supreme appellate 
authority, and which will cease to exist when the Council 
starts to function. The Minister of Justice was accorded the 
power of the last President of the Judiciary, Shaykh Muhammad, 
but it is clear that the Minister will not possess such power. 
Since the Minister of Justice is a member of the cabinet, it is 
only appropriate that his power should be limited. 
The Draft Law of the Judicial Authority amalgamates the 
two Courts of Cassation into one court, whose seat will be 
Riyadh. The new Court of Cassation will consist of three 
divisions, one of which will be criminal. The number of the 
judges will be determined according to need. An appeal is 
examined by three judges unless it concerns a sentence of death 
or mutilation, where it is to be reviewed by five judges. 
17 
As to the lower courts, the change is also considerable. 
There will be only two classes of courts, Public Courts 
(Mal kim `Xmma), and Summary Courts (Mahäkim Juz'iyya). The 
Law does not specify the jurisdiction of each class. It states 
that this is to be determined by a decision of the Minister of 
Justice upon the recommendation of the High Judicial Council. 
18 
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In other words, the present lower courts will continue to 
function for some time after the enforcement of the new law. 
Judging by experience, a considerable time may pass before the 
Public Courts and the Summary Courts begin to function. 
Another important development is the creation of the 
"Department of Legal Research" (al-Idära al-Fanniyya li al- 
Bu 4th) , which is to be attached to the Ministry of Justice. 
The functions. of this department will include the following 
tasks: - 
(a) The selection and classification of legal principles 
derived from the decisions of the Court of Cassation and the 
High Judicial Council. 
(b) The preparation of these selected decisions for 
publication. 
(c) The undertaking of legal research required by the 
Minister of Justice. 
(d) Answering questions raised by the judges. 
(e) The study of the legal principles according to which 
Sharl'a judges give their judgments, in order to assure 
conformity with justice and to commit them to the High Judicial 
Council for approval. 
19 
. 
Although an attempt in 1927 to publish judicial decisions 
and codify the body of laws20 was unsuccessful, it seems that 
the "Department of Legal Research" will function as planned 
since its creation comes as a result of a natural process of 
legal development. In this way, the application of the Law-of 
the Judicial Authority will give rise to the publication of 
judicial reports consisting of selected cases, which will be 
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of great value to judges, lawyers, the members of the prospec- 
tive "Public Prosecution", researchers, and all interested 
persons. Although 'precedents' in substantive law are not in 
theory a source of law, they may be so in practice. In actual 
fact, the reference to certain authorities or the mere 
adherence to a specific school of law, by a judge, is in a way 
a recognition of 'precedents'. A judge may find that the 
solution of a problem in the decision of another judge is more 
applicable than that stated by a jurist who lived in a different 
age. Since there is no objection to reference to precedents 
regarding procedural rules, with the exception of certain 
evidenciary rules, precedents will be useful in replacing any 
procedural shortcomings. 
The enforcement of the prospective law will mark the 
beginning of the decline of the supremacy of the Hanball law, 
and the adoption of a broader approach, probably within the 
Sunni concept at first, to legal problems, which Saudi Arabia 
has not known. The principle of "i tihäd", or the giving of 
independent legal opinion, will provide justification for this 
new legal approach against possible objection by conservative 
elements. Eventually, a fairly comprehensive legal codification 
will emerge in Saudi Arabia. 
The publication of selected cases giving access to 
precedents and codification will all lead to a departure from 
total reliance on Hanball authorities. It has been suggested 
by some legal experts that the application of the Law of the 
Judicial Authority would lead to the integration of the semi- 
judicial tribunals into Shari'aa Judiciary. Such integration 
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does not seem to be particularly intended by the legislature. 
This law, contrary to other preceding judicial laws, recognizes 
the competence of the semi-judicial tribunals. 
21 
Any further legal development must evolve through natural 
processes and after deliberate and conscious review, and not 
through hasty and ill considered imitation of the laws of 
other countries with a different culture and way of life. 
The Saudi Arabian legislature should always give full consi- 
deration to the cultural, social, and economic circumstances of 
the country, with due regard to its unique position as the 
spiritual centre of the Islamic World. 
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GLOSSARY 
of Arabic Legal Terms Appearing in the Text 
`adala : the probity which a witness must possess. 
`adl (pl. `udül) : (a witness) of probity. 
amir : governor. 
al-amp bi al-ma`rüf wa 
al-nahy `an al-munkar : enjoining the right and forbidding 
the wrong. 
arsh : compensation for bodily injury. 
`aýaba : agnate. 
ashhad I testify. 
barä'a : innocence. 
Bayt al-Mä1 : Traditionally: the public treasury. In Saudi 
Arabian usage, the authorities guarding the 
rights of absentees and minors without guardian 
or relatives. 
da'wa Zhayr muharrara ': non-preponderant claim or charge. 
dustUr : constitution. 
fatwä : legal opinion. 
figh : jurisprudence. 
al-furU' : subsidiary issues. 
, hayr `adl : (a witness) without probity. 
hayr muhgan : legally competent person who has never been 
married. 
hadd (pl. udüd) : crime with fixed punishment. 
1adith da`if : weak tradition. 
hadith gahih : authentic tradition. 
hagq al- ` abd : human right. 
hagq Alläh : Divine Right. 
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haqq `ämm : public right. 
hagq khäýý : private right. 
hijra (pl. hijar) : settlement. 
hiräba : highway robbery. 
hisba : anticipation of God's reward in the hereafter. 
ijmä` : consensus. 
i jtihäd : individual legal opinion. 
ijära : lease. 
imam : religious leader. 
istikhläf request from the trial court made to another 
court to carry out the hearing of testimony in 
its place. 
al-jarh wa al-ta`dil : attacking and establishing the probity 
of a witness. 
kafäla 1 uciIriyya : personal appearance bail. 
Kätib al-'Adl : Public Notary. 
khibra : finding of experts. 
1V iha al-i`tiräd : statement of appeal. 
lawth : the existence of incriminating circumstances. 
li`än : oaths of condemnation. 
majlis : council. 
mahkama : court. 
Al-Magäm al-Säm3 : High Authority. 
magdhüf : offended party in a case of defamation. 
marri : tracer of footsteps. (Originally: a member of the 
tribe of 'gal-Murra'", who are experts on this. 
al-masälih al-mursala : general welfare. 
maZUlim : grievances. 
mu`äyana : inspection. 
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muEhtäl : treacherous murderer. 
muhaddir (pl. Muhaddirün) : summoner. 
muhsan : legally competent person who has been married. 
muhtasib (pl. muhtasibi'zn) : person who looks after the public 
interest. 
mujtahid (pl. mujtahiäün) : jurist qualified to' make individual 
legal opinion (i1tih9d) 
mumayyiz : minor who knows reasonably the consequences of his 
action (usually of at least seven years of age). 
musäq-aa : crop sharing. 
nakala : refrain. 
niýäm (pl. nuzum) : legislation, law, or. 
_regulation. 
gäbila : nurse or midwife. 
qadhf : defamation. 
gädi : judge. 
gasäma : repeated oaths. 
gas969 al-athar : tracer of footsteps. 
qaý' al-Variq : highway robbery. 
qatl &hila : murder by treachery. 
Qisus : retaliation. 
ridda : apostasy from Islam. 
sakk : document containing the substance of the record of 
a case. 
sariqa : theft. 
Shähid (pl. shuhUd) : witness. 
Shari'a the law of Islam. 
shalb : dropping. 
shürä : consultation. 
shurb : intoxication. 
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siyäsa shar'iyya : legislative policy: the principle of 
legislation within the spirit of the 
Shari`a. 
sukr : intoxication. 
sulk : settlement. 
Sunna : the Tradition of the Prophet. 
Sunni : orthodox. 
ta'dib : chastisement. 
tadgTq : review. 
tat rIr : stating the case adequately. 
ta`llmät : instructions. 
tamyiz : review. 
Ta`z1r : crimes whose punishments are left to the discretion 
of the appropriate authority to determine. 
tazkiya al-`aläniya : an inquiry about the probity of a 
witness conducted publicly. 
tazkiya al-sirr : an inquiry about the probity of a witness 
conducted secretly. 
`ulamä' (sing. `älim) : the doctors of Islam. 
wäli al-amr : head of state. 
waqf : endowment. 
waqf al-da`wä : suspension of the case. 
wagiyya : bequest. 
zing : illegal sex relations. 
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